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SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN SUPPLY NETWORKS
I study how the structure of supply networks interacts with efforts to make supply chains more
socially responsible. One example concerns mineral mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
that funds armed conflicts. Nonprofits and legislative bodies pressure manufacturers to trace and
disclose their mineral sources. My first essay studies the decisions of manufacturers and smelters in
the mineral supply network. We show the equilibrium depends on the total demand of “compliance-
prone” manufacturers, who would comply if the prices of certified and noncertified metals were equal.
Our results imply once penalties make sufficiently many manufacturers compliance-prone, certified
metal may become so expensive that some compliance-prone manufacturers will not comply.
Five companies established a common fund for auditing the mineral smelters. Since the list
of smelters certified by the audits is public, companies have an incentive to free-ride. Despite
this incentive the fund was a success and received subsequent contributions from dozens of other
companies. My second essay studies why. We consider two factors: an early-stage alliance and
status-seeking behavior. We model the funding initiative as a public goods game and test the
results in laboratory experiments. Our experiments show that the invitation stage is key to high
contribution and status-seeking behavior affects the forming of an alliance.
My third essay studies a buyer auditing suppliers within a network to identify noncompliance.
If a supplier fails an audit, the buyer must rectify the supplier or drop it (along with dependent
suppliers). The network topology evolves as the buyer drops suppliers. We show the buyer should
first audit and drop some suppliers, then either rectify all remaining ones, or proceed directly to
production. When focusing on an upper tier, the buyer should always audit the least valuable
unaudited supplier, yielding greater balance in the network structure. We establish the condition
under which the buyer may truncate auditing (“hear no evil, see no evil”).
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1 Introduction
Supply chain management has traditionally focused on maximizing the profits of the various parties
within the supply chain. As supply chains extend vertically and horizontally into global supply net-
works new dimensions of problems arise, especially from suppliers operating in developing countries.
Environmental sustainability, social and economic development, and business ethics are increasingly
important for the firm. Incidents like the Dhaka garment factory fire in 2012, the Rana Plaza fac-
tory collapse in 2013, and the revelations of bonded labor in upstream suppliers in various countries
repeatedly remind global businesses and supply chain researchers that a modern company can sus-
tain its success only by incorporating into its objectives the triple bottom line of profit, people, and
planet (Lee and Tang 2017).
Consider one case in point: Decades-long civil conflicts have entangled the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, causing more than five million deaths from 1998 to 2007 alone. A primary source of
funding for the war groups is minerals mined in the country, in particular, tin, tungsten, tantalum,
and gold. These minerals are used by manufacturers around the globe, including many household
names, such as Apple, Intel, and Microsoft. By using the minerals without full knowledge of the
sources, the manufacturers may inadvertently funnel funds into the conflicts. Both NGOs and
legislative bodies have pressured manufacturers to trace the sources of the minerals they use and
avoid conflict sources (e.g., Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act). A key challenge for compliance
lies in a pinch point in the mineral supply network in the form of the smelters: numbering a few
hundred globally, the smelters process the ore extracted from mines into metal before manufacturing
use.
In Chapter 2 we study the equilibrium outcome arising from the mineral supply network, mod-
eled in three tiers: mines, smelters, and manufacturers. The smelters and manufacturers make
compliance and procurement decisions. A manufacturer faces a penalty when it chooses not to
be compliant. We characterize the equilibria and discuss their implications for the manufacturers
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and regulators. We show that the penalties on non-compliant manufacturers, while useful in the
beginning, are insufficient to eliminate the use of conflict sources. In practice, instead of indiscrim-
inately targeting all manufacturers who may use the minerals, the NGOs and the legislation focus
their efforts on particular subsets of manufacturers. We model the practice by allowing an NGO
to choose to toggle on the penalty for selected non-compliant manufacturers. Our model shows
that once a critical mass of manufacturers are compliant, it becomes more difficult for the NGO to
convert additional manufacturers.
Recognizing the compliance challenges, Apple, GE, HP, Intel, and Microsoft contributed funds
to launch the Initial Audit Fund under the Responsible Minerals Initiative, an industrial alliance
that audits and certifies mineral smelters to facilitate responsible sourcing. Under the Responsible
Minerals Initiative once a smelter passes an audit its certification is public: all companies have
equal access to the certified smelters regardless of contribution. Because of the public certification,
contributing to such a common fund has minimal direct benefit specific to the contributor. As such
companies have an incentive to free-ride. Despite this incentive the funding initiative succeeded:
dozens of other companies contributed subsequently to the Initial Audit Fund, which drove the
Conflict Minerals Initiative to become the largest and most central industry-led effort on conflict
minerals (Young 2015).
Inspired by the success of the Initial Audit Fund, in Chapter 3 we study how companies with a
shared social responsibility problem can successfully form an alliance to solve the problem together.
We propose two factors that explain the Initial Audit Fund’s success despite the incentive to free-
ride: the initial catalyst of an early-stage alliance and the status-seeking behavior of lower-status
companies. To capture the companies’ incentive to free-ride, we model the funding initiative as
a public goods game and incorporate the two factors: (1) an invitation stage where a subset of
companies can form an initiating alliance and contribute to the fund, and (2) the difference in the
status of each company in the form of the company’s brand value. A company may want to be
associated with other companies with well-known brands beyond any direct economic benefit. We
use the model to show how the combination of both factors leads to high contribution. We then
conduct laboratory experiments to test the effect of the two factors and how they interact. Our
experiments show that successfully forming an alliance significantly increases group contribution.
As our model predicts, status-seeking behavior affects whether and how an alliance is formed. In
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particular a low-status company significantly prefers to invite a high-status company to jointly
initiate an alliance than to invite a low-status company. Surprisingly, high-status companies not in
the initiating alliance also contribute after the invitation stage. We attribute this unexpected act to
the high-status companies’ stronger sense of moral responsibility. Both our theoretical model and
experimental results affirm that forming an initiating alliance is the key to the success of a shared
social responsibility project.
Apart from conflict minerals, social responsibility violations may arise in diverse domains. When
overlooked they may cause hefty economic and reputational damages to the buyer when uncovered
by the media, NGO, or regulator (e.g., Phillips 2016, Gant 2019). As the conflict minerals example
shows, many companies now take the initiative to audit their direct and indirect suppliers to assure
compliance. For example Apple audits its suppliers regularly and publishes the results in its annual
supplier responsibility progress report.
To understand such practice, Chapter 4 focuses on the dynamic decisions of auditing suppliers
within a supply network for social responsibility. We consider a buyer auditing a three-tier supply
network with general network configuration. While auditing all suppliers in the extended network
may be overly expensive and impractical, a buyer may judiciously audit some suppliers to lower
the expected penalty from violations. Beyond the results of audits, Apple also reports remedial
actions taken against the violations the audits uncover. A remedial action may consist of requiring
the supplier to undergo a rectification process (e.g., for debt-bonded labor: see Apple Inc. 2018b)
or dropping the supplier from Apple’s supply chains (e.g., for not meeting conflict-free sourcing
standards: see Apple Inc. 2018a). We incorporate the two remedial actions in our model: if a
supplier fails an audit, the buyer decides whether to rectify or to drop the supplier. If the buyer
drops a supplier, it also drops other suppliers in the network dependent on this supplier. With fewer
suppliers, the network becomes less competitive, raising the buyer’s input cost. Throughout the
process the buyer balances the cost of auditing, the cost of rectifying non-compliant suppliers, the
profit lost due to dropping suppliers along with their dependent firms, and the potential penalty
from violations at unaudited suppliers. The network topology evolves as the buyer conducts audits
and drops suppliers.
We build a two-phase model: an auditing phase followed by a production phase. We prove
the existence of a unique equilibrium arising from the competition in the production phase. The
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equilibrium determines the buyer’s production profit and the value of each supplier to the buyer,
aiding the buyer’s auditing decisions. For the auditing phase we characterize the buyer’s optimal
auditing policy in two subphases: in the first subphase the buyer audits and drops some suppliers;
in the second subphase the buyer either audits and rectifies all remaining suppliers, or passes up
any further audits and proceeds directly to production. Within the first (audit-and-drop) subphase,
when focusing on the upper tier, the buyer should always audit a least valuable unaudited supplier ;
this practice tends to yield greater balance in the structure of the network. We also establish the
condition under which the buyer may truncate auditing altogether, carrying unaudited suppliers to
production (“hear no evil, see no evil”). When the buyer audits more broadly, any supplier (not
necessarily the least valuable) may be chosen. In particular the buyer may audit a supplier in a
pivotal position to ascertain the viability of the network, informing subsequent decisions (a “litmus
test”).
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2 Curbing the Usage of Conflict Minerals: A Supply Network Perspective
Abstract. An important source of funds for the conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC) is the revenue from minerals mined in the DRC. Non-profits and
legislative bodies made efforts to require manufacturers that use “conflict minerals” to
learn and disclose their sources. In the mineral supply chain, the critical link between
mines and manufacturers is smelters. We study equilibrium sourcing decisions that arise
in such a network consisting of manufacturers and smelters. We find the equilibrium
depends on the total demand of “compliance-prone” manufacturers, who would choose to
be compliant if the prices of certified and noncertified metals were equal. We identify the
conditions for the existence of several types of equilibrium: an all-certified equilibrium
in which all smelters become certified; an equilibrium in which both metal types co-exist
with no shortage of certified metal; and an equilibrium in which both metal types co-exist
with a shortage of certified metal. In the event that an all-certified equilibrium is out of
reach, we identify how the usage of conflict minerals change as an NGO or a legislative
body targets additional manufacturers. An implication of our equilibrium results is
that imposing penalties on manufacturers goes only so far: If penalties induce enough
manufacturers to become compliance-prone, certified metal may become so expensive
that some compliance-prone manufacturers will not comply.
2.1 Introduction
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), located in the center of Africa, has suffered a string
of civil wars since it gained its independence in 1960. The revenue from minerals mined in the
DRC, in particular, tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold (often referred to as 3TG minerals), has
been an important source of funds for the parties involved in these armed conflicts, hence the term
“conflict minerals.” To address the humanitarian crisis in the DRC, several NGOs made efforts to
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draw public attention to the matter. Most notably, the Enough Project, which concerns itself with
human rights abuses in Africa, has been effective in publicizing the issue of conflict minerals. As a
consequence of continued pressure from NGOs such as the Enough Project, the U.S. Congress has
developed regulations aimed at curtailing mineral purchases from questionable sources in the DRC.
In particular, Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires all public companies to disclose: (i) if
they use any 3TG minerals in their production, (ii) if so, whether the countries of origin include the
DRC, and (iii) if so, the chain of custody for these minerals from mine to manufacturer. Effectively,
this legislation requires any public company that uses a 3TG mineral to establish its sources. A
similar legislation was passed by the European Union (Lewis 2016).
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which was tasked with implementing Sec-
tion 1502, issued a rule in 2012 for public companies to file conflict minerals reports annually.
However, by mid-2017, the enforcement of Section 1502 faltered amid legal challenges in the Court
of Appeals (Piwowar 2017). Thus, it is not clear what, if anything, a manufacturer must do to be
in compliance with the regulation. Nevertheless, from 2014 through 2016, when the SEC was still
enforcing the regulation, more than 1,000 companies filed disclosure forms with the SEC annually
(Alali and Wang 2018). Prior, in response to the Enough Project’s requests, many electronics man-
ufacturers had disclosed their auditing and tracing efforts, which the Enough Project published in
a 2012 ranking of manufacturers (Lezhnev and Hellmuth 2012).
As manufacturers made efforts to trace the sources of 3TG minerals, many observers have recog-
nized a particular feature of the mineral supply chain: Even though the supply chain has several
intermediaries as the mineral makes its way from the mine to the manufacturer, the most critical
echelon along the way consists of smelters, who convert the ore supplied by mines to the metals used
by manufacturers. This echelon is critical, because it is a “pinch point” of the supply chain: The
number of smelters is relatively low — on the order of hundreds — compared to myriad manufactur-
ers served by a multitude of mines (Schuh and Strohmer 2012). Hence, much of the tracing efforts
have focused on the sourcing practices of smelters, thus creating a set of certified smelters. For
example, the Responsible Minerals Initiative (formerly the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative) main-
tains a list of smelters who meet audit standards to document that they produce responsibly-sourced
materials.
Given this context, our study is informed by the assumption that manufacturers who disregard
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the NGO pressure and legislative action face penalties implicitly imposed by reputational risk, if not
explicitly imposed by legislation. Given the current ambiguity of what it means to be in compliance
with the legislation, in this paper we adopt the following working definition of compliance for
modeling and analysis purposes: We consider a manufacturer to be compliant if it transparently
traces its sources, and buys as much as possible from certified sources. If the quantity of supply
from certified sources is not sufficient to satisfy demand, a manufacturer can buy from uncertified
sources, and we still consider it to be compliant as long as it acknowledges the portion of its metal
coming from uncertified sources.
Our research goal is to study sourcing relationships that arise in a supply network with manu-
facturers and smelters, in the presence of penalties to the manufacturers who do not trace their
sources. Alongside manufacturers and smelters who intend to ensure compliance, there may remain
firms who choose not to do so. Therefore, one can claim that there exist two types of mineral —
certified mineral, which is known to be conflict-free, and noncertified mineral, which is not known
to be so — and the supply and demand for these two types of mineral are interdependent.
Our first research question is about the effect of penalties on the supply network. Specifically, if
one were able to levy increasingly high penalties on noncompliant manufacturers, would one even-
tually reach a supply chain that uses 100% certified metal? On the surface, if more manufacturers
want to buy certified metal, the price of certified metal should go up, thus enticing all smelters
to become certified. However, with all smelters becoming certified, the audited and conflict-free
mines might become over-utilized, thus driving up the cost for certified smelters. Hence, it is not
necessarily clear that all smelters will find it in their best interest to become certified.
Our second research question adopts the perspective of an NGO or a policy-maker. If an NGO
or policy-maker, whose goal is to achieve higher amounts of certified metal in the supply chain,
were to impose the penalty selectively on a subset of manufacturers, which subset of manufacturers
should it target? Both the manufacturer’s volume of metal purchase and what the manufacturer
stands to lose from bad publicity could play a role in this decision. The sourcing decisions of heavy
users have a bigger effect on the quantities traded in the supply network, but the behavior of those
vulnerable to bad publicity might be easier to change. We identify how an NGO or policy-maker
should factor in such manufacturer characteristics.
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2.2 Literature Review
A recent group of papers provide behavioral evidence that customers are willing to pay a premium
for socially responsible products (e.g., Bartling et al. 2015, Pigors and Rockenbach 2016, Kraft et al.
2018). In keeping with this evidence, a stream of research in the supply chain literature studies
interactions among manufacturers and their suppliers in the presence of a group of customers who
are willing to pay more for socially or environmentally responsible products (e.g., Guo et al. 2016,
Ha et al. 2018, Agrawal and Lee 2019, Kraft et al. 2019). A second stream of the supply chain
literature, however, avoids explicit models of competition for consumer segments that value social
responsibility, but assumes that there is a penalty for social responsibility violations. These papers
dwell in more detail on compliance decisions on the part of suppliers and auditing decisions on the
part of buyers (e.g., Aral et al. 2014, Plambeck and Taylor 2016, Chen and Lee 2016, Chen et al.
2018, Caro et al. 2018, Chen et al. 2019b). A third stream of research focuses more on decisions
about whether or not to disclose noncompliance (e.g., Chen and Slotnick 2015, Kim 2015, Kalkanci
and Plambeck 2019a,b).
Similar to the last two streams of research, we forego an explicit model of competition for socially
conscious customer segments — our model assumes that there is a penalty for social responsibility
violations instead — to cover compliance decisions on the part of suppliers and auditing decisions
on the part of buyers. We do not use as granular a model of compliance and auditing decisions as
in the second stream, or make a true distinction between auditing and disclosure decisions as in the
third stream. For example, we do not model compliance and auditing efforts that can take a range
of values. Instead, a supplier complies or not, and a buyer audits or not (and, if an audit is done,
its result is disclosed). Simplifying these aspects of the model allows us to adopt a network-wide
perspective of the supply chain, in which multiple buyers can source from multiple suppliers. This
network perspective is what distinguishes our paper from the aforementioned literature.
Closer to our multi-buyer, multi-supplier setting, some recent work considers compliance and
supplier selection in supply chains by allowing more than two tiers or multilateral auditing ar-
rangements. Huang et al. (2017) study a three-tier supply chain, with one firm in each tier. Each
firm may exert an effort to strengthen compliance at the most upstream tier. They illustrate the
unique challenges of inducing compliance in multi-tier supply chains. Fang and Cho (2019) study
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a hub-and-spoke network with one supplier and multiple buyers, who can form coalitions to either
jointly audit the supplier or audit independently yet share auditing results within the coalition.
Chen et al. (2019a) study the coordination of auditing activities by two buyers, who share one
supplier in addition to each having its exclusive supplier. Focusing on a single buyer’s multi-tier
supply network with fixed material flows, Feng et al. (2019) study whether the buyer should directly
implement environmental and social responsibility standards at upstream suppliers or delegate the
task to midtier suppliers. Zhang et al. (2019a) study a buyer’s auditing decisions in a two-tier net-
work that evolves as the buyer may drop suppliers that fail audits. In contrast to these papers, we
study a setting where the suppliers’ compliance decisions influence the sourcing decisions of multiple
buyers procuring from multiple suppliers. In thematically related work, motivated by the success
of the Responsible Minerals Initiative, Zhang et al. (2019b) develop a behavioral model of auditing
alliances and conduct laboratory experiments to study manufacturers’ incentives to participate.
Our work is methodologically related to research on models of supply networks. Corbett and
Karmarkar (2001) study a supply network with a general number of tiers and general numbers of
firms in each tier; firms in each tier play a Cournot quantity competition game in the downstream
market, facing input cost derived from the upstream markets. Subsequent work in this area includes
Adida and DeMiguel (2011) who study demand uncertainty, Belavina (2017) who examine the
desirableness of relational sourcing, Ang et al. (2017) who study sourcing decisions in a network
where a buyer’s tier-1 suppliers have overlapping and risky tier-2 suppliers, Bimpikis et al. (2019)
who study the optimal structures of supply networks facing disruptions, Bimpikis et al. (2018) who
analyze multi-sourcing and miscoordination in a supply network, and Korpeoglu et al. (2018) who
study the expansion and integration of supply networks.
Our equilibrium concept is a pure-strategy version of that presented in Schmeidler (1973), part
of a literature on large games (e.g., Aumann 1964, Mas-Colell 1984, Housman 1988). A relatively
recent stream of literature compares various large game equilibrium concepts and vindicates their
usage as approximations to finite games (Al-Najjar 2008, Carmona and Podczeck 2009, Yang 2011).
Recent operations-centric papers that apply large game models to competition settings include Yang
and Xia (2013) and Yang et al. (2014).
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2.3 Model
In our model of the supply network, mines supply ore to smelters, who in turn convert the ore
into metal, used by manufacturers. In the upstream echelon, we treat mines as two aggregated
pools, verified mines and unverified mines. Verified mines are those that have been confirmed to
be conflict-free. We label the remainder “unverified mines.” Some of these mines may very well
be conflict-free, but they have not been verified to be so. In the middle echelon, each smelter
decides whether to be certified: A certified smelter commits to purchasing only from the pool of
verified mines. A noncertified smelter, on the other hand, is free to buy from both pools of mines.
We refer to the metal produced by certified smelters as certified metal, which can be traced back
to its verified conflict-free sources, and the metal produced by noncertified smelters as noncertified
metal. In the downstream echelon, each manufacturer decides whether to be compliant: A compliant
manufacturer commits to purchasing certified metal — produced by certified smelters — as long as
there is sufficient supply of the certified metal. We model individual smelters and manufacturers as
infinitesimal players, whose profit-maximizing decisions collectively give rise to an equilibrium from
which no player has an incentive to deviate. We aim to explore the supply relationships that arise
in this equilibrium.
2.3.1 The Supply Network
In this subsection, we discuss entities in the supply network, and the material flows among these
entities.
Manufacturers. Let ℳ ⊆ R be the set of infinitesimal manufacturers with manufacturer 𝑖 char-
acterized by demand 𝐷𝑖 > 0, penalty for noncompliance 𝜌𝑖 > 0, and compliance cost 𝛾𝑖 > 0. We
assume the joint distribution of manufacturer parameters (𝐷𝑖, 𝛾𝑖, 𝜌𝑖) is continuous. Manufacturer 𝑖
incurs penalty 𝜌𝑖 when it chooses to be noncompliant, in which case the manufacturer is free to
buy from certified and noncertified smelters. As discussed in the Introduction, this penalty may be
imposed explicitly by the legislation or arise from reputational risk. On the other hand, manufac-
turer 𝑖 incurs compliance cost 𝛾𝑖 when it chooses to be compliant. The compliance cost captures
the manufacturer’s administrative costs for documenting the chain of custody.
We represent manufacturer 𝑖’s compliance decision by 𝜁𝑖 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁}, with 𝐶 representing compli-
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ance and 𝑁 representing noncompliance. Let 𝑟𝑖 be the proportion of demand 𝐷𝑖 that manufacturer 𝑖
orders from certified smelters. Note that for a compliant manufacturer 𝑖 we must have 𝑟𝑖 = 1. Given
the manufacturers’ compliance decisions, we use 𝑀CM ⊆ ℳ to denote the set of compliant manu-
facturers, and 𝑀NM ⊆ ℳ the set of noncompliant manufacturers.
Let 𝐷𝑇 =
∫︀
ℳ𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑖 be the total demand of all manufacturers in the supply network. The total
demand of all compliant manufacturers is denoted by 𝐷CM =
∫︀
𝑀CM
𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑖 and the total demand of all
noncompliant manufacturers is denoted by 𝐷NM =
∫︀
𝑀NM
𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑖. If manufacturer 𝑖 is noncompliant, it
may split its demand between certified and noncertified smelters. Consequently, the total demand for
certified metal includes all the demand from compliant manufacturers (𝐷CM) and some demand from
noncompliant manufacturers (specifically, a fraction 𝑟𝑖 of noncompliant manufacturer 𝑖’s demand),






𝑟𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑑𝑖. The total demand for noncertified metal is the




Smelters. Let 𝒮 ⊆ R be the set of smelters, with smelter 𝑗 characterized by capacity 𝐾𝑗 > 0 and
unit processing cost 𝑐𝑗 > 0. Assume the joint distribution of 𝑐𝑗 and 𝐾𝑗 is continuous. Denote the
total capacity of all smelters by 𝐾𝑇 =
∫︀
𝒮 𝐾𝑗𝑑𝑗.
Let 𝜎𝑗 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁} denote smelter 𝑗’s decision to be certified or not, with 𝐶 and 𝑁 representing
the smelter choosing to be certified or noncertified, respectively. If a smelter is noncertified, it is
free to split its purchases between verified mines and unverified mines. Let 𝑡𝑗 be the proportion of
ore smelter 𝑗 buys from the pool of verified mines. Note that 𝑡𝑗 = 1 for certified smelter 𝑗. Given
the certification decisions, let 𝑆𝐶 ⊆ 𝒮 denote the set of certified smelters, and 𝑆𝑁 ⊆ 𝒮 the set of
noncertified smelters. The total capacity of certified smelters is 𝐾𝐶 =
∫︀
𝑆𝐶
𝐾𝑗𝑑𝑗. The total capacity




Markets. We assume that the metal will be traded in two distinct but related markets, one for
certified metal, and another for noncertified metal. Even though the trade of 3TG minerals does
not always take place in centralized markets — for example, the trade of tantalum is often through
bilateral contracts — we use the term “market” to reflect the fact that the price of a metal type
(certified or noncertified) will depend on the total demand and supply for it. Hereafter, for ease
of reference, we use 𝐶 and 𝑁 as shorthands for certified and noncertified metal types, respectively.
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Notice that in our model, there is a one-to-one correspondence between metal type 𝑠 and smelter
type 𝑠, 𝑠 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁}, in that certified metal is produced by certified smelters, and noncertified metal
by noncertified smelters.
There can be a variety of different equilibrium outcomes, depending on how the total capacity
of all smelters, 𝐾𝑇 , compares to the total demand of all manufacturers, 𝐷𝑇 . We focus on the case
where the total capacity is equal to the total demand, that is, we assume a balanced market. The
balanced market assumption is not only analytically convenient, but it is also a more reasonable
approximation of markets where excess capacity, while it may exist, is not too large. As for the
unit price functions of certified and noncertified metal, 𝑝𝑠(𝐷𝑠,𝐾𝑠) for 𝑠 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁}, for analytical
convenience, we assume that the unit price functions are symmetric, and linear in capacity and
demand. These assumptions are summarized below.
Assumption 2.1. We focus on a balanced market with linear and symmetric unit price functions:
(a) The total smelting capacity is equal to the total demand for the metal, that is, 𝐾𝑇 = 𝐷𝑇 .
(b) The unit price of metal type 𝑠 is linearly increasing in the demand for metal type 𝑠 and linearly
decreasing in the smelting capacity of metal type 𝑠, that is, 𝑝𝑠(𝐷𝑠,𝐾𝑠) = 𝑎𝐷𝑠−𝑏𝐾𝑠+𝑝0, 𝑠 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁},
where 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑝0 > 0 are constants, except in the boundary case 𝐾𝑠 = 𝐷𝑠 = 0, where we let 𝑝𝑠(0, 0) = 0.
The unit prices for certified and noncertified metal are inter-dependent under Assumption 2.1.
The larger the demand (or capacity) for one metal type is, the lower the demand (or capacity) for
the other one, so the prices of the two metal types are linked. In the boundary case 𝐾𝑠 = 𝐷𝑠 = 0,
that is, when there is no demand or supply for metal type 𝑠, we let the price 𝑝𝑠(0, 0) = 0. In
this boundary, setting the price to zero captures the fact that any infinitesimal smelter choosing to
produce metal type 𝑠 does not have any customer for it. Likewise, for any infinitesimal manufacturer
who chooses to demand metal type 𝑠, the price is moot as there is no supply. In this boundary
condition, if a subset of manufacturers demanded metal type 𝑠 to create non-zero demand for it,
then we would have a shortage for metal type 𝑠, as we discuss next.
In our model, we allow the possibility that there will be a shortage for one of the two metal types,
that is, we allow the demand for a metal type to exceed its capacity. If there is a shortage for metal
type 𝑠, we assume that the excess demand will be met by the capacity of the other metal type,
which we denote by −𝑠. (Given our assumption of a balanced market, there cannot be simultaneous
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shortages of both metal types.) When there is a shortage for a metal type, we assume that the
metal type in shortage will be more expensive than the metal type in surplus. Furthermore, we
assume that each manufacturer receives an allocation proportional to its demand for the metal type
in shortage. These assumptions are summarized below:
Assumption 2.2. For 𝑠 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁}, if 𝐷𝑠 > 𝐾𝑠, then:
(a) 𝑝𝑠(𝐷𝑠,𝐾𝑠) > 𝑝−𝑠(𝐷−𝑠,𝐾−𝑠).
(b) Any manufacturer who has a non-zero demand for metal type 𝑠 receives a fraction 𝐾𝑠𝐷𝑠 of its
demand for metal type 𝑠, and the rest of its demand for metal type 𝑠 must be met with metal type −𝑠
instead.
We remark on three consequences of Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2.
Remark 2.1. The coefficients 𝑎 and 𝑏 in the price functions must be equal (see Lemma 2.1 in
Appendix 2.A). Therefore, the price of metal type 𝑠 changes linearly in the difference between its
demand and capacity.
Remark 2.2. Given the market is balanced, both certified smelters and noncertified smelters will
use up their entire capacity. Therefore, letting 𝑄𝑠, 𝑠 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁}, denote the quantity traded of each
metal type, we must have 𝑄𝑠 = 𝐾𝑠 for 𝑠 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁}.
Remark 2.3. If the demand for certified metal exceeds the capacity of it, then every compliant
manufacturer will receive only a portion of its demand for certified metal, and the rest of its demand
will have to be met using noncertified metal. Consequently, we allow a manufacturer to claim
compliance even if it buys some noncertified metal due to shortages in the certified metal market.
As discussed in the Introduction, this is the working definition of compliance we adopt in this paper,
given the ambiguity surrounding the legislation. This conceptualization of compliance is in keeping
with what the regulators and NGOs initially expected. For example, when publishing its company
rankings in 2012, the Enough Project did not require a manufacturer to achieve 100% conflict-free
sourcing for the manufacturer to earn its “green designation.” Instead, the NGO awarded green
designation for a sufficient degree of tracing and reporting (Lezhnev and Hellmuth 2012). Likewise,
for a two-year period at the outset, the SEC rule allowed manufacturers to report “DRC Conflict
Undeterminable” status, which amounts to the firm claiming that it has not been able to trace its
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sources back to the mines after exerting due diligence (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
2017)
An important driver of equilibrium results will be the total demand of compliance-prone man-
ufacturers, which we define to be those manufacturers whose penalty 𝜌𝑖 exceeds their compliance
cost 𝛾𝑖. These manufacturers are compliance-prone in the sense that if the prices of certified and
noncertified metals were the same, they would prefer to become compliant and buy certified metal
to avoid the penalty cost. Of course, whether or not these manufacturers end up complying in
equilibrium will depend on the relative prices of certified and noncertified metals in equilibrium.
We let ̂︀𝐷 denote the total demand of compliance-prone manufacturers. We refer to this quantity as
compliance-prone demand, and it is given by ̂︀𝐷 := ∫︀ℳ𝐷𝑖1{𝜌𝑖>𝛾𝑖} d𝑖.
Mines. We model mines in two aggregated pools, verified and unverified. As we explain below,
even though we do not explicitly model the mines as strategic players, our model takes into account
how the sourcing decisions made by smelters and manufacturers might affect the available capacity
of the mines and their extraction costs.
The demand for ore from verified mines (verified ore, for short) originates from two sources. First,
all certified metal traded in the market, 𝑄𝐶 , must come from verified ore. Second, any noncertified
smelter 𝑗 purchases a portion 𝑡𝑗 of its ore from verified mines. Therefore, noncertified smelter 𝑗
with capacity 𝐾𝑗 will direct a demand of 𝑡𝑗𝐾𝑗 toward the verified mines. Consequently, the total
demand for verified ore, denoted by 𝑄𝑉 is as follows










We do not impose an explicit capacity constraint on how much ore can be extracted from each
pool of mines, so the demands for verified and unverified ores, 𝑄𝑉 and 𝑄𝑈 , are met in full by the
corresponding pools.
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We next discuss the effects of smelters’ and manufacturers’ sourcing decisions on the mines in
our model. One may speculate that the smelters’ and manufacturers’ sourcing decisions have two
opposite effects on the price of ore paid by smelters to mines. First, what we will refer to as the
depletion effect : The unit price of verified ore increases in the quantity extracted from the verified
pool of mines (similarly for the pool of unverified mines). Second, what we will refer to as the
competition effect : If the total demand of compliant manufacturers is larger (and, consequently, the
demand of noncompliant manufacturers is smaller), then more mines would become verified. Hence,
one would expect that the pool of verified mines would grow (and the pool of unverified mines would
shrink), thus creating more competition among verified mines and driving down the price of verified
ore (and less competition among unverified mines, driving up the price of unverified ore).
To capture the depletion effect, we assume that the unit price of ore coming from a particular
pool will increase as one extracts more from that pool. To capture the competition effect, we assume
that the higher the total demand of compliant manufacturers, the lower the price of verified ore
will be, everything else being equal (and, similarly, the larger the total demand of noncompliant
manufacturers, the lower the price of unverified ore). To summarize, using 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM) and
𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM) to denote the unit prices of verified ore and unverified ore, respectively, we assume:
Assumption 2.3. 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM) is continuous, strictly increasing in 𝑄𝑉 , and decreasing in 𝐷CM;
𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM) is continuous, strictly increasing in 𝑄𝑈 , and decreasing in 𝐷NM.
We expect that it is more plausible that the depletion effect is stronger than the competition
effect in the case of a natural resource. Therefore, to capture the case where the depletion effect
dominates the competition effect, we make the assumption below:
Assumption 2.4. There exists 𝑄 ∈ [0, 𝐷𝑇 ] such that 𝑜𝑉 (𝑥, 𝑥) < 𝑜𝑈 (𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥,𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥) when 𝑥 < 𝑄
and 𝑜𝑉 (𝑥, 𝑥) > 𝑜𝑈 (𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥,𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥) when 𝑥 > 𝑄.
To explain why the depletion effect dominates the competition effect under this assumption, sup-
pose that we had a clear separation of markets so that all the metal used by compliant manufacturers
came from the verified pool of mines (say, quantity 𝑥), and all the metal used by noncompliant man-
ufacturers came from the unverified pool (which would amount to a quantity 𝐷𝑇 −𝑥) — such a clear
separation does not have to arise in equilibrium, but the assumption is best understood through
such a scenario. Then the unit cost of verified ore would be 𝑜𝑉 (𝑥, 𝑥) and the unit cost of unverified
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ore would be 𝑜𝑈 (𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥,𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥). As 𝑥 increases, the verified ore’s cost is driven further down by
the competition effect, but driven further up by the depletion effect. According to the assumption,
the verified ore is more expensive at large values of 𝑥. Therefore, as the verified pool of mines supply
more ore, it must be that the depletion effect dominates the competition effect.
2.3.2 The Equilibrium Concept
In this subsection we discuss the problems solved by individual smelters and manufacturers, and
how they come together in an equilibrium.
The Smelter’s Problem. A smelter incurs a unit processing cost in addition to the price of ore
it pays to the mines and accrues revenue from the metal it sells to manufacturers. Each smelter’s
goal is to maximize its profit. Let 𝜋𝑐𝑠(𝑗) and 𝜋𝑛𝑠(𝑗) be the profits of smelter 𝑗 if it decides to
be certified or noncertified, respectively. If smelter 𝑗 chooses to be certified, then its profit is the
smelter’s margin multiplied by its capacity, where the margin is the price of certified metal net of
the price of verified ore and the smelter’s processing cost:
𝜋𝑐𝑠(𝑗) = (𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶)− 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷𝐶𝑀 )− 𝑐𝑗)𝐾𝑗 . (2.3)
On the other hand, if smelter 𝑗 chooses to be noncertified, then it chooses 𝑡𝑗 ∈ [0, 1], the fraction
of ore it buys from the verified mines. Hence, the margin of a noncertified smelter is the price of




{[𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 )− (𝑡𝑗𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷𝐶𝑀 ) + (1− 𝑡𝑗)𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷𝑁𝑀 ))− 𝑐𝑗 ]𝐾𝑗} . (2.4)
Smelter 𝑗 must decide to be certified or not:
max{𝜋𝑐𝑠(𝑗), 𝜋𝑛𝑠(𝑗)}. (2.5)
The Manufacturer’s Problem. In addition to paying for the metal bought from the smelters,
a manufacturer incurs a compliance cost if it is compliant, and a penalty cost if it is noncompliant.
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Each manufacturer’s goal is to minimize its total cost. Let 𝜈𝑐𝑚(𝑖) and 𝜈𝑛𝑚(𝑖) be the costs of
manufacturer 𝑖 if it decides to be compliant or noncompliant, respectively. If manufacturer 𝑖 chooses
to be compliant, then its cost is











𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖, for 𝐷𝐶 > 0. (2.6)
The first term is what the manufacturer pays for certified metal; in keeping with our assumptions,
compliant manufacturer 𝑖 will meet as much of its demand 𝐷𝑖 as possible using certified metal.
However, if there is a shortage of certified metal, that is, 𝐷𝐶 > 𝐾𝐶 , the supply of certified metal
is rationed in proportion to the manufacturer’s demand for certified metal. Consequently, in the
event of shortage, compliant manufacturer 𝑖 uses noncertified metal to meet the shortfall, that is,(︁
1− 𝐾𝐶𝐷𝐶
)︁+
𝐷𝑖, which gives the second term in the cost function above. The third term is the
exogenously fixed compliance cost for manufacturer 𝑖.












for 𝐷𝑠 > 0. (2.7)
For each unit of metal type 𝑠 a manufacturer demands, what the manufacturer pays is either the
unit price of that metal type (if there is no shortage of it), or a weighted average of the prices
of both metal types (if there is a shortage of metal type 𝑠, thus requiring the manufacturer to
meet the shortfall using the other metal type).1 With this notation in place, the cost of compliant
manufacturer 𝑖 is simply
𝜈𝑐𝑚(𝑖) = 𝑝
𝑒
𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶)𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖. (2.8)
Recall that noncompliant manufacturer 𝑖 must choose 𝑟𝑖 ∈ [0, 1], the proportion of its demand
ordered from certified smelters. A noncompliant manufacturer’s cost consists of what it pays for
certified and noncertified metals and the penalty for noncompliance. Leveraging the definition in
1For the boundary case where there is no demand for metal type 𝑠, that is, 𝐷𝑠 = 0, we define: (i) If
there is no capacity for metal type 𝑠, that is, 𝐾𝑠 = 0, then 𝑝𝑒𝑠(𝐷𝑠,𝐾𝑠) := 𝑝−𝑠(𝐷𝑇 ,𝐾𝑇 ) (a manufacturer
demanding metal type 𝑠 will pay the price of the other metal type, which is the only option available).
(ii) If there is positive capacity for metal type 𝑠, that is, 𝐾𝑠 > 0, then 𝑝𝑒𝑠(𝐷𝑠,𝐾𝑠) := 𝑝𝑠(0,𝐾𝑠) (this is
the price a manufacturer has to pay for the next infinitesimal unit of metal type 𝑠 it demands).
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(2.7), one can write noncompliant manufacturer 𝑖’s cost 𝜈𝑛𝑚(𝑖) as
𝜈𝑛𝑚(𝑖) = min
𝑟𝑖∈[0,1]
{𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶)𝑟𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝑝𝑒𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 )(1− 𝑟𝑖)𝐷𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖} . (2.9)
It is worth remarking upon the boundary case in which there is no capacity for one type of metal,
that is, 𝐾𝑠 = 0 for 𝑠 = 𝐶 or 𝑠 = 𝑁 . In that case, the effective prices defined in (2.7) are the
same, that is, 𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 𝑝
𝑒
𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ), and a noncompliant manufacturer will be indifferent
between the two metal types. As stated below, we make the natural assumption to break the tie:
The noncompliant manufacturer will order the metal type in existence.
Assumption 2.5. When 𝐾𝑠 = 0 for 𝑠 = 𝐶 or 𝑠 = 𝑁 , a noncompliant manufacturer orders only
metal type −𝑠.
Manufacturer 𝑖 must decide to comply or not:
min{𝜈𝑐𝑚(𝑖), 𝜈𝑛𝑚(𝑖)}. (2.10)
Equilibrium. Collectively, the manufacturers’ and smelters’ decisions determine the subset of
manufacturers who are compliant, the subset of smelters who are certified, and for every manu-
facturer and smelter, how they allocate their purchases among sources in their respective upper
echelons. Let 𝐴 = {(𝐶, 1)}∪ ({𝑁}× [0, 1]) be the set of (pure) strategies available to each manufac-
turer or smelter. If manufacturer 𝑖 plays strategy (𝜁𝑖, 𝑟𝑖) ∈ 𝐴, then it is compliant if 𝜁𝑖 = 𝐶, in which
case it demands 𝐷𝑖 from certified smelters, and noncompliant if 𝜁𝑖 = 𝑁 , in which case it demands
a fraction 𝑟𝑖 of 𝐷𝑖 from certified smelters. Likewise, if smelter 𝑗 plays strategy (𝜎𝑗 , 𝑡𝑗) ∈ 𝐴, then it
is certified if 𝜎𝑗 = 𝐶, in which case it procures all of its ore from the verified pool, and noncertified
if 𝜎𝑗 = 𝑁 , in which case it procures fraction 𝑡𝑗 of its ore from the verified pool. A strategy profile
is mapping 𝜑 : ℳ⊔𝒮 → 𝐴.
As for the timing of events, we assume manufacturers and smelters make all their decisions
simultaneously. Once all decisions are made, the market prices for certified metal and noncertified
metal are observed, and the transactions occur and payoffs are collected.
An equilibrium is a strategy profile 𝜑 that simultaneously solves all the smelters’ and manufac-
turers’ problems.
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2.4 Sourcing Decisions in Equilibrium
Noncompliant manufacturers are free to buy any mixture of certified and noncertified metal, but
compliant manufacturers must first seek certified metal. In that sense, certified metal is a perfectly
valid substitute for noncertified metal, but the opposite is not true. Hence, in practice, one would
expect that if one type of metal is in shortage, it would be the certified metal. As we establish in
this section, our model exhibits this intuitively appealing and practically valid property. Therefore,
in our model, there can arise two types of equilibrium: with or without a shortage of the certified
metal. Before we discuss the prices and sourcing relationships that would arise under these two
types of equilibrium, we first dispense with two special cases.
It can be shown that there exists an equilibrium in which no smelter is certified and no manu-
facturer demands certified metal (i.e., 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 = 0) if and only if there is no compliance-prone
manufacturer (i.e., ̂︀𝐷 = 0). In the current landscape, where the manufacturers are concerned about
implicit or explicit penalties for buying conflict minerals, we no longer expect to encounter such a
zero-certification equilibrium, because it cannot be sustained even if just a small subset of manufac-
turers are compliance-prone — there would arise a subset of certified smelters to satisfy the demand
of these manufacturers.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, one can also identify the conditions under which the entire
market turns to certified metal. This type of equilibrium is described in the next proposition. The
proof of the proposition, along with all the other proofs, is included in the Appendices.
Proposition 2.1. If and only if the condition 𝑝0 > 𝑜𝑉 (𝐷𝑇 , ̂︀𝐷) − 𝑜𝑈 (0, 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷) is satisfied, then
there exists an “all-certified” equilibrium with the following properties:
(a) All smelters are certified (i.e., 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐾𝑇 );
(b) All compliance-prone manufacturers are compliant;
(c) All other manufacturers remain noncompliant (i.e., 𝐷CM = ̂︀𝐷); and
(d) All manufacturers, compliant and noncompliant, demand only certified metal (𝐷𝐶 = 𝐷𝑇 ).
Note that, in the equilibrium described above, all smelters are certified, so all smelters buy
from the pool of verified mines. Thus, the demand for verified ore, 𝑄𝑉 , is given by the total
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demand 𝐷𝑇 , while there is no demand for unverified ore, that is, 𝑄𝑈 = 0. Such lopsided ore
demands drive up the price of verified ore and drive down the price of unverified ore. The condition
𝑝0 > 𝑜𝑉 (𝐷𝑇 , ̂︀𝐷) − 𝑜𝑈 (0, 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷) guarantees that, even with such ore prices, no smelter has any
incentive to become noncertified. It seems that this type of equilibrium has already been achieved
for tantalum. According to the Responsible Mineral Initiative, which maintains a list of performance
indicators, 40 out of 41 eligible tantalum smelters are in conformant status at the time of writing
(with the remaining supplier in ‘active’ status, meaning that it is scheduled for an assessment). This
is not the case for tin, tungsten, or gold. Interestingly, in the case of cobalt, which was not one of
the initially targeted 3TG minerals, but has since become the next front in conflict minerals, only 7
out of 31 eligible smelters are reported to be conformant or active (Responsible Minerals Initiative
2019b). Thus, we next turn to other equilibria, in which certified and noncertified metal coexist.
The following theorem shows that, depending on the size of compliance-prone demand, there can
be two types of equilibrium, distinguished by whether the certified metal is in shortage or not.
Theorem 2.1. If the compliance-prone demand, ̂︀𝐷, is less than or equal to the threshold 𝑄, then
there is no shortage of certified metal in equilibrium. Otherwise, there will be a shortage of certified
metal in equilibrium (except when the entire market is certified as in Proposition 2.1).
Recall that 𝑄 is the threshold at which the price of verified ore overtakes the price of unverified
ore. Setting aside the special case of a fully certified market discussed above, the theorem indicates
that if the compliance-prone demand is less than 𝑄, then there will be sufficient certified capacity to
meet the eventual demand for certified metal. Otherwise, there will be a shortage of certified metal.
In the remainder of the section, we characterize the properties of these two types of equilibrium.
The Equilibrium Without Shortage. We first consider the case when compliance-prone de-
mand is less than the threshold, that is, ̂︀𝐷 6 𝑄, in which case there is no shortage of certified metal.
To explain the forces at play, imagine the firms in the supply network formed two completely de-
tached channels, one for certified metal and the other for noncertified metal. In this hypothetical
scenario, suppose that all compliance-prone manufacturers are compliant and buy from certified
smelters, who then buy from the verified pool; all remaining manufacturers are noncompliant and
buy only from noncertified smelters, who then buy from the unverified pool.
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(i) Consider the manufacturers’ incentives in this scenario with detached markets. For each
metal type, the capacity is equal to demand, which leads to the same price for both metal types
(as a consequence of Remark 2.1). With the two metal prices being the same, compliance-prone
manufacturers would indeed remain compliant and buy certified metal; all others would remain
noncompliant.
(ii) Consider now the smelters’ incentives in this scenario. A total demand of ̂︀𝐷 6 𝑄 is flowing
through the certified channel to the verified pool. Given that the quantity demanded from the
verified pool is less than 𝑄, the verified ore would be cheaper than the unverified ore. That being
the case, the noncertified smelters would no longer be content buying only from the unverified pool.
Instead, some noncertified smelters, who may buy from whichever pool is cheaper, would shift their
purchases to the verified pool; they would do so until the prices of the two ores became equal.
Therefore, starting with the hypothetical scenario of two detached markets, the network would
settle in an equilibrium, in which the prices of the two metal types are the same, and the prices
of the two ore types are the same, with some noncertified smelters buying verified ore. In this
equilibrium, all compliance-prone manufacturers would be compliant and all other manufacturers
would remain noncompliant and buy only noncertified metal. The ongoing discussion is formalized
in the next theorem:
Theorem 2.2. Suppose the total demand of compliance-prone manufacturers is less than the thresh-
old, that is, ̂︀𝐷 ∈ (0, 𝑄]. There exists an equilibrium where
(a) All compliance-prone manufacturers are compliant; all other manufacturers remain noncom-
pliant, and buy only noncertified metal, that is, 𝐷CM = ̂︀𝐷 = 𝐷𝐶 ;
(b) The total certified demand and total certified capacity both equal ̂︀𝐷, that is, 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐾𝐶 = ̂︀𝐷;
(c) The prices of certified and noncertified metal are the same (i.e, 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 )).
Furthermore, the supply network would be able to sustain other versions of the above no-shortage
equilibrium, in which the total demand for certified metal increases beyond ̂︀𝐷. The basic intuition
behind this statement is that, since the prices of the two metal types are the same in the no-shortage
equilibrium, a subset of noncompliant manufacturers would be willing to shift their purchases to
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certified metal. In fact, as the following corollary states, given any quantity 𝑄 between ̂︀𝐷 and ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷)
(which is a threshold below 𝑄), there exists an equilibrium in which the demand for the certified
metal is 𝑄.
Corollary 2.1. Suppose the total demand of compliance-prone manufacturers is less than the thresh-
old 𝑄, that is, ̂︀𝐷 ∈ (0, 𝑄]. There exists another threshold ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷) ∈ ( ̂︀𝐷,𝑄] such that, for any strictly
positive quantity 𝑄 ∈ [ ̂︀𝐷, ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷)], there exists an equilibrium where
(a) All compliance-prone manufacturers are compliant; all other manufacturers remain noncom-
pliant, but they demand some certified metal, that is, 𝐷CM = ̂︀𝐷 6 𝐷𝐶 ;
(b) The total certified demand and total certified capacity both equal 𝑄, that is, 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐾𝐶 = 𝑄;
(c) The prices of certified and noncertified metal are the same (i.e., 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 )).
An important implication is that one can obtain more-than-commensurate benefits from having
a subset of compliance-prone manufacturers. Once a group of manufacturers become compliance-
prone, they will create a market for certified metal, which will be utilized by noncompliant man-
ufacturers as well. In equilibrium, the quantity of certified metal that exchanges hands is capped
by a threshold ( ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷)), which is no less than the compliance-prone demand ( ̂︀𝐷). Therefore, policy-
makers and NGOs, by focusing their efforts on a subset of manufacturers, may be able to get the
ball rolling in the creation of a market for certified metal. In fact, this is in keeping with the cur-
rent state of affairs. The efforts of NGOs such as the Enough Project led a group of well-known
electronics manufacturers to take the initiative in sourcing “conflict-free” metal, which led to the
emergence of certified smelters. Now that there are such certified smelters, they could very well be
utilized even by manufacturers who have no incentive to be compliant (e.g., manufacturers that are
not subject to the Dodd-Frank Act or that have not been on the radar of the Enough Project).
The Equilibrium with Shortage. Consider now the case where the compliance-prone demand,̂︀𝐷, exceeds the threshold 𝑄. In this case, according to Theorem 2.1, there will be a shortage
of certified metal. Once again, to explain the first-order effect that leads to a shortage, imagine
the firms started in two completely detached channels, one for certified metal and the other for
noncertified metal. In this hypothetical scenario, all compliance-prone manufacturers are compliant
22
and buy from certified smelters, who then buy from the verified pool; all remaining manufacturers
are noncompliant and buy only from noncertified smelters, who then buy from the unverified pool.
Note that, in such a hypothetical scenario, there is no shortage of certified metal. However, in such
a scenario, a total quantity of ̂︀𝐷, which now exceeds 𝑄, would be flowing through the certified
channel to the verified pool. Thus, the verified ore would now be more expensive. Consequently,
some certified smelters would prefer to give up their certified designation, so that they can shift
their purchases to the unverified pool. This would create a shortage of certified metal, which would
lead to a higher price, thus inducing some compliance-prone manufacturers to choose noncompliance
(specifically, those for whom the noncompliance penalty is not too far above the compliance cost);
others with sufficiently high penalty will continue to ensure compliance.
In conclusion, starting with the hypothetical scenario of two detached channels, the network
would settle in an equilibrium, in which only a subset of compliance-prone manufacturers choose to
comply, and even those who comply will not find sufficient certified metal to meet all their demand.
This observation is formalized in the next theorem, which describes the properties of equilibria with
a shortage of certified metal.
Theorem 2.3. If the total demand of compliance-prone manufacturers, ̂︀𝐷, is higher than the thresh-
old 𝑄, then there exists an equilibrium with a shortage of certified metal. In any equilibrium with
shortage,
(a) The price of certified metal is higher than that of noncertified metal, that is, 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) >
𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 );
(b) The total certified demand exceeds the threshold 𝑄, but does not exceed the compliance-prone
demand, that is, 𝐷𝐶 ∈ (𝑄, ̂︀𝐷];
(c) The total certified capacity exceeds the threshold 𝑄, but is less than the total certified demand,
that is, 𝐾𝐶 ∈ (𝑄,𝐷𝐶); and
(d) Some compliance-prone manufacturers are compliant; all other manufacturers, possibly in-
cluding some compliance-prone manufacturers, remain noncompliant, and they demand only non-









(a) Manufacturer decisions when there is no








(b) Manufacturer decisions when there is a short-
age of certified metal (when ̂︀𝐷 > 𝑄)
Figure 2.1: Manufacturers’ compliance and sourcing decisions
Figure 2.1 provides a summary comparison of compliance decisions in Theorems 2.2 and 2.3.2
Recall that a manufacturer is compliance-prone if its compliance cost, 𝛾𝑖, is less than its penalty
cost, 𝜌𝑖. Panel (𝑎) is the case with no shortage of certified metal (Theorem 2.2 and Corollary 2.1);
all compliance-prone manufacturers choose to be compliant and all other manufacturers choose to
remain noncompliant, but they still buy some certified metal. In contrast, Panel (𝑏) is the case with
a shortage of certified metal (Theorem 2.3); here some compliance-prone manufacturers choose to
be noncompliant. As the figure shows, these are the manufacturers whose penalty cost, while larger
than the compliance cost, is not steep enough to justify the purchase of certified metal, which is
more expensive because of the shortage.
Figure 2.2 puts together Theorem 2.2, Corollary 2.1 and Theorem 2.3 to show the quantity of
certified metal traded in equilibrium, 𝑄𝐶 , as a function of compliance-prone demand, ̂︀𝐷. In the
region where the compliance-prone demand ̂︀𝐷 is below the threshold 𝑄 (Theorem 2.2), any quantity
between ̂︀𝐷 and ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷) (shown as the shaded area) can be supported as the quantity of certified metal
𝑄𝐶 in equilibrium. Therefore, in this region, the supply network uses certified metal in quantities
that exceed the compliance-prone demand. In contrast, once the compliance-prone demand exceeds
the threshold (Theorem 2.3), the certified metal is in shortage and the quantity of certified metal in
2For clarity of illustration, we assume for this figure that all manufacturers have the same demand, that is,










Figure 2.2: How the equilibrium 𝑄𝐶 changes as a function of the compliance-prone demand, ̂︀𝐷
the network falls below the compliance-prone demand. We make the following observation from the
figure: Suppose that the compliance-prone demand, ̂︀𝐷, is less than the threshold 𝑄, putting us in
the region where there is no shortage of certified metal. If the compliance-prone demand increased
by an amount 𝛿 so that it is now higher than the threshold 𝑄, putting us in the region where there
is a shortage of certified metal, the increase in the quantity of certified metal traded will be strictly
less than 𝛿.
The preceding observation has an important policy implication. Policy-makers or NGOs might
have enough leverage to increase noncompliance penalties to manufacturers, and they could use
this leverage to make more manufacturers compliance-prone. However, the above arguments imply
that there may be a limit to the usefulness of such efforts. Starting with a status quo in which
a small enough portion of the total demand is coming from compliance-prone manufacturers, if
one levies additional penalties so that the compliance-prone demand becomes larger, there will be
an incommensurate increase in the amount of certified metal traded as there will not be enough
smelters to meet all the new demand for certified metal.
2.5 Whom to Target for Penalty?
NGOs such as the Enough Project, in their efforts to publicize the issue of conflict minerals, have
targeted a particular subset of manufacturers using 3TG minerals. Specifically, the Enough Project
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focused its initial efforts on electronics manufacturers with wide brand recognition (e.g., Intel,
Apple, Microsoft, Nintendo). These are certainly not the only, or even the largest, users of all 3TG
minerals. For example, tungsten is used in large quantities by industrial tool manufacturers, who
are not household names (Vital Metals 2016, International Tungsten Industry Association 2016).
In short, by focusing their publicity efforts on a subset of manufacturers, NGOs and policy makers
are ultimately choosing whom to target for penalties associated with bad publicity. When making
such choices, one can speculate that there are two dimensions to consider. First, the better known a
manufacturer’s brand, the more vulnerable it is to bad publicity, so it might be easier to change the
behavior of manufacturers with well-known brands. Second, the higher a manufacturer’s demand
for these minerals, the more impact one can have by changing the manufacturer’s behavior. In this
section, we adopt the perspective of an NGO who wishes to improve the amount of verified ore and
certified metal in the supply chain, and we analyze which manufacturers the NGO should target.
In modeling this decision, we assume that each manufacturer has an exogenously fixed penalty
𝜌𝑖, but the penalty is active only if the NGO “toggles” it on by targeting that manufacturer. The
assumption that the NGO can choose to turn on the penalty, but not the size of the penalty, is a
reflection of the penalty being tied to the manufacturers’ characteristics such as brand recognition
(cell phone makers are more exposed than industrial tool makers), revenues (the manufacturers with
high revenues have more to lose), and reputation (a manufacturer is more vulnerable if its brands
appeal to consumers with higher awareness of issues).
Let 𝜏𝑖 be a binary variable that equals 0 when the penalty for manufacturer 𝑖 is off, and 1 when
on. We then replace 𝜌𝑖 in the noncompliant manufacturer’s cost, given by (2.9), with 𝜌𝑖𝜏𝑖. As in
Section 2.4, we refer to a manufacturer as compliance-prone if its exogenous penalty 𝜌𝑖 is greater
than its compliance cost, 𝛾𝑖. However, we now note that this penalty matters only when it is on, that
is, when 𝜏𝑖 = 1. We redefine ̂︀𝐷 := ∫︀ℳ𝐷𝑖1{𝜌𝑖𝜏𝑖>𝛾𝑖} d𝑖, so that it is the total demand of compliance-
prone manufacturers whose penalties are on. Note that, unlike the original definition of ̂︀𝐷, the
revised definition is no longer simply the total demand of all compliance-prone manufacturers, but
the total demand of only those compliance-prone manufacturers that are “targeted.”
Let 𝑇 and 𝑇 ′ be the sets of manufacturers whose penalties are on and off, respectively, and
assume these sets are exogenously given in the status quo. Given the equilibrium in the status quo,
let 𝑉 ⊆ 𝑇 ′ be the set of manufacturers such that turning on the penalty of any manufacturer 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉
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will induce that manufacturer to become compliant. These manufacturers are “vulnerable” to being
targeted by the NGO in the sense that they will be compliant if the NGO decides to turn on their
penalties. The next theorem characterizes the set 𝑉 :
Theorem 2.4. Given the sets of manufacturers whose penalties are currently on (𝑇 ) and off (𝑇 ′),
let ̂︀𝐷 be the total demand of compliance-prone manufacturers whose penalties are currently on.
(a) If ̂︀𝐷 6 𝑄, then 𝑉 is the set of all compliance-prone manufacturers whose penalties are
currently off, that is, 𝑉 = {𝑖 : 𝑖 ∈ 𝑇 ′ and 𝜌𝑖 > 𝛾𝑖}.
(b) If ̂︀𝐷 > 𝑄, then 𝑉 is a subset of compliance-prone manufacturers whose penalties are currently
off: 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑖 : 𝑖 ∈ 𝑇 ′ and 𝜌𝑖−𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑖 > 𝜉
}︁
where 𝜉 > 0 depends on the equilibrium.
According to Theorem 2.4a, when ̂︀𝐷 is sufficiently low, any compliance-prone manufacturer will
become compliant once targeted by the NGO. In contrast, part b implies that, once ̂︀𝐷 becomes
sufficiently large, only certain compliance-prone manufacturers could be induced to actually be
compliant when targeted. Specifically, once ̂︀𝐷 is beyond the threshold 𝑄, a compliance-prone
manufacturer is vulnerable to targeting only if its net penalty per unit (i.e., the portion of the
penalty in excess of compliance cost, spread over the manufacturer’s entire demand) is sufficiently
large. Therefore, what makes a manufacturer vulnerable is not simply its penalty or its demand,
but essentially the ratio of the two.
Parts a and b together have the following implication: Once a critical mass of manufacturers
have become compliant (precisely, a group of manufacturers whose demands add up to 𝑄 or more),
it becomes more difficult for the NGO to convert additional manufacturers: The set 𝑉 , which is
the set of manufacturers vulnerable to targeting, becomes smaller. Furthermore, there is another
type of diminishing returns associated with targeting additional manufacturers beyond a critical
mass: Once the total demand of compliant manufacturers exceeds the threshold 𝑄, we know from
our earlier results that there will be a shortage of certified metal. Hence, if the NGO targets an
additional manufacturer to become compliant after that stage, only some of the manufacturer’s
demand will be met by certified metal, with the rest of its demand still met by uncertified metal.
In the spirit of this result, when the Enough Project updated its conflict mineral rankings in
2017, it included jewelry retail companies for the first time, in addition to consumer electronics
manufacturers that have been the sole subject of previous rankings (Callaway 2017). This may be
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seen as the NGO investing its efforts in a mineral for which it has not progressed too far up the curve
of auditing and tracing: While significant progress has been made in tantalum, tin, and tungsten
(with 98%, 79% and 79%, respectively, of eligible smelters listed as conformant by the Responsible
Minerals Initiative), the progress has been much slower in gold (with 66% of eligible smelters listed
as conformant) (Responsible Minerals Initiative 2019b).
2.6 Conclusion
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is an important source of 3TG minerals (tantalum,
tin, tungsten and gold), and the trade of these minerals helped to fund armed groups involved in
ongoing hostilities in the DRC. In an effort to curb the flow of funds to such armed groups, there
have been efforts by legislative bodies (e.g., Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S.) and
NGOs (e.g., the Enough Project). These efforts put pressure on manufacturers so that they will
trace their sources for 3TG minerals and avoid buying from questionable sources. In the supply
chain for minerals, the critical link between a manufacturer (who uses the metal) and a mine (who
supplies the ore) is the smelter, who converts the ore into the metal. In this paper, we study how
legislative efforts and NGOs may influence sourcing relationships among multiple manufacturers
and smelters in a supply network.
In our modeling framework, we aggregate mines into two pools, verified mines (known to be
conflict-free) and unverified mines (not known to be so). Each smelter decides whether to be
certified (committing to purchase only from the pool of verified mines), or noncertified (free to buy
from both pools of mines). Each manufacturer decides whether to be compliant (committing to
purchasing from certified smelters to the extent possible) or noncompliant (free to buy from both
certified and noncertified smelters). Thus, we essentially model two parallel markets for metal, one
for certified metal and the other for noncertified. The two markets interact because the supply and
demand in each market are tied to the prices in the other market.
We find that an important predictor of outcomes is the “compliance-prone demand” in the net-
work. The compliance-prone demand is the total demand of the manufacturers who would prefer
to be compliant if the prices of certified and noncertified metals were the same. These are the man-
ufacturers whose noncompliance penalty exceeds their compliance cost. If the compliance-prone
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demand is below a threshold, then there will be enough certified metal to go around. However, once
the compliance-prone demand exceeds the threshold, there will arise a shortage of certified metal.
Even when the compliance-prone demand is low, it can still create a market for certified metal,
which even noncompliant manufacturers take advantage of, by spreading their purchases between
certified and noncertified metals until the prices of the two metal types meet. However, once
the compliance-prone demand is high, there will be a shortage of certified metal, and even some
compliant manufacturers will have to buy noncertified metal to make up for the shortage. In this
equilibrium, certified metal will remain more expensive than noncertified metal.
Equipped with the equilibrium results above, we ask whether increased efforts by policy-makers
(NGOs and legislative bodies) can induce a conflict-free supply network. Policy-makers can in-
fluence the “compliance-prone demand” in the network, because they are in a position to impose
larger penalties for noncompliant manufacturers. A consequence of the results discussed above is
that even if policy-makers imposed increasingly high noncompliance penalties on a broader group of
manufacturers, such penalties might not be sufficient. Once the compliance-prone demand reaches
a threshold, further increases in compliance-prone demand will be countered with less than com-
mensurate increases in certified metal capacity, thus leading to shortages. In short, imposing higher
penalties on more manufacturers might not be enough to achieve a conflict-free network.
We then ask which additional manufacturers an NGO should target in its efforts to curb the usage
of conflict minerals. When the quantity of certified metal in the network is low, then the NGO
can target any manufacturer vulnerable to bad publicity, and this will compel the manufacturer
to become compliant. However, once the certified metal volume reaches a critical mass and the
certified metal is in shortage, then the NGO would have to choose additional targets judiciously.
Because of the shortage, certified metal will be more expensive, and it will be harder to convert
the manufacturers to compliance. In this case, the NGO should target the manufacturers whose
noncompliance penalty, spread over the volume of metal they need, is high enough to justify paying
the premium for certified metal.
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Appendix 2.A Technical Assumptions and Preliminary Lemmas
We first state and prove preliminary lemmas that will be used throughout the appendix. Here we
omit measurability and integrability assumptions and “almost everywhere” qualifiers in most of our
statements.
Lemma 2.1. In a balanced market, the linear unit price functions 𝑝𝑠(𝐷𝑠,𝐾𝑠) = 𝑎𝐷𝑠 − 𝑏𝐾𝑠 + 𝑝0
for 𝑆 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁} must have 𝑎 = 𝑏.
Proof. Pick any 𝑥 ∈ (0, 𝐷𝑇 ) and any 𝜖 ∈ (0, 𝑥∧𝐷𝑇 −𝑥). Let 𝐷𝑠 = 𝑥+ 𝜖 and 𝐾𝑠 = 𝑥. In a balanced
market, 𝐷−𝑠 = 𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥 − 𝜖 and 𝐾−𝑠 = 𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥 (by Assumption 2.1a). Since metal type 𝑠 is in
shortage, Assumption 2.2a yields 𝑝𝑠(𝑥 + 𝜖, 𝑥) > 𝑝−𝑠(𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥 − 𝜖,𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥). By Assumption 2.1b,
this is equivalent to 𝑎(𝑥 + 𝜖) − 𝑏𝑥 + 𝑝0 > 𝑎(𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥 − 𝜖) − 𝑏(𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥) + 𝑝0, which reduces to
𝑏(𝐷𝑇 − 2𝑥) > 𝑎(𝐷𝑇 − 2𝑥− 2𝜖).
Now, let 𝐷𝑠 = 𝑥− 𝜖 and 𝐾𝑠 = 𝑥. Therefore, 𝐷−𝑠 = 𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥+ 𝜖 and 𝐾−𝑠 = 𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥. Since metal
type −𝑠 is in shortage, Assumption 2.2a now yields 𝑝𝑠(𝑥 − 𝜖, 𝑥) < 𝑝−𝑠(𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥 + 𝜖,𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥). By
Assumption 2.1b, this is equivalent to 𝑎(𝑥− 𝜖)− 𝑏𝑥+ 𝑝0 < 𝑎(𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥+ 𝜖)− 𝑏(𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥) + 𝑝0, which
reduces to 𝑏(𝐷𝑇 − 2𝑥) < 𝑎(𝐷𝑇 − 2𝑥+ 2𝜖).
Thus, we obtain 𝑎(𝐷𝑇 − 2𝑥 − 2𝜖) < 𝑏(𝐷𝑇 − 2𝑥) < 𝑎(𝐷𝑇 − 2𝑥 + 2𝜖), which must hold for any
arbitrarily small 𝜖 > 0. Therefore, we must have 𝑎(𝐷𝑇 − 2𝑥) = 𝑏(𝐷𝑇 − 2𝑥) and, hence, 𝑎 = 𝑏.
Lemma 2.2. Let ℎ : R → R be defined as ℎ(𝑦) =
∫︀





Proof. Since the joint distribution of (𝐷𝑖, 𝛾𝑖, 𝜌𝑖) is continuous, the distribution of 𝜇𝑖 is continu-







ℳ𝐷𝑖|1{𝜇𝑖>𝑦𝑛} − 1{𝜇𝑖>𝑦}| d𝑖 → 0 by the integrability of
𝐷𝑖 and invoking the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem.
Definition 2.1.
(a) Define function 𝑅 : [𝑄,𝐷𝑇 ]× [𝑄,𝐾𝑇 ] → R by
𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) := 2𝑎(𝑥− 𝑦)− (𝑜𝑉 (𝑦, 𝑥)− 𝑜𝑈 (𝐷𝑇 − 𝑦,𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥)). (2.11)
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(b) Define 𝜅 : [𝑄,𝐷𝑇 ] → R to be the implicit function 𝑦 = 𝜅(𝑥) that solves 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) = 0, such
that 𝜅(𝑥) ∈ [𝑄, 𝑥], ∀𝑥 ∈ [𝑄,𝐷𝑇 ].
Lemma 2.3. The implicit function 𝜅 is well defined and has the following properties: (i) 𝜅(𝑥)
is monotonically increasing; (ii) 𝜅(𝑥) is continuous; (iii) 𝜅(𝑥) ∈ (𝑄, 𝑥) for 𝑥 ∈ (𝑄,𝐷𝑇 ], and
𝜅(𝑄) = 𝑄.
Proof. We first show that 𝜅 is well-defined. Given 𝑥 ∈ [𝑄,𝐷𝑇 ], first observe that 𝑅(𝑥,𝑄) =
2𝑎(𝑥−𝑄)− (𝑜𝑉 (𝑄, 𝑥)− 𝑜𝑈 (𝐷𝑇 −𝑄,𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥)) > 2𝑎(𝑥−𝑄)− (𝑜𝑉 (𝑄,𝑄)− 𝑜𝑈 (𝐷𝑇 −𝑄,𝐷𝑇 −𝑄)),
where the inequality follows from 𝑥 > 𝑄 and Assumption 2.3. Therefore, it now follows from
the definition of 𝑄 in Assumption 2.4 that 𝑅(𝑥,𝑄) > 2𝑎(𝑥 − 𝑄) > 0. Second, observe that
𝑅(𝑥, 𝑥) = 0 − (𝑜𝑉 (𝑥, 𝑥) − 𝑜𝑈 (𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥,𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥)) 6 0 because 𝑜𝑉 (𝑥, 𝑥) > 𝑜𝑈 (𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥,𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥) for
𝑥 ∈ [𝑄,𝐷𝑇 ] due to Assumption 2.4. By virtue of these two observations, the continuity of 𝑅, and
the intermediate value theorem, there exists 𝑦 ∈ [𝑄, 𝑥] s.t. 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) = 0. Moreover, by the strict
monotonicity of 𝑜𝑉 and 𝑜𝑈 , 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) is strictly decreasing in 𝑦; so there exists a unique 𝑦 ∈ [𝑄, 𝑥]
s.t. 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) = 0.
Next, we show that 𝜅(𝑥) satisfies properties (i) through (iii):
(i) Because 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) is increasing in 𝑥 and decreasing in 𝑦, it follows that 𝜅(𝑥) is increasing in 𝑥.
(ii) Extend 𝑅 to 𝑅 : R2 → R by extending 𝑜𝑉 and 𝑜𝑈 monotonically outside of [0, 𝐷𝑇 ]2 in
such a way that they remain continuous throughout, and are strictly increasing in their respec-
tive first argument, and strictly decreasing in their respective second argument, and given any 𝑥,
lim𝑦→±∞𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) = ∓∞. Now, 𝑅 is continuous. Given any 𝑥, 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) is strictly decreasing in 𝑦.
Consequently, (a) 𝑅(𝑥, ·) is one-to-one, hence, locally one-to-one; (b) by the intermediate value the-
orem, there exists a unique 𝑦 s.t. 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) = 0. We write this unique 𝑦 as 𝑦 = 𝐻𝑥. By Theorem 1.1 in
Kumagai (1980), 𝐻 is continuous. Because 𝜅 coincides with 𝐻 in the relevant domain, we conclude
that 𝜅 is also continuous.
(iii) We first note that 𝑅(𝑄,𝑄) = 0, so 𝜅(𝑄) = 𝑄. Now, consider 𝑥 > 𝑄. In that case, we
have 𝑅(𝑥,𝑄) > 0 and 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑥) < 0 by (2.11) and Assumptions 2.3 and 2.4. Because 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) is
continuous and strictly decreasing in 𝑦, it follows that 𝑅(𝑥, 𝑦) = 0 for some 𝑦 ∈ (𝑄, 𝑥). In other
words, 𝜅(𝑥) ∈ (𝑄, 𝑥).
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Appendix 2.B Proof of Preliminary Equilibrium Results
We first state the following result, which implies only certified metal could be in shortage in equi-
librium.
Lemma 2.4. In equilibrium, noncertified metal is never in shortage, that is, 𝐷𝑁 6 𝐾𝑁 .
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose noncertified metal is in shortage, that is, 𝐷𝑁 > 𝐾𝑁 , in
equilibrium. Then 𝐷𝑁 > 0. By (2.7), we have









Note that since noncertified metal is in shortage, certified metal cannot be in shortage, that is,
we have 𝐾𝐶 > 𝐷𝐶 . Therefore, given certified metal has sufficient capacity, its effective price
𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶), is simply 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶). In the remainder, we will show a contradiction arises by
showing that 𝐷𝑁 = 0.
By Assumption 2.2a, 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) > 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶). If 𝐾𝑁 > 0, it follows from (2.12) that
𝑝𝑒𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) is greater than 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶), which is equal to 𝑝
𝑒
𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶). Therefore, no manufac-
turer would demand noncertified metal, and we would have 𝐷𝑁 = 0, thus yielding a contradiction.
If 𝐾𝑁 = 0, by Assumption 2.5, all manufacturers demand only certified metal. Thus, once again,
we would have 𝐷𝑁 = 0, yielding a contradiction. Hence in equilibrium, 𝐷𝑁 6 𝐾𝑁 .
We next prove a result that describes all possible cases that may arise in equilibrium. Subsequent
equilibrium results will be derived by studying these cases in detail.
Theorem 2.5. Any equilibrium falls into one of the following two cases:
(a) Certified metal is in shortage: In this case, certified metal is more expensive than non-
certified metal and only compliant manufacturers demand certified metal, that is, 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) >
𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ), 𝐷CM = 𝐷𝐶 > 𝐾𝐶 , and 𝐷NM = 𝐷𝑁 < 𝐾𝑁 .
(b) Certified metal is not in shortage: In this case, certified metal has the same effective price
as noncertified metal and noncompliant manufacturers also demand some certified metal, that is,
𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 𝑝
𝑒
𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ), 𝐷CM 6 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐾𝐶 , 𝐷NM > 𝐷𝑁 = 𝐾𝑁 .
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Proof. We divide all possible equilibria into three mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive
cases, and we show that one case cannot arise in equilibrium and the two remaining cases correspond
to cases a and b.
∙ Case A: Equilibria in which 𝐷𝐶 > 𝐾𝐶 . In this case, given that the certified metal is in shortage,
it follows from Assumption 2.2a that 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) > 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ). If 𝐾𝐶 = 0, then there is no
capacity for certified metal and, by Assumption 2.5, all noncompliant manufacturers would demand
only noncertified metal, that is, 𝐷𝑁 = 𝐷NM. This yields a special case of the equilibrium in part a
with 𝐾𝐶 = 0. In the remainder, we consider the case with 𝐾𝐶 > 0. By (2.7),
𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶)
𝐾𝐶
𝐷𝐶






Given 𝐾𝐶 > 0, it follows from (2.13) that 𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) > 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ). Furthermore, because 𝐾𝑁 >
𝐷𝑁 , 𝑝𝑒𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) = 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ). Therefore, we have 𝑝
𝑒
𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) > 𝑝
𝑒
𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ). Consequently,
all noncompliant manufacturers will demand only noncertified metal, that is, 𝐷𝑁 = 𝐷NM. This
also implies that the demand for certified metal is only the demand of compliant manufacturers,
that is, 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐷CM. These equilibria correspond to case a.
∙ Case B: Equilibria in which 𝐷𝐶 < 𝐾𝐶 : This case cannot occur in equilibrium. Suppose that
𝐷𝐶 < 𝐾𝐶 . Under Assumption 2.1a, 𝐷𝐶 < 𝐾𝐶 implies 𝐷𝑁 > 𝐾𝑁 , contradicting Lemma 2.4.
∙ Case C: Equilibria in which 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐾𝐶 : In this case, we also have 𝐷𝑁 = 𝐾𝑁 by the balanced
market assumption (Assumption 2.1a). We consider three cases: 0 < 𝐾𝐶 < 𝐾𝑇 , 𝐾𝐶 = 0, 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐾𝑇 .
In the first case, with 0 < 𝐾𝐶 < 𝐾𝑇 , we observe from the price function 𝑝𝑠(𝐷𝑠,𝐾𝑠) = 𝑎𝐷𝑠−𝑏𝐾𝑠+𝑝0
for 𝑠 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁}, that 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) (because we have 𝑎 = 𝑏 by Lemma 2.1 and 𝐷𝑠 =
𝐾𝑠 for 𝑠 ∈ {𝐶,𝑁}). Hence, it is also true that 𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 𝑝𝑒𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ). In the second case,
with 𝐾𝐶 = 0, we note that we must have 𝐾𝑁 = 𝐾𝑇 . In addition, we have 𝑝𝑒𝐶(0, 0) = 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑇 ,𝐾𝑇 )
(see footnote 1 — with zero demand and capacity for the certified metal, the effective price of
the certified metal is the price of the noncertified metal) and 𝑝𝑒𝑁 (𝐷𝑇 ,𝐾𝑇 ) = 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑇 ,𝐾𝑇 ). Thus,
𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 𝑝
𝑒
𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) holds in the case with 𝐾𝐶 = 0. In the third case, with 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐾𝑇 , we
note that we must have 𝐾𝑁 = 0. Similar to the previous case, 𝑝𝑒𝑁 (0, 0) = 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝑇 ,𝐾𝑇 ) (with zero
demand and capacity for the noncertified metal, the effective price of the noncertified metal is the
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price of the certified metal) and 𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝑇 ,𝐾𝑇 ) = 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝑇 ,𝐾𝑇 ). Thus, 𝑝
𝑒
𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 𝑝
𝑒
𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 )
holds in the case as well. Finally, because any compliant manufacturer always demands certified
metal only and a noncompliant manufacturer may also demand certified metal, we have 𝐷𝐶 > 𝐷CM
and 𝐷𝑁 6 𝐷NM. Such equilibria correspond to case b.
Appendix 2.C Proofs of Results in Section 2.4
In this section, we state and prove Proposition 2.2. Subsequently, we show that Proposition 2.1, The-
orem 2.1, Theorem 2.2, Corollary 2.1, and Theorem 2.3 in Section 2.4 all follow from Proposition 2.2.
For any given 𝐷 ∈ [0, 𝐷𝑇 ], define ̃︀𝑄(𝐷) as the value of 𝑄 at which 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄,𝐷) = 𝑜𝑈 (𝐷𝑇−𝑄,𝐷𝑇−𝐷).3




𝐷𝑖1{︁𝜇𝑖> 2𝑎𝜅(𝑥)𝑥 (𝑥−𝜅(𝑥))}︁ d𝑖. (2.14)








}︁ d𝑖. It suffices to show that
𝐹 has a zero in (𝑄, ̂︀𝐷]. Since both 𝜅 (Definition 2.1) and ℎ (defined in Lemma 2.2) are continuous,
𝐹 is continuous. Observe 𝐹 (𝑄) = 𝑄 −
∫︀
ℳ𝐷𝑖1{𝜇𝑖>0} d𝑖 = 𝑄 − ̂︀𝐷 < 0 (where the first equality
holds because, by Lemma 2.3, 𝜅(𝑄) = 𝑄; the second equality follows from the definition of ̂︀𝐷;
the last inequality holds because ̂︀𝐷 > 𝑄 by the premise of the lemma). In addition, observe that
𝐹 ( ̂︀𝐷) = ̂︀𝐷 − ∫︀ℳ𝐷𝑖1{︁𝜇𝑖> 2𝑎𝜅( ̂︀𝐷)̂︀𝐷 ( ̂︀𝐷−𝜅( ̂︀𝐷))}︁ d𝑖 > ̂︀𝐷 − ̂︀𝐷 = 0 (where the inequality holds because, by
Lemma 2.3, 0 6 𝑄 < 𝜅(𝑥) < 𝑥 for 𝑥 ∈ (𝑄,𝐷𝑇 ]). Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, there
exists 𝑥 ∈ (𝑄, ̂︀𝐷] s.t. 𝐹 (𝑥) = 0.
Proposition 2.2. The following lists all possible equilibria and the respective conditions (on model
parameters) for the existence of each of them:
(1 ) There exists an equilibrium of the type in Theorem 2.5b, in which 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 = 0, if and only
if ̂︀𝐷 = 0.
(2 ) There exists an equilibrium of the type in Theorem 2.5b, in which 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐾𝑇 , 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐷𝑇 , and
𝐷CM = ̂︀𝐷, if and only if 𝑝0 − (𝑜𝑉 (𝐷𝑇 , ̂︀𝐷)− 𝑜𝑈 (0, 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷)) > 0.
3For any given 𝐷 ∈ [0, 𝐷𝑇 ], the existence and uniqueness of ̃︀𝑄(𝐷) follows from Assumptions 2.3 and 2.4.
34
(3 ) There exists an equilibrium of the type in Theorem 2.5b, in which 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ),
0 < 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐾𝐶 = 𝑄 < 𝐷𝑇 , and the compliant manufacturers are precisely those manufacturers who
are compliance-prone, that is, 𝐷CM = ̂︀𝐷, if and only if 𝑄 ∈ [ ̂︀𝐷, ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷)] and 𝑄 > 0.
(4 ) There exists an equilibrium of the type in Theorem 2.5a, in which 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) > 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ),
𝑄 < 𝐾𝐶 < 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐷CM 6 ̂︀𝐷, and only some compliance-prone manufacturers are compliant, if and
only if ̂︀𝐷 > 𝑄.
Proof. To exhaust all possible types of equilibrium that might exist, we analyze both types of
equilibrium listed in Theorem 2.5 to show if and when such an equilibrium exists. In the remainder
of the proof, we will utilize the condition for smelter 𝑗 to be certified. Smelter 𝑗 is certified if and
only if 𝜋cs(𝑗) > 𝜋ns(𝑗).4 This condition is equivalent to
(𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶)− 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)− 𝑐𝑗)𝐾𝑗 > [𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 )− (𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM) ∧ 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM))− 𝑐𝑗 ]𝐾𝑗 .
(2.15)
Under Assumption 2.1, recall that 𝑝𝑠(𝐷𝑠,𝐾𝑠) = 𝑎𝐷𝑠−𝑏𝐾𝑠+𝑝0 (except when 𝐷𝑠 = 𝐾𝑠 = 0, in which
case 𝑝𝑠(𝐷𝑠,𝐾𝑠) = 0) and furthermore, by Lemma 2.1, 𝑎 = 𝑏. Therefore, except when 𝐷𝑠 = 𝐾𝑠 = 0
for 𝑠 = 𝐶 or 𝑠 = 𝑁 , the above expression simplifies as follows:
𝑎(𝐷𝐶 −𝐾𝐶) + 𝑝0 − 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)− 𝑐𝑗 > 𝑎(𝐷𝑁 −𝐾𝑁 ) + 𝑝0 − (𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM) ∧ 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM))− 𝑐𝑗 .
(2.16)
In what follows, we take up each possible type of equilibrium listed in Theorem 2.5. For each
type of equilibrium, (a) we derive additional properties of this type of equilibrium, (b) supposing
such an equilibrium exists, we identify the conditions (on model parameters) that must be satisfied,
and (c) we show that if these conditions are satisfied, then this equilibrium exists.
∙ Case b of Theorem 2.5. Since the effective prices of certified and noncertified metals are equal
in this type of equilibrium, the manufacturers’ problems will be solved when all manufacturers with
𝜌𝑖 > 𝛾𝑖 are compliant and all manufacturers with 𝜌𝑖 < 𝛾𝑖 are noncompliant, that is, manufacturer 𝑖
is compliant if and only if it is compliance-prone. Hence, in this type of equilibrium, the total
4More precisely, smelter 𝑗 gets certified if 𝜋cs(𝑗) > 𝜋ns(𝑗); smelter 𝑗 does not get certified if 𝜋cs(𝑗) < 𝜋ns(𝑗);
smelter 𝑗 is indifferent between certification or otherwise if 𝜋cs(𝑗) = 𝜋ns(𝑗).
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demand of compliant manufacturers will be the same as the total demand of compliance-prone
manufacturers, that is, 𝐷CM = ̂︀𝐷. We continue our analysis by examining three mutually exclusive
and collectively exhaustive subcases, depending on where 𝐾𝐶 lies in the range [0,𝐾𝑇 ]:
– Subcase a: 𝐾𝐶 = 0. In this subcase, all smelters are noncertified. First, in addition to
𝐷CM = ̂︀𝐷 as argued above, we observe the following properties of the type of equilibrium in this
subcase. (i) We must have 𝐷𝐶 = 0 (because 𝐷𝐶 6 𝐾𝐶 according to Theorem 2.5b). (ii) Given
𝐷𝐶 = 0, we must also have ̂︀𝐷 = 𝐷CM = 0 (because 𝐷CM 6 𝐷𝐶). (iii) Given 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐾𝐶 = 0, we
must have 𝐾𝑁 = 𝐷𝑁 = 𝐷𝑇 .
From property (ii), we get the condition: ̂︀𝐷 = 0. In addition, the condition 𝜋cs(𝑗) < 𝜋ns(𝑗) must
hold for all smelters (i.e., all smelters prefer to be noncertified), which can be written as
(𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶)− 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)− 𝑐𝑗)𝐾𝑗 < [𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 )− (𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM) ∧ 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM))− 𝑐𝑗 ]𝐾𝑗 .
When 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐾𝐶 = 0, we have 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 0 and 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) = 𝑝0 (because 𝐾𝑁 = 𝐷𝑁 = 𝐷𝑇 ),
so the above condition simplifies to (−𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)−𝑐𝑗)𝐾𝑗 < [𝑝0−(𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)∧𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM))−
𝑐𝑗 ]𝐾𝑗 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆. Using property (ii), the condition can be further simplified as −𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 0) <
𝑝0−(𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 0)∧𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷𝑇 )). Observe from the smelter’s problem in (2.4) that, in any equilibrium
where 𝐾𝑁 = 𝐷𝑇 (i.e., all smelters are noncertified), we must have 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 0) = 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷𝑇 ).5 Now,
given that 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 0) = 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷𝑇 ), the previous condition reduces to 𝑝0 > 0, which holds by
assumption.
Next, we prove the converse, that is, if ̂︀𝐷 = 0, then there exists an equilibrium of the type
in Theorem 2.5b with 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 = 0. To that end, consider the following strategy profile: All
manufacturers are noncompliant and demand only noncertified metal. All smelters are noncertified
and buy a total quantity of ̃︀𝑄(0) from the verified pool, and buy the rest from the unverified pool.
Note that, by construction, 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 = 0 in this strategy profile. We will show that this strategy
5 Suppose for a contradiction that 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 0) < 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷𝑇 ). Then all smelters would set 𝑡𝑗 = 1 and buy
only verified ore, that is, 𝑄𝑉 = 𝐷𝑇 and 𝑄𝑈 = 0. However, with 𝑄𝑉 = 𝐷𝑇 and 𝑄𝑈 = 0, Assumptions 2.3
and 2.4 together imply that 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 0) > 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷𝑇 ), yielding a contradiction. For another contradiction,
suppose that 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 0) > 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷𝑇 ). Then all smelters would set 𝑡𝑗 = 0 and buy only unverified
ore, that is, 𝑄𝑉 = 0 and 𝑄𝑈 = 𝐷𝑇 . In this case, with 𝑄𝑉 = 0 and 𝑄𝑈 = 𝐷𝑇 , Assumptions 2.4
implies that 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 0) 6 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷𝑇 ), yielding a contradiction once again. Thus, it must be that
𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 0) = 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷𝑇 ).
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profile is an equilibrium (i.e., solves the manufacturers’ and smelters’ problems simultaneously).
Here are some implications, expressed in our notation, of the strategy profile specified above: (i)
𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 𝑝
𝑒
𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) (since 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 = 0, we have 𝑝
𝑒
𝐶(0, 0) = 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑇 ,𝐾𝑇 ) (see footnote 1)
and since 𝐾𝑁 = 𝐷𝑁 = 𝐷𝑇 , we have 𝑝𝑒𝑁 (𝐷𝑇 ,𝐾𝑇 ) = 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑇 ,𝐾𝑇 )), and (ii) 𝑄𝑉 = ̃︀𝑄(0), 𝑄𝑈 =
𝐷𝑇 − ̃︀𝑄(0). Now, given the condition ̂︀𝐷 = 0 — equivalently, 𝜌𝑖 6 𝛾𝑖,∀𝑖 — and property (i),
one can compare (2.8) and (2.9) to verify that the manufacturer’s problem (2.10) is indeed solved
when the manufacturer’s strategy is to choose noncompliance and to demand only noncertified
metal. Given property (ii) and recalling that 𝑜𝑉 ( ̃︀𝑄(0), 0) = 𝑜𝑈 (𝐷𝑇 − ̃︀𝑄(0), 𝐷𝑇 ) by the definition
of ̃︀𝑄(·), one can verify from (2.4) that 𝜋ns(𝑗) = [𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑇 ,𝐾𝑇 )− 𝑜𝑉 ( ̃︀𝑄(0), 0)− 𝑐𝑗 ]𝐾𝑗 , which further
simplifies to 𝜋ns(𝑗) = [𝑝0 − 𝑜𝑉 ( ̃︀𝑄(0), 0) − 𝑐𝑗 ]𝐾𝑗 (by noting that 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑇 ,𝐾𝑇 ) = 𝑝0). Similarly,
one can verify from (2.3) that 𝜋cs(𝑗) = [𝑝𝐶(0, 0) − 𝑜𝑉 ( ̃︀𝑄(0), 0) − 𝑐𝑗 ]𝐾𝑗 , which further simplifies to
𝜋cs(𝑗) = [−𝑜𝑉 ( ̃︀𝑄(0), 0)−𝑐𝑗 ]𝐾𝑗 (by noting that 𝑝𝐶(0, 0) = 0). Therefore, 𝜋ns(𝑗) > 𝜋cs(𝑗) holds for all
𝑗 ∈ 𝑆, and the smelter’s problem (2.5) is indeed solved when all smelters choose to be noncertified
and buy a total quantity of ̃︀𝑄(0) from the verified pool. In summary, under the condition ̂︀𝐷 = 0,
the strategy profile we described is an equilibrium, whose outcome is as described in Theorem 2.5b
with 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 = 0.
This subcase proves Proposition 2.2(1 ).
– Subcase b: 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐾𝑇 . In this subcase, all smelters must be certified. Once again, in addition
to 𝐷CM = ̂︀𝐷, we observe the following properties of the type of equilibrium in this subcase. (i) We
must have 𝐾𝑁 = 0, in which case 𝐷𝑁 = 0 as well (by Lemma 2.4); hence, 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐷𝑇 . (ii) Given all
smelters are certified, we must have 𝑄𝑉 = 𝐷𝑇 .
Next, supposing that this type of equilibrium exists, we identify the conditions that must hold.
The condition 𝜋cs(𝑗) > 𝜋ns(𝑗) must hold for all smelters, (i.e., all smelters prefer to be certified).
This condition can be written as
(𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶)− 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)− 𝑐𝑗)𝐾𝑗 > [𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 )− (𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM) ∧ 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM))− 𝑐𝑗 ]𝐾𝑗 .
When 𝐷𝑁 = 𝐾𝑁 = 0, we have 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) = 0 and 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 𝑝0 (because 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐷𝑇 ),
so the above condition simplifies to (𝑝0−𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)−𝑐𝑗)𝐾𝑗 > [−(𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)∧𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM))−
𝑐𝑗 ]𝐾𝑗 for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆. Using property (ii) and recalling 𝐷CM = ̂︀𝐷, the condition can be further
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simplified to 𝑝0 − 𝑜𝑉 (𝐷𝑇 , ̂︀𝐷) > −(𝑜𝑉 (𝐷𝑇 , ̂︀𝐷)∧ 𝑜𝑈 (0, 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷)). From Assumptions 2.3 and 2.4, we
can verify that 𝑜𝑉 (𝐷𝑇 , ̂︀𝐷) > 𝑜𝑈 (0, 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷). Hence, the condition reduces to 𝑝0 > 𝑜𝑉 (𝐷𝑇 , ̂︀𝐷) −
𝑜𝑈 (0, 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷).
Next, we prove the converse, that is, if 𝑝0 > 𝑜𝑉 (𝐷𝑇 , ̂︀𝐷) − 𝑜𝑈 (0, 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷), then there exists an
equilibrium of the type in Theorem 2.5b with 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐾𝑇 and 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐷𝑇 . To that end, consider
the following strategy profile: A manufacturer 𝑖 is compliant if and only if 𝜌𝑖 > 𝛾𝑖; all manufac-
turers demand only certified metal; all smelters are certified, and buy only verified ore. Note that,
by construction, 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐷𝑇 and 𝐷CM = ̂︀𝐷 in this strategy profile. We will show that this
strategy profile is an equilibrium (i.e., solves the manufacturers’ and smelters’ problems simulta-
neously). Some implications of this strategy profile, expressed in our notation, are as follows: (i)
𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 𝑝
𝑒
𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) (since 𝐾𝑁 = 𝐷𝑁 = 0, we have 𝑝
𝑒
𝑁 (0, 0) = 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝑇 ,𝐾𝑇 ) (see foot-
note 1) and since 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐷𝑇 , we have 𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝑇 ,𝐾𝑇 ) = 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝑇 ,𝐾𝑇 )); (ii) 𝑄𝑉 = 𝐷𝑇 , 𝑄𝑈 = 0.
Given (i), a noncompliant manufacturer’s cost is the same no matter how it allocates its demand
between certified and noncertified metal. Also by (i), 𝜈cm(𝑖) < 𝜈nm(𝑖) if and only if 𝜌𝑖 > 𝛾𝑖.
Hence, manufacturer 𝑖’s problem (2.10) is indeed solved when its strategy is to choose compliance
if and only if 𝜌𝑖 > 𝛾𝑖, and demand only certified metal regardless of compliance decision. Given
property (ii) and recalling that 𝐷CM = ̂︀𝐷, one can verify from (2.4) that 𝜋ns(𝑗) = [𝑝𝑁 (0, 0) −
(𝑜𝑉 (𝐷𝑇 , ̂︀𝐷)∧ 𝑜𝑈 (0, 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷))− 𝑐𝑗 ]𝐾𝑗 , which further simplifies to 𝜋ns(𝑗) = [−𝑜𝑈 (0, 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷)− 𝑐𝑗 ]𝐾𝑗
(by noting that 𝑝𝑁 (0, 0) = 0 and 𝑜𝑉 (𝐷𝑇 , ̂︀𝐷) > 𝑜𝑈 (0, 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷) by Assumptions 2.3 and 2.4). Sim-
ilarly, one can verify from (2.3) that 𝜋cs(𝑗) = [𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝑇 ,𝐾𝑇 ) − 𝑜𝑉 (𝐷𝑇 , ̂︀𝐷) − 𝑐𝑗 ]𝐾𝑗 , which further
simplifies to 𝜋cs(𝑗) = [𝑝0 − 𝑜𝑉 (𝐷𝑇 , ̂︀𝐷) − 𝑐𝑗 ]𝐾𝑗 (by noting that 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝑇 ,𝐾𝑇 ) = 𝑝0). Therefore, if
𝑝0 > 𝑜𝑉 (𝐷𝑇 , ̂︀𝐷)−𝑜𝑈 (0, 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷), then 𝜋cs(𝑗) > 𝜋ns(𝑗) holds for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆, and the smelter’s problem
(2.5) is indeed solved when all smelters choose to be certified and (as required by the model) buy
only certified metal. In summary, under the condition 𝑝0 > 𝑜𝑉 (𝐷𝑇 , ̂︀𝐷)−𝑜𝑈 (0, 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷), the strategy
profile we described is an equilibrium, which leads to the outcome described in Theorem 2.5b with
𝐾𝐶 = 𝐾𝑇 , 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐷𝑇 , and 𝐷CM = ̂︀𝐷.
This subcase proves Proposition 2.2(2 ).
– Subcase c: 0 < 𝐾𝐶 < 𝐾𝑇 . In this subcase, there are both certified and noncertified smelters.
In addition to 𝐷CM = ̂︀𝐷, we observe the following properties of the type of equilibrium in this
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subcase: (i) Because 0 < 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 = 𝑄 < 𝐾𝑇 , it is also true that 0 < 𝐾𝑁 = 𝐷𝑁 < 𝐾𝑇 . (ii) We
must have 𝐾𝐶 6 𝑄𝑉 (because certified smelters can only buy verified ore). (iii) Putting together
the observations made throughout this subcase, we can also write ̂︀𝐷 6 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐾𝐶 = 𝑄 6 𝑄𝑉 .
Next, supposing that this type of equilibrium exists, we show that 𝑄 ∈ [ ̂︀𝐷, ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷)]. Noting
that 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 and 𝐾𝑁 = 𝐷𝑁 in this subcase, observe that condition (2.16), which must hold
for smelter 𝑗 to be certified, reduces to 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , ̂︀𝐷) 6 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , ̂︀𝐷) ∧ 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷), which is
independent of 𝑗. Note that 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , ̂︀𝐷) can never be strictly less than 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , ̂︀𝐷)∧𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷).
On the other hand, since there exist some certified smelters (𝐾𝐶 > 0), it cannot be the case that
𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , ̂︀𝐷) > 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , ̂︀𝐷) ∧ 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷). Hence it must be that condition (2.16) holds as
equality. Therefore, we must have 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , ̂︀𝐷) 6 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷), which would then imply that
𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , ̂︀𝐷) = 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷).6 Hence, by definition of ̃︀𝑄(·), we have 𝑄𝑉 = ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷). Given property
(iii) in the paragraph above, we conclude 𝑄 ∈ [ ̂︀𝐷, ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷)].
Next, we prove the converse, that is, if 𝑄 ∈ [ ̂︀𝐷, ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷)] and 𝑄 > 0, then there exists an equilibrium
of the type in Theorem 2.5b with 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 = 𝑄 and 𝐷CM = ̂︀𝐷. To that end, consider the following
strategy profile: Manufacturer 𝑖 is compliant if and only if it is compliance-prone (i.e., 𝜌𝑖 > 𝛾𝑖);
all compliant manufacturers demand only certified metal, and a total of 𝑄− ̂︀𝐷 of the noncompliant
manufacturers’ demand goes to the certified metal, while the rest goes to the noncertified metal. A
set of smelters whose total capacity amounts to 𝑄 are certified, and the rest noncertified; the certified
smelters buy only verified ore; ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷) −𝑄 of the noncertified smelters’ demand goes to verified ore,
and the remaining goes to unverified ore. We will prove that if 𝑄 ∈ [ ̂︀𝐷, ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷)] and 𝑄 > 0, then
this strategy profile is an equilibrium (i.e., solves the manufacturers’ and smelters’ problems) and
it yields the outcome described in Theorem 2.5b with 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 = 𝑄 and 𝐷CM = ̂︀𝐷. Here
are some implications of such a strategy profile: (i) 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) = 𝑝0 (because
𝐷𝐶 = 𝐾𝐶 = 𝑄, 𝐷𝑁 = 𝐾𝑁 = 𝐷𝑇 − 𝑄); (ii) hence 𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 𝑝𝑒𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ); (iii) 𝑄𝑉 = ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷);
(iv) since 0 < 𝑄 6 ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷) < 𝐷𝑇 , 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐾𝐶 = 𝑄 > 0 and 𝐷𝑁 = 𝐾𝑁 = 𝐷𝑇 − 𝑄 > 0. Now,
given (ii), one may compare (2.8) and (2.9) to verify that the manufacturer’s problem (2.10) is
indeed solved when, for all 𝑖 ∈ ℳ, manufacturer 𝑖 chooses to be compliant if and only if 𝜌𝑖 > 𝛾𝑖.
6Suppose for a contradiction that 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , ̂︀𝐷) < 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷𝑇− ̂︀𝐷). Then all smelters would set 𝑡𝑗 = 1 and buy
only verified ore, that is, 𝑄𝑉 = 𝐷𝑇 and 𝑄𝑈 = 0. In this case, we would have 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , ̂︀𝐷) > 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷𝑇− ̂︀𝐷)
(according to Assumptions 2.3 and 2.4), yielding a contradiction.
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Given 𝑜𝑉 ( ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷), ̂︀𝐷) = 𝑜𝑈 (𝐷𝑇 − ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷), 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷) (by the definition of ̃︀𝑄(·)) along with properties (i),
and (iv), one can compare (2.3) and (2.4) to verify that the smelter’s problem (2.5) is indeed solved
when the smelters collectively follow the strategy profile described above (i.e., a set of smelters whose
total capacity amounts to 𝑄 are certified, and the rest noncertified; the certified smelters buy only
verified ore; ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷)−𝑄 of the noncertified smelters’ demand goes to verified ore, and the remaining
goes to unverified ore). In summary, under the conditions 𝑄 ∈ [ ̂︀𝐷, ̃︀𝑄( ̂︀𝐷)] and 𝑄 > 0, the strategy
profile we described is an equilibrium, which leads to the outcome described in Theorem 2.5b with
𝐾𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 = 𝑄 and 𝐷CM = ̂︀𝐷.
This subcase proves Proposition 2.2(3 ).
∙ Case a of Theorem 2.5. First, we show that an equilibrium of the type in Theorem 2.5a
must satisfy a number of properties in addition to those already listed in Theorem 2.5a. Second,
we show that if such an equilibrium exists, then we must have ̂︀𝐷 > 𝑄. Third, we show that if̂︀𝐷 > 𝑄, then there exists an equilibrium of the type in Theorem 2.5a. These complete the proof of
Proposition 2.2(4 ).
First, we observe the following properties of the type of equilibrium in this case. (i) The type of
equilibrium in Theorem 2.5a, by definition, has 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐷CM > 𝐾𝐶 . (ii) We must have 𝐷𝐶 −𝐾𝐶 =
−(𝐷𝑁 −𝐾𝑁 ) (because 𝐷𝐶 +𝐷𝑁 = 𝐾𝐶 +𝐾𝑁 by Assumption 2.1).
Given property (ii) above, we substitute 𝐷𝐶 −𝐾𝐶 = −(𝐷𝑁 −𝐾𝑁 ) in Condition (2.16) to reduce
it to 2𝑎(𝐷𝐶 −𝐾𝐶) > 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)− (𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM) ∧ 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM)). Note that this condition is
independent of 𝑗, so if any relationship (“>”, “=”, or “<”) between 2𝑎(𝐷𝐶−𝐾𝐶) and 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)−
(𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM) ∧ 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM)) holds for a smelter 𝑗, then it must hold for all smelters. Next we
show that, in this type of equilibrium, Condition (2.16) must hold as equality. For a contradiction,
suppose that 2𝑎(𝐷𝐶−𝐾𝐶) > 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)−(𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)∧𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM)) for all smelters. Then,
all smelters will choose to be certified, that is, 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐾𝑇 , but this contradicts the equilibrium’s
property that 𝐷𝐶 > 𝐾𝐶 . For another contradiction, suppose that 2𝑎(𝐷𝐶 −𝐾𝐶) < 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)−
(𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM) ∧ 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM)) for all smelters. Then, all smelters will choose to be noncertified,
that is, 𝐾𝑁 = 𝐾𝑇 and 𝐾𝐶 = 0, in which case we must have 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM) = 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM) (the
reasoning is the same as in Footnote 5), which implies that we must have 2𝑎𝐷𝐶 < 0, which yields
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another contradiction. Therefore, we must have
2𝑎(𝐷𝐶 −𝐾𝐶) = 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)− (𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM) ∧ 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM)). (2.17)
Since 𝐷𝐶 > 𝐾𝐶 , it follows from (2.17) that 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM) > 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM). Therefore, noncertified
smelters would buy only from the unverified pool, so 𝑄𝑉 = 𝐾𝐶 and 𝑄𝑈 = 𝐾𝑁 = 𝐷𝑇 −𝐾𝐶 . Thus,
we can write the last inequality as 𝑜𝑉 (𝐾𝐶 , 𝐷CM) > 𝑜𝑈 (𝐷𝑇 − 𝐾𝐶 , 𝐷NM). Furthermore, because
𝐷𝐶 = 𝐷CM > 𝐾𝐶 (property (i) above), the last inequality combined with Assumption 2.3 allows
us to conclude 𝑜𝑉 (𝐾𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) > 𝑜𝑈 (𝐷𝑇 −𝐾𝐶 , 𝐷𝑇 −𝐾𝐶). Now, Assumption 2.4 allows us to observe
property (iii): 𝐾𝐶 > 𝑄.
Using the definitions of 𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) and 𝑝
𝑒






+ 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 )
𝐷𝐶−𝐾𝐶
𝐷𝐶
, and 𝑝𝑒𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) = 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ). Since 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) >
𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) and 𝐾𝐶 > 0 in this equilibrium, 𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) > 𝑝
𝑒
𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ). By observing (2.10)
and using the definitions of 𝜈cm(𝑖) and 𝜈nm(𝑖) from (2.8) and (2.9) respectively, we note that man-
ufacturer 𝑖 chooses to be compliant if and only if
𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶)𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖 < 𝑝
𝑒
𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 )𝐷𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖. (2.18)
Since 𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) > 𝑝
𝑒
𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ), if (2.18) holds for manufacturer 𝑖 ∈ ℳ, then manufacturer 𝑖
must have 𝛾𝑖 < 𝜌𝑖, that is, manufacturer 𝑖 must be compliance-prone. Therefore, in the type of
equilibrium in Theorem 2.5a, any compliant manufacturer must be compliance-prone, so we have
property (iv): 𝐷CM 6 ̂︀𝐷.
Second, supposing that the type of equilibrium in Theorem 2.5a exists, we conclude that ̂︀𝐷 > 𝑄
must hold (by the equilibrium property that 𝐷CM > 𝐾𝐶 along with 𝐾𝐶 > 𝑄 (property (iii)) and
𝐷CM 6 ̂︀𝐷 (property (iv)).
Third, we prove that if ̂︀𝐷 > 𝑄, then there exists an equilibrium of the type in Theorem 2.5a.
To do so, assuming ̂︀𝐷 > 𝑄, we will specify a particular strategy profile, which we will show is
an equilibrium (i.e., solves the manufacturers’ and smelters’ problems) and leads to the outcome
described in Theorem 2.5a. Let 𝑥 ∈ (𝑄,𝐷𝑇 ] be a number that satisfies (2.14) (the existence of 𝑥 is







and only compliant manufacturers demand certified metal; the set of certified smelters is such that
the total certified capacity is equal to 𝜅(𝑥), and only certified smelters purchase verified ore. Here









}︁ d𝑖 = 𝑥 (by the definition of 𝑥).
(ii) 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐷CM = 𝑥 (since only compliant manufacturers demand certified metal).
(iii) 𝑄 < 𝐾𝐶 < 𝐷𝐶 (because 𝐾𝐶 = 𝜅(𝑥) and 𝜅(𝑥) ∈ (𝑄, 𝑥) by Lemma 2.3).
(iv) 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) > 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) (by (iii) and Assumption 2.2).
(v) 𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶)
𝐾𝐶
𝐷𝐶
+ 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 )
𝐷𝐶−𝐾𝐶
𝐷𝐶
and 𝑝𝑒𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) = 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) (by
(iii) and (2.7)).
(vi) 𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) > 𝑝
𝑒
𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) (by (iv) and (v)).
(vii) 𝑄𝑉 = 𝐾𝐶 (since only certified smelters purchase verified ore).
(viii) 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)− 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM) = 2𝑎(𝐷𝐶 −𝐾𝐶) > 0: Given properties (ii), (iii), and (vii),
we note that 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM) = 𝑜𝑉 (𝜅(𝑥), 𝑥) and 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM) = 𝑜𝑈 (𝐷𝑇 − 𝜅(𝑥), 𝐷𝑇 − 𝑥). Therefore,
𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)−𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM) = 𝑜𝑉 (𝜅(𝑥), 𝑥)−𝑜𝑈 (𝐷𝑇 −𝜅(𝑥), 𝐷𝑇 −𝑥) = 2𝑎(𝑥−𝜅(𝑥)) where the last
equality follows from the definition of 𝜅(𝑥) (Definition 2.1). The property follows because 𝑥 = 𝐷𝐶
and 𝜅(𝑥) = 𝐾𝐶 by (ii) and (iii), respectively.
We first show that the strategy profile we specified above solves the manufacturers’ problems.
Because of (vi), a noncompliant manufacturer facing problem (2.9) would demand only noncer-
tified metal. Hence, if manufacturer 𝑖 chooses to be noncompliant, then its profit is 𝜈nm(𝑖) =
𝑝𝑒𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) + 𝜌𝑖. Therefore, by examining the manufacturer’s problem (2.10), we observe that
manufacturer 𝑖 chooses to comply if and only if 𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶)+ 𝛾𝑖 < 𝑝
𝑒
𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 )+ 𝜌𝑖. This last in-




substituting the expressions for 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) and 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) from Assumption 2.1 in 𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶)
and 𝑝𝑒𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) given in (v)). Noting from properties (ii) and (iii) above that 𝐷𝐶 = 𝑥 and
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𝐾𝐶 = 𝜅(𝑥), the last inequality is equivalent to (2.19). Thus, manufacturer 𝑖 chooses to comply if
and only if (2.19) holds, which is what is what manufacturers do in the strategy profile we specified.
We next show that the strategy profile we specified above solves the smelters’ problems. Because
of (viii), a noncertified smelter facing problem (2.4) would demand only unverified ore. Hence, if
smelter 𝑗 chooses to be noncertified, then its profit is 𝜋ns(𝑗) = (𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 )−𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM)−𝑐𝑗)𝐾𝑗 .
Therefore, by examining the smelter’s problem (2.5), we observe that smelter 𝑗 chooses to be certified
if and only if (𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶)− 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)− 𝑐𝑗)𝐾𝑗 > (𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 )− 𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM)− 𝑐𝑗)𝐾𝑗 . This
last inequality is equivalent to 2𝑎(𝐷𝐶−𝐾𝐶) > 𝑜𝑉 (𝑄𝑉 , 𝐷CM)−𝑜𝑈 (𝑄𝑈 , 𝐷NM) (which can be verified
using Assumption 2.1). We note from property (viii) that the last inequality holds as an equality,
which implies that any smelter 𝑗 is indifferent between being certified or noncertified. Therefore,
all smelters’ problems are indeed solved when the strategy profile is as we specify.
Proposition 2.1, Theorem 2.1, Theorem 2.2, Corollary 2.1, and Theorem 2.3 all follow from
Proposition 2.2 as we argue next. By reviewing parts (1 ) through (4 ) of Proposition 2.2, observe
that there exists an equilibrium with 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐷𝑇 and 𝐷CM = ̂︀𝐷 if and only if 𝑝0 > 𝑜𝑉 (𝐷𝑇 , ̂︀𝐷)−
𝑜𝑈 (0, 𝐷𝑇 − ̂︀𝐷). This observation yields Proposition 2.1. Once again, reviewing parts (1 ) through
(4 ) of Proposition 2.2, we notice that if ̂︀𝐷 < 𝑄, there is no equilibrium with shortage of certified
metal. In contrast, if ̂︀𝐷 > 𝑄, the equilibria described in parts (1 ) and (3 ) of Proposition 2.2 are
not possible. Therefore, if ̂︀𝐷 > 𝑄, either there is a shortage and the equilibrium is the type in
part (4 ), or the entire market is certified as in the equilibrium of part (2 ). This observation yields
Theorem 2.1. Theorem 2.2 and Corollary 2.1 are direct consequences of part (3 ) of Proposition 2.2.
Theorem 2.3 is a direct consequence of part (4 ) of Proposition 2.2.
Appendix 2.D Proof of Results in Section 2.5
Proof of Theorem 2.4. In this proof, we assume that the current equilibrium is not the “all-certified”
equilibrium (i.e., 𝐷𝐶 = 𝐾𝐶 = 𝐷𝑇 as in part (2 ) of Proposition 2.2); in that case, there is no need
to target any additional manufacturers. When ̂︀𝐷 6 𝑄, the equilibrium is part (1 ) or (3 ) in
Proposition 2.2. In all of these equilibria, the effective prices of certified and noncertified metals are
equal (in part (1 ), the effective prices of both metal types are 𝑝0, and part (3 ) has the property
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that 𝑝𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) = 𝑝𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 )). Therefore, a manufacturer is compliant if and only if 𝜌𝑖𝜏𝑖 > 𝛾𝑖;
that is, turning on the penalty of any manufacturer in {𝑖 : 𝑖 ∈ 𝑇 ′ and 𝜌𝑖 > 𝛾𝑖} induces it to become
compliant.
When ̂︀𝐷 > 𝑄, the equilibrium is part (4 ) in Proposition 2.2 (given that we exclude the possibility
of all-certified equilibrium in part (2 ) of Proposition 2.2). Manufacturer 𝑖 is compliant if and
only if (2.18) holds, where 𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶) > 𝑝
𝑒
𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ) (implication (vi) on p. 42). Let 𝜉 :=
𝑝𝑒𝐶(𝐷𝐶 ,𝐾𝐶)−𝑝𝑒𝑁 (𝐷𝑁 ,𝐾𝑁 ). It then follows from (2.18) that turning on the penalty of manufacturer 𝑖
induces it to become compliant in equilibrium if and only if 𝑖 ∈ 𝑇 ′ and 𝜌𝑖 > 𝜉𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖.
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3 Building Alliances for Corporate Social Responsibility
Abstract. Following the Dodd-Frank Act’s mandate that public companies disclose
the use of conflict minerals in their products and processes, five well-known companies
established an alliance and initiated a fund to audit mineral suppliers. Since contribut-
ing to a common fund has minimal direct benefits—audits are public and companies
have equal access to certified suppliers regardless of contributions—companies have an
incentive to free ride. Nevertheless, the initiative was successful: the alliance was es-
tablished and dozens of other companies also contributed. We propose two factors that
explain this success: the initial catalyst of an alliance and the status-seeking behavior of
lower-status companies that subsequently contributed. To capture companies’ incentives
to free-ride, we model the funding initiative as a public goods game and incorporate the
two factors: (1) an invitation stage where some of the companies can form an alliance
and make an initial contribution to the public good, and (2) status-seeking behavior, by
which low-status firms want to be associated to high-status firms. We use the model to
show how the combination of both factors leads to high contributions. We then conduct
a laboratory experiment to test the effect of the two factors and how they interact. Our
experiment shows that the invitation stage is key to high contributions. In particular,
the formation of an alliance significantly increases group contribution. As our model
predicts, we find evidence of status-seeking behavior which influences whether and how
an alliance forms. Surprisingly, we find that high-status companies not in an alliance
also contribute after the invitation stage. We attribute this unexpected result to higher
moral responsibility for the high-status companies. Our findings demonstrate important
insights for companies that seek to address industry-wide social responsibility problems.
45
3.1 Introduction
In response to pressure from legislation, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and investors,
manufacturers have been working to avoid “conflict minerals” from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (the Dodd-Frank Act, see U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2013; Development
International 2017, Walt and Meyer 2018).1 Tracing the sources of minerals used to finance armed
conflicts is challenging for two reasons. First, it requires working closely with smelters in remote
regions less subject to pressure from regulation and NGOs. Second, only a few hundred smelters
worldwide process the minerals (King 2014), while countless companies worldwide—including thou-
sands of publicly traded companies in the U.S.—use them (Bayer and de Buhr 2011). As a result,
each smelter may supply many manufacturers, sharply limiting the influence of an individual man-
ufacturer over the smelter’s practices.
A group of well-known manufacturers recognized the need for an industrial alliance to strengthen
their influence as they work with the smelters to trace the sources of minerals. In addition such an
alliance avoids individual manufacturer audits which may lead to “auditing fatigue” for a smelter
facing numerous downstream manufacturers. As a result, the manufacturers established the Re-
sponsible Minerals Initiative (RMI) to audit and certify smelters who shun conflict minerals (Zhang
et al. 2017).2 Using a consistent protocol, the RMI independently audits smelters (Responsible Min-
erals Initiative 2018). A key component of the RMI is the Initial Audit Fund (IAF) that reimburses
smelters for their first annual audit and relies entirely on corporate donations (D’Esposito 2012,
Responsible Minerals Initiative 2019a).3 Initially, executives from Intel successfully persuaded their
counterparts at Apple, GE, HP, and Microsoft to help launch the IAF (Weaver 2012, Responsible
Minerals Initiative 2019a). Subsequently, more than twenty other companies contributed (Respon-
sible Minerals Initiative 2019a).
Similar industrial alliances exist for other social responsibility causes. For example, in the phar-
maceutical industry, a group of companies formed the Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Initiative to
jointly audit suppliers for ethics, fair labor, health and safety, environmental protection, and man-
agement systems. By avoiding duplication of auditing efforts, these audits achieve cost and resource
1The minerals are commonly known as 3TGs for their initials (tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold ore) and
are used in the manufacturing of various devices such as consumer electronics.
2The RMI was formerly the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative.
3The IAF was formerly the Early-Adopters Fund.
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savings (Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Initiative 2018b,c,a, Chen et al. 2019a). Similarly, after the
tragic Rana Plaza collapse that killed 1,100 people in 2013, more than 150 brands set up the Accord
on Fire and Building Safety to improve safety in the Bangladeshi garment industry. The signatories
annually contribute to the Accord Foundation to maintain the programs (Thomasson 2014, Accord
on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh 2017, Chen et al. 2019a). Finally, in business education,
a coalition of corporate and academic organizations founded The PhD Project to support under-
represented minorities in business doctoral programs and establish a pipeline of minority business
leaders (The PhD Project 2018a,b). The common feature of these alliances is that many companies
share the same social responsibility issue. In some cases an alliance of organizations with combined
resources and market power have greater clout in addressing the problem; in other cases, coordinat-
ing the compliance effort helps spread the cost, avoid duplication, and possibly achieve economies
of scale.
Among the alliances, the RMI is especially successful (Young 2015) and motivated our research.
The success of the RMI’s Fund is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, its benefits are
equally shared among all manufacturers—those who contribute and those who do not. In fact, the
RMI publicly displays the list of certified smelters for all manufacturers to view and use. In the
RMI’s own words, “Participating smelters or refiners . . . are publicly listed on the RMI’s website for
all actors in the supply chain to view and use in their sourcing decisions, regardless of whether they
are a member of RMI or not” (Responsible Minerals Initiative 2019a). As a result, contributing to
the Fund does not give a manufacturer a procurement advantage over other manufacturers. Second,
manufacturers derive minimal direct benefits from contributing to the Fund. A manufacturer cannot
appease an NGO or a regulator merely by donating to a fund; it appeases them by demonstrating
that its minerals come from legitimate sources. Furthermore, manufacturers who contribute do not
actively advertise their contribution to appeal to customers.
These characteristics make the IAF resemble a public good, for which “use of a unit of the good by
one agent does not preclude its use by other agents” (Mas-Colell et al. 1995, p. 359). Interestingly,
while public goods typically suffer from the free-rider problem and hence underprovision, the IAF
has received continued corporate donation, making it the most successful industry-led effort on
conflict minerals (Young 2015). In this paper, we seek to understand what drove the success of the
IAF and why companies contribute to the IAF in spite of the incentive to free ride.
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Figure 3.1: Screenshot of the IAF’s Website
A screenshot of a part of the web page of the Initial Audit Fund (in three segments to save space) (source: Responsible
Minerals Initiative 2019a).
A screenshot of the IAF’s website (Figure 3.1) exhibits two salient features. First, the website
includes a complete listing of all companies that have contributed to the IAF, highlighting the five
initial contributors above the subsequent contributors. Second, the initial contributors generally
have more valuable brands than the subsequent contributors. In Forbes World’s Most Valuable
Brands ranking, all five initial contributors were highly ranked, while the majority of the subsequent
contributors fell out of the top 100 (Forbes 2013; see electronic companion 3.A for the list).4 Based
on these two focal features of the IAF, we conjecture that two factors could help explain the IAF’s
success and, more broadly, should be considered by companies seeking to address a common social
responsibility problem: (1) the existence of an early invitation stage, in which a company can invite
others to form an alliance and commit to contribute to the initiative before all other companies
decide whether to contribute; and (2) the heterogeneity in the status of the companies—in terms
of their brand values—leading to status-seeking behavior of low-status companies. Status-seeking
behavior has been documented extensively in the literature, both theoretically and experimentally
(see, for example, Ball et al. 2001 and Kumru and Vesterlund 2010 for experimental evidence on
individuals, Ball et al. 2001 for a discussion on earlier theoretical work, and Heffetz and Frank 2011
42013 is the year the IAF was launched.
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for a survey on empirical and experimental evidence on social status). In our setting, status-seeking
behavior would imply that low-status companies—those with a less known brand—may want to
be associated with high-status companies, resulting in an additional incentive to contribute to the
Fund when high-status companies are among the initial contributors.
This paper addresses the following research questions: (1) Are the invitation stage and the hetero-
geneity in companies’ statuses relevant in establishing a successful alliance with high contributions?
(2) If so, do the two factors interact?
We study, both from a theoretical and experimental perspective, success drivers for social re-
sponsibility initiatives that address a problem shared among several companies. Our contribution is
two-fold. Our theoretical model and experimental design allow us to uncover the behavioral drivers
leading to high contributions, and our experimental results derive important managerial insights for
companies seeking to start such initiatives.
To study the problem, we analyze a two-stage public goods game with four players each repre-
senting a company, two with high status and two with low status.5 An invitation stage in which
one company may invite another to form an alliance and commit to contribute is followed by a
contribution stage in which any company can make a contribution. We compare four variants of
the game: a baseline case with neither heterogeneity in status nor an invitation stage; a case with
heterogeneity in status but no invitation stage; a case with no heterogeneity in status but with an
invitation stage; and a full case with both heterogeneity in status and an invitation stage. We
solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium in each case. We show that both the invitation stage and
the heterogeneity in status are necessary for contributions to arise, and that the total contribution
depends on the difference between the levels of status and the extent to which companies value it.
We test the predictions of the theoretical model with a laboratory experiment. The experimen-
tal results show that the invitation stage is key to generating high contributions. Interestingly,
the successful formation of an alliance significantly increases group contribution, with or without
heterogeneity in status. Nevertheless, status does matter. When there is heterogeneity in compa-
nies’ statuses, the decisions in the invitation stage are consistent with “status-seeking” behavior.
In particular, a low-status company significantly prefers to invite a high-status company to jointly
5The game is modified version of the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) public goods game (Plott
et al. 1985, Isaac and Walker 1988a,b).
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establish an alliance than to invite another low-status company. However, we find that among
non-alliance members facing the same type of alliance, a high-status company is even more likely
to contribute than a low-status company. Our results suggest that while status-seeking preferences
explain low-status companies’ behavior well, a sense of higher “moral responsibility” seems to be
the behavioral driver behind the high-status companies’ contributions.
Our results provide useful managerial insights for companies seeking to address a shared social
responsibility problem. Both our theoretical model and experimental results indicate that establish-
ing an alliance is key to reaching an overall high contribution. While in the formation of the IAF
all initial contributors were companies with well-known brands, our results suggest that a company
with a relatively lower brand value can also initiate an effective alliance—to do so, they should invite
a company with high brand value, who will be more likely to join. In addition, while the IAF was
established by a company with high brand value inviting other companies with high brand value to
join, our results suggest that a company with high brand value can also start a successful alliance
by inviting a company with low brand value. Once the alliance is established, other companies
with high brand value may also contribute out of a sense of moral responsibility to be part of the
initiative.
3.2 Literature Review
Our work is related to various literature streams. Kim and Davis (2016) review conflict minerals
reports that firms submit to the Securities and Exchange Commission and identify the complexity in
the structure of the supply chain as a difficulty for monitoring. Noting the emergence of NGOs and
industrial efforts to overcome the obstacle, Berman et al. (2017) show empirically that transparency
and traceability initiatives have been able to reduce the risk of conflict, and Zhang et al. (2017)
show with a supply network model that an industrial alliance to pool the auditing efforts is effective
in reducing the use of noncertified minerals. Focusing on the various programs on conflict minerals,
Young (2015) identifies the RMI—which motivates our research—as the largest and most central
industry-led effort. We contribute to this literature by exploring the incentives at work in the
formation of an industrial alliance that coordinates the compliance efforts.
More broadly, our work complements the literature on socially responsible supply chain manage-
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ment. The majority of the work in this area focuses on how an individual buyer induces a supplier
to comply (Plambeck and Taylor 2016, Chen and Lee 2016, Cho et al. 2018, Kraft et al. 2019). Also
focusing on a single buying firm, Kalkanci and Plambeck (2019a) study how managers can optimize
the investors’ valuation of the buying firm through auditing, remediation, and disclosure decisions.
Instead of focusing on an isolated buyer, our work is closest to existing research on multiple buyers
auditing shared suppliers. Caro et al. (2018) and Chen et al. (2019a) study different supply chain
models with two buyers and show the myriad benefits that arise when an alliance of buyers audits
a shared supplier. In particular, Chen et al. (2019a) demonstrate the tendency of buyers to avoid
auditing the shared supplier when acting independently without an alliance. Fang and Cho (2019)
study a supply chain in which multiple buyers audit a single supplier and show that buyers are able
to sustain coalitions for joint auditing. We complement the existing literature by exploring the con-
ditions that favor the formation of an alliance by a group of buyers for a shared social responsibility
concern.
Given the main features of the IAF, we model the companies’ decision to join the Fund as a
decision to contribute to a public good (see Marwell and Ames (1981), Andreoni (1988), Isaac and
Walker (1988b), Andreoni (1995) for seminal work; see Ledyard (1995) and Vesterlund (2016) for an
extensive survey). In particular, we incorporate two main characteristics of the IAF: an invitation
stage where an alliance of initial contributors can be formed, and heterogeneity in companies’ status.
The existence of an invitation stage relates our work to the literature on sequential public goods
games. Existing research shows that whether sequential moves increase contribution highly depends
on the context. In games with two players Andreoni et al. (2002) and Nosenzo and Sefton (2011)
show that when the benefits from the public good are heterogeneous the effect of sequential moves on
group contribution is mixed, while Potters et al. (2005) find that when there is imperfect information,
letting the informed player contribute first increases group contribution. In finitely repeated games
with four players (with fixed matching), Halloran et al. (2006) find that allowing players to commit
a portion of their endowment to the public good does not affect the group contribution. In contrast,
Güth et al. (2007) find that allowing only one player to contribute early significantly increases
group contribution, and Rivas and Sutter (2011) find that a voluntary first mover is more effective
in inducing high group contribution than an exogenously designated first mover. Arbak and Villeval
(2013) study a one-shot game with multiple players and focus on identifying what motivates players
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to lead when one volunteer can make an initial contribution. Our work is different from the previous
literature in that it focuses on the establishment of an alliance and its effects on group contribution.
We also study the role of status on the formation of alliances and contribution—this leads to a
second stream of public goods literature related to our work. Kumru and Vesterlund (2010) find
that, in a simultaneous move game with two players, a low-status player mimics a high-status player,
inducing the high-status player to contribute more, together leading to greater group contribution
when the high-status player contributes first. Eckel et al. (2010) designate one player as the central
player in a group of four and find that the peripheral players mimic the central player more when
the central player has high rather than low status. We contribute to the stream by studying how
status influences the formation of an alliance of early contributors and subsequent contribution.
At a higher level, our research falls within the field of behavioral supply chain management, sur-
veyed by Chen and Wu (2019). In the domain of social preferences in particular, the extant research
mostly focuses on the interaction between one buyer and one supplier. Factors such as fairness (Cui
et al. 2007, Loch and Wu 2008, Katok and Pavlov 2013), trust and trustworthiness (Özer et al. 2011,
2014, Spiliotopoulou et al. 2016, Özer and Zheng 2017, Beer et al. 2017), and long-term relational
concerns (Davis and Hyndman 2017) have shown to be important to understand buyer-supplier re-
lations. In the domain of social responsibility, Kraft et al. (2018) find that consumers value greater
visibility regarding a company’s social responsibility practices in the upstream supply chain. We
contribute to this literature by studying the interactions among same-tier companies (buyers) in
the context of raising funds for a shared social responsibility initiative.
3.3 Theoretical Model
We consider a game with four companies where each company chooses to contribute or not to a social
responsibility project that benefits every company in the group. Motivated by the characteristics of
the IAF, we assume that—as in standard public goods games—the marginal benefit of contributing
does not cover the cost of contributing. Individual companies have no incentive to contribute,
but every company is better off if all companies contribute than if no company contributes. To
isolate the effects of an invitation stage (where an alliance can be formed) and of status, we analyze
separately four different variants of the game. First, we present a baseline model with neither an
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invitation stage nor a difference in status.6 Second, we incorporate heterogeneity in status in the
model: companies have either high or low status and the utility of a company depends on the status
of others she interacts with. In particular, we incorporate in the model the status-seeking behavior
of low-status companies. Third, we put aside the model with status momentarily and add to the
baseline model an invitation stage (before the contribution stage) where a company may invite
another to form an alliance. Fourth, we study a full model with both heterogeinity in status and
an invitation stage. Note that four is the minimum number of companies that allows us to study
high- (and low-) status companies in the roles of both initiators and invitees in the full model. We
study the equilibrium in pure strategies of the static games without the invitation stage, and the
subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies of the extensive games with the invitation stage.
3.3.1 Baseline Model
We consider a single-stage (i.e. contribution stage) baseline model with four companies. Let 𝑁 =
{1, 2, 3, 4} be the group of companies (players) in the game. Each company has an endowment 𝑤 > 0
and, motivated by Kumru and Vesterlund (2010), we make the assumption that each company either
contributes her entire endowment or does not contribute at all . That is, company 𝑖’s contribution
is 𝑐𝑖 ∈ {0, 𝑤} for 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 (and we denote 𝑐−𝑖 := (𝑐𝑘)𝑘∈𝑁−𝑖 the contributions of other companies in
the group). A binary decision captures the fact that when companies contribute to the IAF, they
are automatically included on the list of contributors—independent of the amount contributed. In
fact, the website does not publish each companies’ contribution amounts nor does any source easily
accessible to the public.7 In the contribution stage, companies make their decisions simultaneously.
The total amount the group contributes to the social responsibility project generates a benefit of
𝑏 > 0 per unit to each company, regardless of the company’s contribution. Thus a company’s profit
is given by her initial endowment, minus her contribution, plus the return of the project. More
6Note that this setting resembles a canonical voluntary contribution mechanism public goods game with
binary decisions.
7In addition, binary decisions allow us to model status (in section 3.3.2) in a way that is consistent with
the previous literature. In our status-seeking model, a low-status company derives utility from “being
associated” to a high-status company. A binary contribution allows this association to either exist or not
(and not depend on the contribution level each company chooses), consistent with the literature (Ball
et al. 2001, Kumru and Vesterlund 2010).
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specifically, company 𝑖’s profit is:




To ensure the game captures the main features of the IAF, we make the following canonical
assumptions for public goods games (Fehr and Gächter 2000, Kumru and Vesterlund 2010, Reuben
and Riedl 2013):
Assumption 3.1. (a) The marginal benefit of contribution to the contributor herself does not
cover the marginal cost of contribution, that is 𝑏 < 1;
(b) Every company is better off if all companies contribute than if no company contributes: |𝑁 |𝑏 >
1 (i.e., 𝑏 > 1|𝑁 | =
1
4).
Assumption 3.1a implies that independent of the other companies’ decisions, a company seeking
to maximize her own profit should never contribute. If this assumption did not hold, all the
companies would have incentive to contribute unilaterally and the IAF would not have been needed.
Assumption 3.1b implies that if every company contributes, the benefit the social responsibility
project brings to each company, 𝑏|𝑁 |𝑤, exceeds the cost 𝑤 the company incurs to contribute to
the project. In this case, every company is better off than if they had all held on to their own
endowment, rendering the project efficient.
There is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium in the baseline model:
Proposition 3.1. In equilibrium, no company contributes to the social responsibility project in the
baseline model.
The proofs of all results are in the electronic companion.
3.3.2 Heterogeneity in Status
We now incorporate heterogeneity in companies’ statuses into the baseline model and assume two
companies have a higher status than the other two companies. We represent company 𝑖’s status
by a status score 𝑠𝑖 ∈ {𝑠𝐿, 𝑠𝐻} corresponding to low-status and high-status companies respectively
with 𝑠𝐿 < 𝑠𝐻 .
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To capture the status-seeking behavior of low-status companies, we assume that company 𝑖’s
utility from contributing to the social responsibility project alongside another company 𝑗 has an
additional status term given by:
𝑓𝑖𝑗(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑗) = 𝛾 · (𝑠𝑗 − 𝑠𝑖)+ · 1{𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑗>0} (3.2)
where the behavioral parameter 𝛾 > 0 represents a company’s concern for status.8 Note that
𝑓𝑖𝑗(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑗) = 𝛾(𝑠𝐻 − 𝑠𝐿) if 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠𝐿, 𝑠𝑗 = 𝑠𝐻 and 𝑐𝑖 > 0, 𝑐𝑗 > 0, and 𝑓𝑖𝑗(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑗) = 0 otherwise.
Combining the monetary profit and the utility from status, company 𝑖’s utility is




where 𝜋𝑖(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐−𝑖) is as defined in (3.1).9
We show that in equilibrium it is never optimal to contribute: heterogeneity in status by itself—
without an invitation stage—results in no contributions in equilibrium. Intuitively, a high-status
company derives no utility from status (her utility is as in Proposition 3.1) and does not contribute.
Since high-status companies do not contribute, low-status companies do not derive utility from
status and do not contribute either.
Proposition 3.2. In the one-stage game with two low-status companies and two high-status com-
panies with utilities given by (3.3), no company contributes in equilibrium.
3.3.3 Invitation Stage
In order to reproduce the sequence of events that allowed for the IAF to arise, we now modify the
baseline model and incorporate an initial stage where an alliance can be formed. Specifically, we
8We model status-seeking behavior in a way analogous to Kumru and Vesterlund (2010) and Ball et al.
(2001). Note that, as in Kumru and Vesterlund (2010), we assume that a company’s aversion to being
associated with a lower status company is negligible.
9We also consider an alternative model where a low-status company gains the same amount of utility
from association with high-status companies regardless of whether one or more high-status companies
contribute. Formally, the utility of company 𝑖 is
𝑢𝑖(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐−𝑖) = 𝜋𝑖(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐−𝑖) + max
𝑘∈𝑁−𝑖
𝑓𝑖𝑘(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑘).
The equilibrium is similar to that of the model we present in the paper except that more stringent
assumptions on the parameters are needed for an alliance and contributions to arise.
55
consider a two-stage game with an invitation stage followed by a contribution stage. In this section
we consider the case without heterogeneity in and preference for status; we reintroduce status in
the full model presented in the next subsection.
In the invitation stage, an initiator is exogenously and randomly selected from among the four
companies. The initiator decides whether (or not) to invite one other company to form an alliance
to commit to contribute early. If the initiator decides to invite a company, she chooses which
company to invite; then the invitee decides whether to accept the invitation or to reject it.10 If
the initiator sends an invitation and the invitee accepts it, the two companies form an alliance
and the invitation stage ends with the two companies in the alliance committed to contribute.
The commitment is binding: the committed companies will contribute to the social responsibility
project. If either the initiator decides not to send an invitation or the invitee declines the invitation,
no alliance is formed and the invitation stage ends without any company committed to contribute.
When an alliance is not formed, each of the four companies can decide whether to contribute in the
subsequent contribution stage, which reduces the game to the baseline case (in which no company
contributes by Proposition 3.1). If no alliance is formed the companies other than the initiator
and the invitee do not directly observe the invitation process or who the initiator and the invitee
are. On the other hand if an alliance is formed, the two members of the alliance will be announced
publicly (without differentiating the initiator and the invitee) at the end of the invitation stage.
In the contribution stage, every company who has committed in the invitation stage automatically
contributes her endowment 𝑤 into the social responsibility project. Each uncommitted company
(the two companies who are not part of the alliance if there is an alliance, or all four companies if
there is no alliance) can choose whether to contribute or not.
We assume that the initiator is exogenously and randomly selected for simplicity.11 This allows
us to focus on how the status of the initiator influences the equilibrium and to have opportunities
where companies from either status are the initiators. In addition, we focus on the interesting case
where, when only two companies contribute, the benefit from the project to each company is not
large enough to justify contribution. Otherwise any invitation would be accepted in equilibrium, as
accepting always makes the invitee better off. In the case of the IAF, this is reflected by the fact
10Note that in this section the other companies are homogeneous, so the initiator is indifferent between
which company to invite.
11In the experiment, the initiator is randomly selected by the computer program.
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that the initial contributors actively seek to extend the initiative to the other members of the RMI.
To this end, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 3.2. A company is better off holding onto her own endowment than if only she and
one other company contribute while the others do not: 2𝑏𝑤 < 𝑤 or 𝑏 < 12 .
Proposition 3.3. In the case with an invitation stage (and without utility from status), in equilib-
rium the initiator is indifferent between sending an invitation or not, and between which company
to invite (if an invitation is sent). If an invitation is sent, the invitee will decline the invitation. No
company contributes to the social responsibility project in equilibrium.
With the invitation stage (but without utility from status), no alliance is formed and no contri-
butions are made in equilibrium.
3.3.4 Full Model (Heterogeneity in Status and Invitation Stage)
Lastly, we analyze the full model with an invitation stage and heterogeneity in and concern for
status. We solve by backward induction starting with the final contribution stage and rolling back
in sequence to the previous decisions in the game.
Contribution Stage.
We first analyze the uncommitted company’s optimal strategy in the contribution stage. Note that
a committed company does not have a decision to make in the contribution stage as her endowment
will be automatically contributed to the social responsibility project.
The concern for status 𝛾 is critical to the low-status uncommitted company’s decision. We analyze
three cases corresponding to three levels of 𝛾:12
Case LCS (low concern for status). 𝛾 < 12
(1−𝑏)𝑤
(𝑠𝐻−𝑠𝐿) .
Case MCS (moderate concern for status). 12
(1−𝑏)𝑤
(𝑠𝐻−𝑠𝐿) < 𝛾 <
(1−𝑏)𝑤
𝑠𝐻−𝑠𝐿 .
Case HCS (high concern for status). 𝛾 > (1−𝑏)𝑤𝑠𝐻−𝑠𝐿 .
12Throughout the paper, we omit the relatively uninteresting cases of equality in the condition on the
parameters (e.g., 𝛾 = 12
(1−𝑏)𝑤
𝑠𝐻−𝑠𝐿 precisely), where the company will be indifferent between two decisions
from the two adjacent cases of inequality in the condition.
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Proposition 3.4. In the contribution stage,
(a) When the concern for status is low (case LCS), a low-status uncommitted company will not
contribute. When the concern for status is moderate (case MCS), a low-status uncommitted company
will contribute if and only if both high-status companies contribute. When the concern for status
is high (case HCS), a low-status uncommitted company will contribute if and only if at least one
high-status company contributes.
(b) A high-status uncommitted company will not contribute.
Because a high-status company does not gain any utility from status by being associated with
another company in the group, in the contribution stage a high-status uncommitted company is
concerned only with her monetary profit and does not contribute. A low-status company gains utility
from being associated with high-status companies; therefore, her contribution decision critically
depends on her concern for status, 𝛾. When the concern for status is low, the additional utility
from status is insufficient to justify contribution. When the concern for status is moderate, a low-
status uncommitted company contributes if both high-status companies contribute and, in doing so,
derives a utility from status equal to 2𝛾(𝑠𝐻 −𝑠𝐿). When the concern for status is high, a low-status
uncommitted company contributes even if only one high-status company contributes, in which case
she derives 𝛾(𝑠𝐻 − 𝑠𝐿) in utility from status.
We note that when the concern for status is low (case LCS), no company contributes in the
contribution stage and therefore, no company has incentive to form an alliance in the invitation
stage. Thus, no company contributes at any point in the game:
Proposition 3.5. Under case LCS, an alliance will not be formed in the invitation stage and there
will be no contribution in the contribution stage.
In the remaining analysis, we focus on the more interesting cases MCS and HCS where the utility
a low-status company can derive from being associated with a high-status company is sufficently
high that alliance formation and contributions are possible.
Invitee’s Decision to Accept.
We next analyze the invitee’s decision to accept an invitation, assuming that every company follows
its optimal strategy in the subsequent contribution stage. There are four types of invitations: from
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a high-status company to a high-status company (H→H), from a high-status company to a low-
status company (H→L), from a low-status company to a high-status company (L→H), and from a
low-status company to a low-status company (L→L). If the invitation is accepted, we represent the
alliance type as HH, HL, LH, or LL, where the first letter represents the status of the initiator and
the second that of the invitee.
In preparation for the analysis, we distinguish between the following two cases:
Case LMB (low marginal benefit). The benefit to a contributor when three companies contribute
is less than the cost to the contributor: 3𝑏𝑤 < 𝑤 or equivalently, 𝑏 < 13 .
Case HMB (high marginal benefit). The benefit to a contributor when three companies contribute
is greater than the cost to the contributor: 3𝑏𝑤 > 𝑤 or equivalently, 𝑏 > 13 .
This distinction is relevant because whether a high-status invitee accepts an invitation from a
low-status initiator depends on whether the benefit to the invitee (when three companies contribute)
exceeds the invitee’s cost of contribution.
We note that, whether an invitee profits from accepting an invitation depends on (1) whether
the invitee gains utility from status by contributing along with the initiator and (2) how many
uncommitted companies will contribute along with the alliance in the contribution stage.
We must analyze separately the invitee’s decision for each of the four possible invitation types. A
low-status invitee will decline an invitation from a low-status initiator because there is neither utility
gain from status nor anticipated subsequent contribution. Since a high-status company does not
derive utility from status, a high-status invitee will accept an invitation from a low-status initiator
only when the total number of contributors is sufficient to make a profit. This happens if and only if
the low-status uncommitted company contributes subsequently (case HCS) and three contributors
are sufficient to make a profit (case HMB). A low-status invitee will accept an invitation from a high-
status initiator when her concern for status is high (case HCS), or when it is intermediate (case MCS)
and 𝛾 > (1−2𝑏)𝑤𝑠𝐻−𝑠𝐿 . In these cases, the utility from contributing alongside a high-status initiator is
sufficient to justify the low-status invitee’s acceptance (even if no other company contributes in the
following stage). If her concern for status is not sufficiently high (case MCS and 𝛾 < (1−2𝑏)𝑤𝑠𝐻−𝑠𝐿 ), even
if an HL alliance is formed, having a single high-status contributor in the alliance is not sufficient to
induce the remaining low-status uncommitted company to contribute, thus the low-status invitee
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has no incentive to accept in the first place. Finally, a high-status invitee will accept an invitation
from a high-status initiator both in HCS and MCS since the invitee anticipates the resulting HH
alliance will induce contribution from both low-status companies, ensuring that the invitee derives
a profit under Assumption 3.1b.
Proposition 3.6. An L→L invitation will be declined; an L→H invitation will be accepted if and
only if both cases HCS and HMB hold; an H→L invitation will be accepted if and only if case HCS,
or case MCS with 𝛾 > (1−2𝑏)𝑤𝑠𝐻−𝑠𝐿 holds; an H→H invitation will be accepted both in HCS and MCS.
Equilibrium.
Finally, we characterize the equilibrium strategy of the initiator and the subgame-perfect equilib-
rium.
An initiator chooses to invite another company or not depending on whether the invitee will
accept and whether the initiator can profit from the group contribution or gain utility from status.
By Proposition 3.6, an L→L invitation will always be declined, so for a low-status initiator, inviting
another low-status company is equivalent to not inviting any company. Hence, a low-status initiator
can only meaningfully invite a high-status company. By Proposition 3.6, an L→H invitation is
accepted if and only if both cases HCS and HMB hold. These conditions also ensure that the
low-status initiator is compensated for the cost of contributing, resulting in the only equilibrium in
which an alliance is formed with a low-status initiator.
Theorem 3.1 (equilibrium with low-status initiator). If the initiator has low status,
(a) Under case MCS or LMB, in equilibrium, the low-status initiator is indifferent between invit-
ing either company and not inviting; any invitee will decline the invitation; and no company con-
tributes at any stage of the game;
(b) When cases HCS and HMB hold, in equilibrium the low-status initiator invites a high-status
company, who accepts the invitation; the remaining low-status uncommitted company also contributes
in the contribution stage; the remaining high-status uncommitted company does not contribute.
Under either case HCS or MCS, a high-status initiator maximizes her utility by inviting the
other high-status company who accepts the invitation (Proposition 3.6), inducing both low-status
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uncommitted companies to contribute in the following stage. In equilibrium, all four companies
contribute. Note that in case HCS, a high-status initiator invites the other high-status company
in equilibrium—if the initiator chose to invite a low-status company (off equilibrium), the invitee
would also accept the invitation, resulting in an alliance of type HL. Nevertheless, a high status
initiator prefers inviting the other high-status company over a low-status company, as this results
in four companies contributing in total rather than three.
Theorem 3.2 (equilibrium with high-status initiator). If the initiator has high status, in the unique
equilibrium under either case HCS or case MCS, the initiator invites the other high-status company,
who accepts the invitation; the two low-status uncommitted companies contribute in the following
stage; and every company contributes to the social responsibility project.
3.4 Experimental Design
We design a laboratory experiment to test the predictions from our theoretical model. We program
the experiment using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). At the beginning of each session the instructions
are displayed on each subject’s screen and simultaneously read out loud by the experimenter. Each
session consists of (1) ten rounds of a corporate social responsibility game (CSR game) that exactly
conforms to our theoretical model, (2) a pro-social orientation task (3) a risk aversion task, (4) a
debriefing questionnaire and (5) a demographics questionnaire. At the end of the experiment, each
subject is paid based on her performance in the CSR game (one of the ten rounds of the CSR game
played is randomly selected for payment), the pro-social orientation task, and the risk aversion task.
3.4.1 Corporate Social Responsibility Game
Subjects take the role of one of four companies who may contribute to a common fund to address
a social responsibility problem the companies share. The process takes the form of a voluntary
contribution game that follows the model in section 3.3. Subjects play ten rounds of the CSR game,
and are randomly and anonymously matched into groups of four companies in each round. At
the beginning of each round, each company is endowed with 𝑤 = 20 points. Through subsequent
decisions she may choose to either keep all 20 points in her private fund or to contribute all 20
points into a public fund for a shared social responsibility project. At the end of each round, the
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total amount in the public fund is multiplied by a factor of 1.6 and then distributed equally among
the four companies in the group; that is, the marginal benefit 𝑏 = 1.64 = 0.4. The return from the
public fund is added to each company’s private fund.
We conduct four different treatments varying in two dimensions—following a 2 × 2 design. The
baseline game consists of homogeneous companies (in terms of status) and a single “contribution
stage.” All four companies in a group simultaneously decide whether to contribute their full en-
dowment or not to contribute. Three variants on the baseline game arise from (1) the addition of
an invitation stage at the beginning of the game, (2) inducement of status differences among the
companies, or (3) both.
Invitation Stage. With an invitation stage, two companies may commit to contribute (form
an alliance) prior to a contribution stage where all uncommitted companies simultaneously decide
whether to contribute or not. The invitation stage begins with the computer randomly selecting
one company in each group as the initiator. The initiator may choose to invite one other company
to form an alliance or not to invite anyone. If the invitee accepts the invitation, the initiator and
the invitee form an alliance and are committed to contribute their entire endowment to the fund. If
the initiator does not invite any other company or if the invitee declines the invitation, they remain
uncommitted and may each choose to contribute or not in the contribution stage. The companies
who are neither the initiator nor the invitee are uncommitted. Capturing a main feature of the
IAF, at the end of each round the computer displays to all the subjects in a group the list of all
companies who have contributed. Also analogous to the IAF’s website, in the treatments where an
invitation stage is available and an alliance was formed, the computer lists those companies who
are part of the alliance (initial contributors) separately and above the uncommitted companies who
contributed later in the contribution stage.13 The computer calculates each company’s profit and
displays it to all the companies in the same group, and then random re-matches subjects for the
following round.
13A contributor is identified as “Company 1, high brand value” or “Company 3, low brand value,” etc. The
subjects always remain anonymous.
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Inducement of Status. When heterogeneity in status is induced, the instructions include an
explanation of the concept of “brand value” in business.14 Then each company is randomly assigned
a status, either “high brand value” or “low brand value”, and the instructions indicate that a high-
brand-value company has a “much higher” brand value than a low-brand-value company. In the
treatments with induced status, each group consists of exactly two high-status companies and two
low-status companies, and each company sees the status of the other companies in the same group.
To sustain the difference in status throughout the session, high-status companies will see a golden
star on their screen when the status is assigned and in all decision stages in the CSR game, while
the low status subjects will not see this star. In addition, a subject’s assignment to a high- or low-
status company remains fixed throughout the experiment.
The four treatments of the CSR game are labeled: treatment B (for “baseline”) which has nei-
ther induced status nor an invitation stage, treatment S (“status”) with status inducement but no
invitation stage, treatment I (“invitation”) with no status inducement but with an invitation stage,
and treatment F (“full”) with both status inducement and an invitation stage. We follow a between
subject design, i.e., each subject participates in only one treatment.
3.4.2 Additional Tasks
Pro-social Orientation Task. We conduct a dictator game (Forsythe et al. 1994) to assess
subjects’ pro-social orientation (Kraft et al. 2018). In this game, player 1 is initially endowed with
10 points and player 2 is endowed with 0 points. Player 1 decides how much of her endowment
(between 0 and 10) to give player 2. Player 1’s payoff is her initial endowment minus the amount
given to player 2, and player 2’s payoff is the amount received from player 1. Following the strategy
method, all subjects make decisions as player 1 and then the computer randomly determines which
subjects are assigned the role of player 1 and which subjects are player 2. Each player 1 is randomly
and anonymously matched with a player 2 and player 1’s decision is implemented for payment.
14The explanation is the following: “Brand value is the net present value of the estimated future cash flows
attributable to the brand. According to Forbes, an American business magazine, a firm creates brand
value if, for example, it invests in innovative ideas and research; it positively impacts the everyday lives
of its customers; it maintains high standards of quality in its products; and it understands and addresses
unique needs.”
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Initiator Invitation Accepted? Alliance Contributors
H H→H Yes HH HHLL
L L→H Yes LH HLL
H H→H Yes HH HHLL
L Indifferent No × ×
H, L Indifferent No × ×
Equilibrium behavior in the full model as a function of the marginal benefit 𝑏 and concern for status 𝛾. The legend
on the right lists all possible equilibria in each shaded region. “x” indicates no alliance or no contribution.
Risk Aversion Task. This task aims to assess subjects’ risk preferences (Holt and Laury 2002).
Subjects choose between a fixed payoff of a specific number of points, ranging from 0.5 point to
7.5 points in 0.5 point increments, and a 50-50 chance lottery between a payoff of 0 or 8 points.
Subjects’ decisions are elicited following the strategy method (subjects make a decision for each
possible situation) and then one of the decisions is randomly selected for payment.
After finishing these tasks, subjects complete a debriefing questionnaire, which includes questions
about subjects’ reasoning behind their decisions in the CSR game, and a demographics questionnaire.
3.5 Hypotheses
By Propositions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 we expect that no alliance is formed in treatment I and no
contributions are made in treatments B, S, and I. In contrast, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate
that in the full model, an alliance and positive contributions can arise.
Hypothesis 3.1 (Comparison Between Treatments). Alliances and contributions arise only in
treatment F.
For the rest of the section we focus on treatment F. Figure 3.2 illustrates the equilibrium behavior
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in the full model given marginal benefit 𝑏 and concern for status 𝛾. By Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2
we focus on the region 14 < 𝑏 <
1





gray and intermediate gray regions). These regions correspond to cases MCS (below the line
𝛾 = 𝑤(1−𝑏)𝑠𝐻−𝑠𝐿 ) and HCS (above the line 𝛾 =
𝑤(1−𝑏)
𝑠𝐻−𝑠𝐿 ). If the initiator has high status, by Theorem 3.2,
in these regions the initiator will invite the other high-status company and form an alliance of the
type HH, and both low-status companies will contribute in the contribution stage. We list the
contributors as HHLL (two high status and two low status). If the initiator has low status, in the
dark gray ( ) region (corresponding to the intersection of cases HCS and HMB) by Theorem 3.1
the initiator invites a high-status company and forms an alliance of the type LH; the remaining
low-status company contributes in the contribution stage. We list the contributors as HLL (one
high status and two low status). In the intermediate gray ( ) region (corresponding to case MCS or
case LMB) by Theorem 3.1 the low-status initiator is indifferent between inviting another company
or not as no alliance will be formed in equilibrium and no company will contribute. Finally in the
light gray ( ) region (corresponding to case LCS) by Proposition 3.5 no alliance is formed and no
contribution is made in equilibrium. We detail the equilibrium corresponding to each scenario in
the legend in Figure 3.2.
In the experiment, we choose marginal benefit 𝑏 = 0.4 (shown with a dashed line in Figure 3.2)
to allow for the maximum variety of equilibria to arise. In particular, we are most interested in the
regions above the line 𝛾 = 12
𝑤(1−𝑏)
(𝑠𝐻−𝑠𝐿) where our theory predicts that some companies will successfully
form an alliance and, when they do, some other companies will contribute to the project along with
the members of the alliance. We state our next hypothesis about the type of alliance that arises
according to the equilibrium predictions for this region:
Hypothesis 3.2 (Treatment F, 14 < 𝑏 <
1
2 : Alliance Types). (a) A high-status initiator invites
another high-status company, who accepts the invitation, and they form an alliance of the type HH.
(b) If the concern for status is high (case HCS), a low-status initiator invites a high-status
company, who accepts the invitation, and they form an alliance of the type LH. If the concern
for status is moderate (case MCS), a low-status initiator may or may not invite another company;
if she does, the invitee declines the invitation and an alliance is not formed.
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3.6 Experimental Results
We collected the data between September of 2017 and April of 2018 at a large public university in
the Midwest of the United States.15 Each session had 12 to 20 subjects, and lasted for about an
hour. Subjects received $0.25 per point plus a $5 show-up fee, and earned on average $14 (including
the show-up fee). In total, 264 subjects participated in the experiment (60, 48, 52, and 104 subjects
in treatments B, S, I, and F, respectively).
3.6.1 Comparison Between Treatments
We first compare the total group contribution across the four treatments. Recall that Hypothesis 3.1
predicts that only treatment F results in positive contributions. Interestingly, Table 3.1 shows that
the group contributions are significantly different across the four treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test
𝑝 < 0.001), but treatment I is not significantly different than treatment F.16 Specifically, pairwise
comparisons show that group contributions are not different across treatments B and S (11.1 vs.
12.0 points; Wilcoxon rank-sum test 𝑝 = 0.738) nor across treatments I and F (26.6 vs. 25.1 points;
𝑝 = 0.625). In addition, Figure 3.5 shows that the higher contribution in treatments I and F
relative to B and S remains quite consistent as rounds in a session progress.17 This result indicates
that the two treatments where there is an invitation stage lead to significantly higher contributions
than the two treatments that do not have an invitation stage—note that, treatments S and F have
significantly different group contributions (12.0 vs. 25.2 points; 𝑝 < 0.001) as do treatments B and
I (11.1 vs. 26.6 points; 𝑝 < 0.001). The results are confirmed using a linear regression of group
contribution on treatment indicator variables with subject random effects controlling for round,
as shown in Table 3.11. Taken together, these results demonstrate the importance of having an
invitation stage (where an alliance can be formed) on group contributions.18
15The average age of the subjects was 21 years. 94% were undergraduate students and the remainder
graduate students. 53% of the subjects were female. 62% identified themselves as white, 22% as Asian
or Pacific Islander, and the remainder as Hispanic, black/African American, multiracial, or other. 50%
declared business administration or economics as one of their majors.
16The Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test tests the hypothesis that multiple samples are from
the same population. It is a generalization of the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test to multiple samples.
17Figure 3.5 also shows that the contribution levels decline as rounds pass by in a session in all treatments,
a common result in public goods experiments (see for example Isaac and Walker 1988b, Kumru and
Vesterlund 2010, Arbak and Villeval 2013).
18Also note that in both treatments I and F, the frequency of companies forming an alliance is quite high
(43%) and companies’ average profit is significantly higher when an alliance is established than when it
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Table 3.1: Group Contribution by Treatment






Test 1: B=S=I=F <0.001
Test 2: B=S 0.738
Test 3: I=F 0.625
Average group contribution by treatment. Test 1: Kruskal-Wallis test on the hypothesis that the group contributions
from the four treatments are from the same population. Tests 2 & 3: Wilcoxon rank-sum test on the hypothesis that
the group contributions from the two treatments tested are from the same population.
Lab Result 1. The existence of an invitation stage, where an alliance can be formed, significantly
increases group contribution, regardless of whether companies are heterogeneous in status.
Our finding that an alliance can be successfully formed and high contributions may arise in
treatment I differs from Hypothesis 3.1, but is consistent with extant research on sequential public
goods experiments with multiple players. For example, Güth et al. (2007) find in a repeated game
setting that letting one subject in a group of four contribute early increases contribution. This
result is attributed to conditional cooperation by which a subject becomes more cooperative the
more cooperative the other subjects are. Arbak and Villeval (2013) find in a one-shot game with
three players that some subjects persistently volunteer to contribute early. The study identifies three
motives for this behavior: strategically distilling personal gains (anticipating others to reciprocate),
altruism, and a positive social image associated with leadership. We believe that some of these
explanations may also explain the high contributions in treatment I in our experiment. The result
suggests that if companies were homogeneous in their brand values, implementing an invitation
mechanism (allowing for the formation of an initial alliance) would be sufficient to ensure high
contributions. However, as we observed in the case of the IAF, in most real examples companies
are heterogenous in their brand values. In the next section we investigate whether and how the
heterogeneity in status plays a role in the alliance formation and in the subsequent contribution by
uncommitted companies. To do so we focus on treatment F, which has both heterogeneity in status
and an invitation stage.
is not, confirming the importance that alliances have on contribution (see Table 3.12 for details).
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Figure 3.3: Treatment F—Frequency of Each Type of Alliance

















Table 3.2: Treatment F—Frequency of Each Type of Alliance
Type of alliance Frequency Percent Test 1: Freq. = 25%(𝑝-value)
HH 25 22.3 0.586
HL 28 25.0 >0.999
LH 51 45.5 <0.001
LL 8 7.1 <0.001
Test 2: HH = HL 𝑝 = 0.784
Test 3: LH = LL 𝑝 < 0.001
Frequency of each alliance type. The percentage is relative to the total number of rounds in which an alliance is formed
(43% of all rounds). Test 1 is a two-sided binomial probability test on the hypothesis that the type of alliance occurs
with probability 25% among all rounds in which an alliance is formed. Test 2 is a two-sided binomial probability test
on the hypothesis that types HH and HL occur with equal frequency. Test 3 is a two-sided binomial probability test
on the hypothesis that the types LH and LL occur with equal frequency.
3.6.2 Treatment F: Interaction Between Alliance and Status
Status Matters: The Type of Alliance That Arises.
Hypothesis 3.2 predicts that only HH and LH types of alliance will arise, and only if the concern for
status is sufficiently high. Table 3.2 and Figure 3.3 show the frequency of each alliance type across
all rounds in the experiment.
Figure 3.3 shows that the four types of alliance are not equally likely to arise (frequencies: 25
HH, 28 HL, 51 LH, and 8 LL; Pearson’s 𝜒2-test 𝑝 < 0.001). If subjects were oblivious to status, we
would expect the four types of alliance to arise with the same probabiliy, each at 0.25. However,
Test 1 in Table 3.2 shows that while the frequencies of the types HH and HL are not significantly
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different from 0.25 (0.22, 𝑝 = 0.587 for HH; 0.25, 𝑝 > 0.999 for HL), the frequency of the LH type
is significantly higher than 0.25 (0.46, 𝑝 < 0.001) and that of LL is significantly lower than 0.25
(0.07, 𝑝 < 0.001). The fact that all alliance types are not equally likely to arise implies that subjects
perceive a difference in status and incorporate it in their decisions leading to the formation of an
alliance.
Pairwise comparisons of the frequency of alliance types with the same initiator status show that
an alliance LH arises significantly more frequently than an alliance LL (51 vs. 8; binomial probability
test 𝑝 < 0.001, Test 3 in Table 3.2). This result is consistent with the theoretical prediction resulting
from low-status companies’ status-seeking behavior. While an LH alliance arises in equilibrium if
the concern for status is sufficiently high (case HCS), an LL alliance does not arise in equilibrium
in any case (HCS, MCS, or LCS). When we compare alliance types HH and HL, we find that
their frequencies are not significantly different (25 vs. 28; 𝑝 = 0.784, Test 2 in Table 3.2) while,
by Hypothesis 3.2, we expect more HH types than HL types. Note that, in theory, both low- and
high- status invitees would accept and invitation from a high-status initiator (case HCS); however,
in theory a high-status initiator prefers to invite a high-status company over a low-status company
as it results in a total of four contributors in equilibrium rather than three.
Overall, the results generally are consistent with Hypotheses 3.2: both HH and LH alliance types
arise with a relatively high frequency (25 and 51 out of 112 rounds in which an alliance is formed).
In addition, alliance type LL only arises 8 out of 112 rounds, consistent with Hypothesis 3.2. A
result not predicted by our theory is that the frequency of alliance type HL is relatively high, 28 out
of 112 rounds in which an alliance is formed. To understand this result, in the following sections we
take a closer look at the initiator’s, the invitee’s, and the uncommitted company’s decision making.
Lab Result 2. The four types of alliance do not arise with equal probability. Alliance type LH arises
significantly more often than LL; the frequencies of alliance types HH and HL are not significantly
different.
Initiator’s Decision.
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 predict that, with the marginal benefit 𝑏 we use in the experiment, if the
concern for status is high (case HCS), then both the high- and low-status initiators will invite a
high-status company; if the concern for status is moderate (case MCS), the high-status initiator will
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Table 3.3: Treatment F—Initiator’s Decision
High-status initiator Low-status initiator
(1) (2)
Invite 89 97
Not invite 39 35
Test 1: Invite = Not invite (𝑝-value) <0.001 <0.001
Test 2: Both initiators equally likely to invite (𝑝-value) 0.481
Invite a high-status company 43 79
Invite a low-status company 46 18
Test 3: Either status equally likely (𝑝-value) 0.832 <0.001
Test 4: Each company equally likely (𝑝-value) 0.003 0.002
Test 1: Binomial probability test on the hypothesis that an initiator is equally likely to invite and not to invite.
Test 2: Wilcoxon rank-sum test on the hypothesis that the high- and low-status initiators are equally likely to invite
some company. Test 3: Binomial probability test on the hypothesis that the event of an initiator inviting a high-status
company and the event of the initiator inviting a low-status company are equally likely. Test 4: Binomial probability
test on the hypothesis that an initiator invites each of the other three companies equally likely, regardless of status.
invite another high-status company, and the low-status initiator will be indifferent between inviting
anyone and not inviting, since any invitation from the low-status initiator will be declined.
Invite or Not? The upper half of Table 3.3 shows that both a high-status initiator and a low-
status initiator are more likely to invite another company than not (frequency: 89 vs. 39 for high
status, binomial probability test 𝑝 < 0.001; 97 vs. 35 for low status, 𝑝 < 0.001). In addition,
the likelihood of making an invitation is no different across the two types of initiator (the high-
status initiator invites 69.5% of the time and the low-status initiator 73.5%; Wilcoxon rank-sum
test 𝑝 = 0.481). Thus, the result is consistent with theoretical prediction for the case with high
(and moderate) concern for status.
Lab Result 3. Both the high- and low-status initiators are more likely to invite some company than
not to invite any company.
Whom to Invite? We first consider the invitation decision of a low-status initiator. We test the
hypothesis that a low-status initiator invites a company of either status equally likely, i.e., given that
the initiator invites some company, she chooses a high-status company with probability 0.5. Test 3 in
column (2) of Table 3.3 shows that a low-status initiator invites high-status companies significantly
more often than low-status companies (79 vs. 18 counts; binomial probability test 𝑝 < 0.001). Since
a group consists of two companies of each status (high and low), a low-status initiator chooses
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Table 3.4: Treatment F—Likelihood of Being Invited by Status
Company is invited Company is invited
(Initiator has high status) (Initiator has low status)
(1) (2)







N. of subjects 99 98
Probit regression with subject random effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance is denoted *
𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01. Company is Invited is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the company
is invited. Company has high status is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the company’s status is high and
zero otherwise. The data includes companies who are not the initiator in the current round.
from a pool of two high-status companies and one low-status company. If the initiator disregards
status, she will invite a high-status company twice as often as a low-status company. In contrast,
Test 4 in column (2) of Table 3.3 shows that the low-status initiator’s preference for inviting a
high-status company is significantly high, even after taking into account group composition. A low-
status initiator invites high-status companies significantly more than twice as often as she invites
low-status companies (79 vs. 18 counts; binomial probability test 𝑝 = 0.002). These results largely
confirm that low-status initiators prefer to invite a high-status company over the other low-status
company. Finally, Column (2) in Table 3.4 confirms that, among those companies who are not the
initiator, high-status companies are more likely than low-status companies to receive an invitation
from a low-status initiator (probit regression with subject random effects, 𝛽 = 0.583, 𝑝 < 0.001).
Overall, these results are consistent with status-seeking behavior and the theoretical predictions in
section 3.3.
We next turn to the invitation decision of a high-status initiator. Again, we begin by testing
whether an initiator is equally likely to invite a company with either status. Test 3 in column (1) of
Table 3.3 shows that the frequencies with which a high-status initiator invites a high- and low-status
company are not significantly different (43 vs. 46 for high and low respectively, binomial probability
test 𝑝 = 0.832). However, this does not imply that the high-status initiator is oblivious to status.
Since the group consists of two companies of each status, a high-status initiator chooses from a pool
of two low-status companies and one high-status company. If the initiator was oblivious to status,
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rather than observing her inviting high- and low-status companies equally likely, we should observe
low-status companies being invited twice as often as high-status companies. On the contrary, Test 4
in column (1) of Table 3.3 shows that when the initiator has high status the frequency of inviting a
low-status company is significantly lower than twice the frequency of inviting a high-status company
(binomial probability test 𝑝 = 0.003). In addition, the regression in column (1) of Table 3.4 confirms
that a high-status company is more likely than a low-status company to receive an invitation from a
high-status initiator (𝛽 = 0.531, 𝑝 = 0.003). Taken together, these results suggest that a high-status
initiator distinctly recognizes the difference in status and is more likely to invite the high-status
company when choosing among two low-status and one high-status companies.
Lab Result 4. A low-status initiator is more likely to invite a high-status company than a low-status
company. A high-status initiator, choosing between two low-status and one high-status companies,
is more likely to choose the high-status company out of the three.
Overall, the experimental results show that both high- and low- status initiators clearly distinguish
between the high- and low-status companies. In the following sections, we explore the decisions of
the invitee and the uncommitted companies.
Invitee’s Decision.
We take two perspectives in the analysis. We first take the invitee’s perspective, and look into
whether an invitee is equally likely to accept an invitation from an initiator of either status. We
then take the initiator’s perspective, and investigate whether both types of invitees are equally likely
to accept her invitation.
Invitee’s Perspective. For a high-status invitee, accepting an invitation from either a high- or a
low-status initiator is in line with the predictions of our theory. For a low-status invitee, accepting
an invitation from a high-status initiator is in line with our theory, while accepting an invitation
from a low-status initiator is not expected.
Table 3.5 presents the frequency with which an invitation is accepted for either status of the ini-
tiator and of the invitee separately. We observe that, while high-status invitees accept an invitation
from an initiator with either status with relatively similar frequency, low-status invitees are (direc-
tionally) more likely to accept an invitation from a high-status company than an invitation from a
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Table 3.5: Treatment F—Frequency of Acceptance
Invitee status
High Low
(1) (2) Test 2 (𝑝-value)
Initiator status High 58.1 % 60.9 % 0.794(43) (46)
Low 64.6 % 44.4 % 0.117
(79) (18)
Test 1 (𝑝-value) 0.487 0.237
Frequency of acceptance. Number of observations reported in parentheses. Test 1: Wilcoxon rank-sum test on the
hypothesis that an invitee accepts an invitation from an initiator of either status equally likely. Test 2: Wilcoxon
rank-sum test on the hypothesis that an invitee of either status is equally likely to accept an invitation.
low-status company. These results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, particularly for
the case where concern for status is high. Test 1 shows that the difference between accepting an
invitation from a high- or low-status initiator is not statistically significant for an invitee of either
status (58.1% H→H vs. 64.6% L→H, Wilcoxon rank-sum test 𝑝 = 0.487 for a high-status invitee;
60.9% H→L vs. 44.4% L→L, 𝑝 = 0.237 for a low-status invitee). The results are confirmed when we
regress an indicator variable which takes value 1 if an invitee accepts an invitation on the initiator’s
status (probit regression with subject random effects 𝛽 = 0.129, 𝑝 = 0.533 for high-status invitees;
𝛽 = 0.735, 𝑝 = 0.584 for low-status invitees; see Table 3.13).
Lab Result 5. A low-status invitee is (directionally) more likely to accept an invitation from a
high-status initiator than from a low-status initiator. A high-status invitee is equally likely to accept
an invitation from an initiator of either status.
Initiator’s Perspective. A high-status initiator’s invitation being accepted by an invitee of either
status is in line with our theory. On the other hand, according to theory, a low-status initiator’s
invitation is only accepted by a high-status invitee. Consistent with the theoretical prediction,
Table 3.5 shows that a high-status initiator’s invitation is equally likely to be accepted by a company
of either status (58.1% vs. 60.9%), while a low-status initiator’s invitation is (directionally) more
likely to be accepted by a high-status invitee (64.6% vs. 44.4%). Test 2 in Table 3.5 shows no
significant difference for an initiator of either status (Wilcoxon rank-sum test 𝑝 = 0.794 when the
initiator is of high status; 𝑝 = 0.117 when the initiator is of low status). Table 3.13 shows similar
results with probit regressions with subject random effects.
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Lab Result 6. A high-status initiator’s invitation is equally likely to be accepted by an invitee
of either status. A low-status initiator’s invitation is directionally more likely to be accepted by a
high-status invitee than by a low-status invitee.
Summary of the Invitation Stage.
By analyzing the invitation stage, we find (1) evidence of a relatively high concern for status, and
(2) results that are consistent with status-seeking behavior of low-status companies. High-status ini-
tiators are equally probable to invite a high- or low-status company, although since the high-status
initiator is choosing from a pool of two low-status companies and just one high-status company,
we observe a statistically significant preference for inviting the high-status company. Nonetheless,
the result that a high-status initiator invites companies of either status with equal probability ex-
plains our surprising observation that the frequencies of the HL and HH types of alliance are not
statistically different: a high-status initiator makes H→L and H→H invitations equally probable,
which the respective invitee is equally likely to accept. Then, a follow-up question is, why does
a high-status initiator not show a stronger preference for inviting a high-status company? In the-
ory, the high-status initiator prefers to invite another high-status company because the resulting
HH alliance will induce both remaining uncommitted companies of low status to contribute. In
comparison, an HL alliance will only induce the one remaining low-status uncommitted company
to contribute (Proposition 3.4). To answer this question, in the next section we explore whether
uncommitted companies behave according to theory in the contribution stage.
Contribution Stage.
We now look at the contributions of uncommitted companies in the contribution stage. Note that
we consider three alliance types HH, HL/LH, and LL. This is because the uncommitted companies
who are not part of an alliance cannot distinguish which of the two members of the alliance is the
initiator and which is the invitee. Therefore, alliances HL and LH are indistinguishable for the
uncommitted companies.
Effect of Alliance on Total Contribution. Proposition 3.4 predicts that if the concern for
status is high (case HCS), an HH alliance will induce both low-status uncommitted companies to
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Figure 3.4: Treatment F—Group Contribution by Alliance Type















Contribution by uncommitted companies
Contribution by members of alliance
Average group contribution when each type of alliance is formed and when no alliance is formed. The bottom part of
the bar corresponds to the average contribution by uncommitted companies–two companies when there is an alliance
and four companies when there is no alliance (dark gray); the top part of the bar corresponds to the contribution by
the two alliance members, when formed (light gray).
contribute in the contribution stage; an HL/LH alliance will induce the low-status but not the high-
status uncommitted company to contribute; and an LL alliance will not induce any high-status
uncommitted company to contribute. If the concern for status is moderate (case MCS), an HH
alliance will induce both low-status uncommitted companies to contribute; no other alliance type
will be able to induce any uncommitted company to contribute. Finally, Proposition 3.4 predicts
no contributions when an alliance was not formed.
Figure 3.4 shows the total group contribution under each alliance type. The total contribution
by the uncommitted companies is indicated in the bottom part of the bars (dark gray), while the
total contribution by the alliance members is indicated in the top part of the bars (light gray).
We note a few things from the figure. First, as discussed in section 3.6.1, the group contributes
significantly more when there is an alliance than when there is not. Second, the average contribution
by uncommitted companies is significantly higher when an alliance is formed than when no alliance
is in place. The average contribution by an uncommitted company is 7.41 points when there
is an alliance, and it is 0.676 points when an alliance was not formed (Wilcoxon rank-sum test
𝑝 < 0.001). Table 3.6 confirms this result with a regression of a dummy variable that takes the
value one if the uncommitted company contributes and zero otherwise, on a dummy variable that
takes the value one when an alliance was formed and zero otherwise. We observe that both high-
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Table 3.6: Treatment F—Contribution by Uncommitted Companies when Alliance Is Formed
Contribution by uncommitted company
High-status Low-status
(1) (2)







N. of subjects 52 52
Probit regression with subject random effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance is denoted *
𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01. The variable alliance formed is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if an
alliance is formed.
and low-status uncommitted companies are significantly more likely to contribute when an alliance
is formed than when an alliance was not formed (𝛽 = 2.380, 𝑝 < 0.001 for high-status companies;
𝛽 = 1.461, 𝑝 < 0.001 for low-status companies). Third, the three types of alliance are equally
effective in inducing contribution by uncommitted companies. The average contribution by the two
uncommitted companies is 5.2 points when the alliance is of type HH, 7.97 points for HL/LH, and
8.75 points for LL (Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test 𝑝 = 0.2991).
Lab Result 7. The total contribution by uncommitted companies in the contribution stage is sig-
nificantly higher when an alliance is formed. Every alliance type is equally effective in inducing the
uncommitted companies to contribute.
The fact that all alliance types are equally effective in inducing contributions by uncommitted
companies suggests that uncommitted high-status companies do contribute in the contribution stage
when an alliance was formed. This is an unexpected result not predicted by our theory, as high-
status companies do not derive any additional utility from status and therefore have no incentive
to contribute at the last stage of the game. In the next subsections we explore this result more
in-depth and we uncover the behavioral driver of this result.
Effect of Alliance Type on Individual Contribution. Proposition 3.4 predicts that with
moderate concern for status (case MCS) the low-status uncommitted company will contribute only to
an alliance of the type HH, and with high concern for status (case HCS) the low-status uncommitted
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Table 3.7: Treatment F: Contribution by Uncommitted Company with Alliance
Status of uncommitted company
High Low








Test 1 (𝑝-value) 0.822 0.407
Average contribution by an uncommitted company when each alliance type is in place. Number of observations
reported in parentheses. Test 1: Wilcoxon rank-sum test on the hypothesis that the uncommitted company contributes
equally likely to the two types of alliance the uncommitted company may face. Test 2 Wilcoxon rank-sum test on
the hypothesis that high- and low-status uncommitted companies are equally likely to contribute when an HL/LH
alliance is in place.
company will contribute both to an alliance of the type HH and HL/LH (since either alliance type
has at least one high-status member). A high-status uncommitted company is not expected to
contribute regardless of the alliance type.
Table 3.7 shows the average contribution by high- and low-status uncommitted companies when
the different types of alliance were formed. Low-status uncommitted companies contribute equally
to the two types of alliance, consistent with a high concern for status (5.20 points for HH vs. 6.58
points for HL/LH; Wilcoxon rank-sum test 𝑝 = 0.407). We confirm the result by regressing an
indicator variable that takes value one if the uncommitted company contributes and zero otherwise
on an indicator variable that takes value one if the alliance is of the type HH (see Table 3.14,
𝛽 = −0.144, 𝑝 = 0.714).
A result not predicted by the theory is that high-status uncommitted companies also contribute
in the contribution stage. Table 3.7 shows that a high-status uncommitted company’s average
contribution is 8.75 points when an LL alliance is formed vs. 9.37 points when an HL/LH alliance
is formed (Wilcoxon rank-sum test 𝑝 = 0.822). We confirm the result with a regression of an
indicator variable that takes value one if the uncommitted company contributes and zero otherwise
on an indicator variable that takes value one if the alliance is of the type LL (see Table 3.14,
𝛽 = −0.244; 𝑝 = 0.538). This result shows that high-status uncommitted companies are equally
likely to contribute to either an alliance LL or LH/HL, which is consistent with the fact that a
high-status company’s decision is not driven by status-seeking preferences.
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Table 3.8: Treatment F—Uncommitted Company Contribution by Status
Contribution by uncommitted company
(when alliance HL/LH was formed)







N. of subjects 73
Probit regression with subject random effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance is denoted *
𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01. The variable Own status high is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if the
company has high status.
Table 3.7 shows that high-status uncommitted companies not only contribute in the contribution
stage, but also that they contribute even more than low-status uncommitted companies when they
face the same type of alliance. To study this, we focus on the alliance HL/LH, which may be faced
by both high- and low-status uncommitted companies. Test 2 in Table 3.7 shows that the average
contribution by a high-status uncommitted company is 9.37 points vs. 6.58 points by the low-status
company (Wilcoxon rank-sum test 𝑝 = 0.075). In Table 3.8 we regress an indicator variable that
takes value one if the uncommitted company contributes (considering only cases where an alliance of
the type HL/LH was formed) and zero otherwise on an indicator variable that takes value one if the
company has high status and zero otherwise. The regression confirms that a high-status company
contributes significantly more often than a low-status company (𝛽 = 0.747, 𝑝 = 0.068).
Lab Result 8. When an alliance of the type HL/LH has been established the high-status uncom-
mitted company is significantly more likely to contribute than the low-status uncommitted company.
The experimental results show that all alliance types are equally effective at inducing later contri-
butions by uncommitted companies in the contribution stage. In fact, while the theory predicts that
only low-status uncommitted companies contribute in the contribution stage, the results show that
high-status uncommitted companies contribute as well (and even more than low-status companies).
This explains why the high-status initiator has no reason to favor inviting one type of company
over the other. Both high- and low-status invitees are equally likely to accept an invitation from a
high-status initiator (consistent with our theoretical prediction when concern for status is high), and
both HL and HH alliances induce the same expected contribution from uncommitted companies.
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Table 3.9: Treatment F—Effect of Pro-sociality on Uncommitted Companies’ Contribution
Contribution by uncommitted companies
(when alliance was formed)









N. of subjects 39 46
Probit regression with subject random effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance is denoted *
𝑝 < 0.10 ** 𝑝 < 0.05 *** 𝑝 < 0.01. Pro-social is an indicator variable taking value 1 if the company is pro-social and
zero otherwise.
The question remaining unanswered is: Why do high-status uncommitted companies contribute
in the contribution stage? A high-status company does not gain utility from status by contributing
along with the alliance members since she already has the highest status in the group. We conjecture
that having a high status may be perceived as having a higher “moral responsibility” to contribute
along with others. If this is the case, we would expect that more pro-social individuals will be more
likely to experience this sense of higher moral responsibility of joining others’ efforts. To explore the
idea, we next study whether pro-social preferences provide a good explanation for the high-status
companies’ behavior.
Effect of Pro-sociality. We elicit a measure of subjects’ pro-sociality based on their decision
in the additional pro-social orientation task. Specifically, we create a measure of pro-sociality by
taking the amount of points a subject chooses to give the other subject in the dictator game. We
define that a subject is “pro-social” if the amount she sends in the dictator game is greater than
or equal to the 75th percentile (= 4 points) of the pro-sociality measure, and we create a binary
variable, Pro-social, which takes value one if the subject is pro-social and zero otherwise.19
The experimental results show that pro-sociality is a good predictor of contributions by high-
status uncommitted companies when an alliance was formed, but not of contributions by low-status
uncommitted companies. In Table 3.9 we consider uncommitted companies in the contribution stage
19The results are qualitatively the same if we take the 65th and 85th percentiles.
79
when an alliance has been established, and we regress an indicator variable that takes value one
if the uncommitted company contributes and zero otherwise, on the indicator variable Pro-social.
The regression shows that pro-sociality drives contribution by a high-status uncommitted company
(column (1), 𝛽 = 1.100, 𝑝 = 0.045) but not by a low-status uncommitted company (column (2), 𝛽 =
1.038, 𝑝 = 0.179). This result suggests that, when an alliance is in place, high-status uncommitted
companies’ pro-sociality gets “triggered” leading to high contributions. On the other hand, low-
status uncommitted companies’ decisions appear to be less driven by their inherent pro-sociality
(possibly overshadowed by the status-seeking behavior). Note that in the same way that high-status
uncommitted companies are overall more likely to contribute when an alliance is in place (Table
3.6), pro-social high-status uncommitted companies also contribute more when an alliance was
established than when it was not (𝛽 = 2.025, 𝑝 = 0.002 in Table 3.15). This suggests that pro-social
companies may also be driven by a desire to reciprocate the initiator’s and invitee’s contributions.
To further explore whether high-status inherently reinforces the effect of pro-sociality on com-
panies’ decisions (or whether the invitation stage also plays a role) we test whether the effect is
also present in treatment S, where there is no invitation stage and alliances cannot be established.
We find that in treatment S, pro-sociality is not correlated with higher contributions by either a
high- or a low-status company (𝛽 = 0.104, 𝑝 = 0.826 for high status; 𝛽 = 0.408, 𝑝 = 0.154 for
low status—see Table 3.16). This suggests that experiencing the invitation stage elicits the sense
of “moral responsibility” of the high-status company. When the invitation stage is not present,
pro-sociality does not have an effect on companies’ decisions.
Lab Result 9. When an alliance is in place, pro-sociality drives contribution by a high-status
uncommitted company. Pro-sociality does not have a significant effect on high-status companies’
contributions in treatment S, which has no invitation stage and therefore no alliance.
Our analysis sheds light on the question of why high-status uncommitted companies contribute.
Given that other companies have committed to contribute, a sense of “moral responsibility” drives
pro-social high-status uncommitted companies to contribute. This is consistent with what we ob-
serve in the IAF example: the list of contributors on the IAF’s website shows that a number of
companies with a high brand value also contribute after the alliance has been established. Our re-
sults suggests that they do so out of a sense of higher moral responsibility as a high-status company,
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after having seen that other companies contributed to the IAF.
Effect of Alliance on Profit.
We review average round profit by role and status, separately when an alliance is formed and when
an alliance is not formed. Considering all roles combined, the results confirm that establishing an
alliance leads to significantly higher profits (28.2 points vs. 20.4 points for high- and low-status
combined, 𝑝 < 0.001—see Table 3.17). Interestingly, those who benefit the most from establishing
an alliance are low-status initiators (column (2)). According to the theory, alliances initiated by a
high-status company should be more profitable as they lead to four companies contributing rather
than three when the initiator is a low-status company. However, since in the lab uncommitted high-
status (pro-social) companies also contribute when an alliance is established, low-status initiators
can benefit highly from forming an alliance.
Discussion of Alternative Explanations
While subjects’ behavior throughout the experiment clearly demonstrates the influence of status in
their decision making, we also elicited subjects’ own perception of whether status played a role in
their decisions. A significant number of subjects in treatment F perceived that status influenced
their decisions. Specifically, in the debriefing questionnaire at the end of the session, 27.2% of the
subjects in treatment F said they agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “The brand values
influenced my decision-making” (46.4% of them had high status and 53.6% had low status; binomial
probability test 𝑝 = 0.851). This suggests that status not only affected subjects’ decisions (as is
reflected in the experimental results), but it was also one of the factors that subjects perceived as
a behavioral driver. In addition, this result provides further support for the status inducement
procedure used in the experiment.
While the theory predicts that both high- and low-status companies can initiate profitable al-
liances (as long as the concern for status is sufficiently high), strategic uncertainty may render it
risky to form an alliance. In this case, risk aversion may affect initiators’ and invitees’ decisions.
To test this, we elicit a measure of subjects’ risk aversion based on their decisions in the additional
risk aversion task.20 We regress companies’ decisions in each role on the risk aversion metric and
20We measure a subject’s risk aversion by the number of scenarios in which the subject chooses the fixed
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observe that the coefficient of the risk aversion metric is not significant for any role and any status
companies (see Table 3.18). This result suggests that risk aversion does not seem to be a main
behavioral driver in this setting.
3.7 Conclusion and Managerial Implications
We study the formation of an industrial alliance to fund a corporate social responsibility project
that benefits a group of companies which differ in their brand value. Recognizing the non-exclusivity
of the benefits from the project, we model the problem as a public goods game. We incorporate
two salient features from the IAF motivational example. First, we consider an invitation stage
(where an industry alliance can be formed) to be followed by a contribution stage where non-
alliance members can contribute as well. Second, we assume that companies are heterogeneous
in their status (capturing different brand values) and that low-status companies gain utility from
being associated with high-status companies by contributing along with them. Our model shows
that both the invitation mechanism and the heterogeneity in status and status-seeking behavior of
low-status companies are necessary for the successful formation of an alliance and for contributions
to arise in equilibrium. Whether and how the group of companies form an alliance and contribute
to the project depend critically on the extent to which the companies are concerned about status
and the marginal benefit each company derives from the project. In particular, within a focal range
of the marginal benefit, higher concern for status enables the companies to form an alliance in more
scenarios and increases the equilibrium group contribution to the project.
We conduct a laboratory experiment to test the predictions of our model. We find that the key
to high contribution is the opportunity to form an alliance, whether there is heterogeneity in status
or not. When both the invitation stage and heterogeneity in status are present, we confirm the
status-seeking behavior of low-status companies. A low-status initiator strongly prefers to invite a
high-status company than to invite a low-status company, and a low-status invitee is directionally
more likely to accept an invitation from a high-status initiator than from a low-status initiator. A
result not predicted by our theory is that, when an alliance has been established, not only low-status
companies contribute in a later contribution stage (a result consistent with status-seeking behavior)
payoff over the random payoff. We create a binary variable for risk aversion for analysis: a subject is
“risk averse” if the number of fixed options she chooses is greater than or equal to the 75th percentile of
the distribution (= 8.5).
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but high-status companies contribute as well. This is surprising because high-status companies do
not derive utility from status association (they already have high status) and contributing in the final
contribution stage cannot result in monetary gains. Our experimental design allows us to identify
the underlying behavioral driver behind this result: pro-social high-status companies develop a
sense of moral responsibility that drives them to contribute when an alliance is in place. The
finding is consistent with the contributions to the IAF—a number of high-brand-value companies
also contribute to the IAF after the initial round of contribution.
Our results have important managerial implications for companies seeking to address a common
social responsibility problem. Both our theoretical model and our experiment confirm that forming
an alliance of initial contributors is key to reach an overall high contribution. Then a follow-up
question is, how can companies successfully build such alliances? While in the case of the IAF all the
alliance members were companies with high-brand value (“status”), our theory and our experimental
results suggest that a low-brand-value company can also start an alliance that will be equally
effective in inducing contribution by non-alliance members. To increase the chances of forming an
alliance the low-brand-value company should approach some high-brand-value companies, who are
more likely to agree to jointly initiate the social responsibility project. In addition, while the IAF
was established by a high brand value company inviting other companies with high brand value to
join the alliance, our experimental results indicate that companies with high brand value can also
initiate a successful alliance by inviting companies with low brand value to join. Establishing the
alliance will induce other pro-social companies with high brand value to contribute out of a sense
of moral responsibility to be part of the initiative.
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Appendix 3.A Brand Value and Ranking of Contributors to IAF
Table 3.10: Contributors to IAF in Ranking of World’s Most Valuable Brands by Forbes
Forbes Ranking Contributor to IAF Brand Value ($b)
Initial Contributors
1 Apple 104.3





> 100 3M -
> 100 ABB -
> 100 Baxter Healthcare Corporation -
> 100 Becton, Dickinson and Company -
> 100 Best Buy -
84 Dell Inc. 6.4
84 EMC Corporation 6.4
44 Ford Motor Company 10.6
5 Google 47.3
> 100 GM -
20 Honda 21.1
4 IBM 50.7
> 100 Juniper Networks -
> 100 Lenovo -
> 100 Lockheed Martin -
72 Nokia 7.0
> 100 NXP Semiconductors -
> 100 On Semiconductor -
> 100 Qualcomm -
80 Sony Corporation 6.6
> 100 Tenneco -
> 100 Texas Instruments Inc. -
The ranking and estimated brand value of every contributor to the IAF in the World’s Most Valuable Brands ranking
by Forbes magazine in 2013 (Forbes 2013), the year the IAF was launched. The ranking includes only the top one
hundred brands. Dell acquired EMC Corporation in 2016.
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Appendix 3.B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1. For company 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 , given 𝑐−𝑖,








By Assumption 3.1a, 𝜋𝑖(0, 𝑐−𝑖) > 𝜋𝑖(𝑤, 𝑐−𝑖). Hence 𝑐𝑖 = 0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. For high-status company 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐻 , 𝑓𝑖𝑘(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑘) = 𝛾 · 0 · 1{𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑘>0} = 0,∀𝑘 ∈
𝑁 − 𝑖. Hence high-status company 𝑖 maximizes 𝜋𝑖(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐−𝑖) and as in the proof of Proposition 3.1
will not contribute. For low-status company 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐿, 𝑓𝑖𝑘(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑘) = 𝛾 · (𝑠𝐻 − 𝑠𝐿)+ · 0 = 0, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝑁𝐻
(because neither high-status company contributes) and 𝑓𝑖𝑘(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑘) = 𝛾 ·0 ·1{𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑘>0} = 0, ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝑁𝐿− 𝑖.
Therefore low-status company 𝑗 also maximizes 𝜋𝑖(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐−𝑖) and will not contribute. In equilibrium
no company contributes.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. As in the proof of Proposition 3.1 an uncommitted company will not
contribute in the contribution stage. In the invitation stage, if an initiator 𝑖 invites a company 𝑗,
the invitee 𝑗’s profit is
𝜋𝑗(𝑐𝑗 , 𝑐−𝑗) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
𝑤, if invitee 𝑗 declines so that 𝑐𝑗 = 0
2𝑏𝑤, if invitee 𝑗 accepts so that 𝑐𝑗 = 𝑤
(3.6)
By Assumption 3.2, 𝑤 > 2𝑏𝑤, so invitee 𝑗 will decline the invitation. Therefore the initiator’s
profit is equal to 𝑤 regardless of whether she invites some company (in which case the invitee will
decline the invitation) or not to invite any one. In equilibrium no company will contribute to the
project.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. We first look at the low-status uncommitted company’s problem. For
𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝐿, company 𝑖’s utility is
𝑢𝑖(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐−𝑖) = 𝑤 − 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑏
∑︁
𝑘∈𝑁





If both high-status companies contribute, i.e., 𝑐𝑗 = 𝑤,∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐻 , then











+ 2𝛾(𝑠𝐻 − 𝑠𝐿). (3.9)




𝑠𝐻−𝑠𝐿 , i.e., case HCS or MCS. If exactly one high-status company contributes, i.e., without loss
of generality 𝑐1 = 𝑤, 𝑐2 = 0, then











+ 𝛾(𝑠𝐻 − 𝑠𝐿) (3.11)
The low-status company 𝑖 contributes if and only if 𝑢𝑖(𝑤, 𝑐−𝑖) > 𝑢𝑖(0, 𝑐−𝑖), or 𝛾 >
(1−𝑏)𝑤
𝑠𝐻−𝑠𝐿 , i.e.,
case HCS. If neither high-status company contributes, i.e., 𝑐𝑗 = 0,∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐻 , then












By Assumption 3.1a 𝑏 < 1, so 𝑢𝑖(𝑤, 𝑐−𝑖) < 𝑢𝑖(0, 𝑐−𝑖). The low-status company 𝑖 will not contribute.
The high-status uncommitted company’s problem is identical to the problem in the proof of
Proposition 3.1. Hence a high-status uncommitted company will not contribute.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. By Proposition 3.4 with low concern for status (case LCS) no uncommit-
ted company will contribute in the contribution stage. A high-status invitee will get a utility of 2𝑏𝑤
by accepting any invitation and a utility of 𝑤 by declining. By Assumption 3.2 she will decline the
invitation. A low-status invitee will get a utility of 2𝑏𝑤 by accepting an invitation from a low-status
initiator and get 𝑤 by declining it. By Assumption 3.2 she will decline the invitation. If the initiator
is of high status, a low-status invitee will get 2𝑏𝑤+𝛾(𝑠𝐻−𝑠𝐿) by accepting the invitation and get 𝑤
by declining it. Therefore the low-status invitee will accept the invitation if 2𝑏𝑤+𝛾(𝑠𝐻 − 𝑠𝐿) > 𝑤𝐿
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and decline it otherwise. Nevertheless if 2𝑏𝑤 + 𝛾(𝑠𝐻 − 𝑠𝐿) > 𝑤𝐿 so that the low-status invitee will
accept an invitation from a high-status initiator, a high-status initiator will get 2𝑏𝑤 by inviting
a low-status company and get 𝑤 by not inviting any one. By Assumption 3.2 𝑤 > 2𝑏𝑤 so the
high-status initiator will never invite a low-status company. In summary, no alliance will be formed
and no contribution will be made in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.6. The invitee makes the decision to accept or to decline an invitation based
on the utility that each choice results in. By Proposition 3.4, a high-status uncommitted company
will not contribute whether an alliance is formed or not. Next, for each of the four types of
invitation, we analyze the effect of the formation of the alliance on the low-status uncommitted
companies’ decision in the contribution stage and whether the invitee should thus accept or decline
the invitation.
L→L By Proposition 3.4, if the alliance is not formed, the low-status companies will not con-
tribute. Therefore the utility of the low-status invitee if she accepts the invitation will be 2𝑏𝑤 and
if she declines will be 𝑤. By Assumption 3.2 she will decline the invitation.
L→H Under case MCS by Proposition 3.4 a low-status uncommitted company will not contribute
whether the alliance of the type LH is formed or not. Therefore the utility of the high-status invitee
if she accepts the invitation will be 2𝑏𝑤 and if she declines will be 𝑤. By Assumption 3.2 she will
decline the invitation.
Under case HCS by Proposition 3.4 a low-status uncommitted company will contribute if and
only if the alliance of the type LH is formed. Therefore the utility of the high-status invitee if she
accepts the invitation will be 3𝑏𝑤 and if he declines will be 𝑤. Therefore she accepts the invitation
under case HMB and declines under case LMB.
H→L Under case MCS by Proposition 3.4 a low-status uncommitted company will not contribute
whether the alliance of the type H→L is formed or not. Therefore the utility of the low-status invitee
if she accepts the invitation will be 2𝑏𝑤 + 𝛾(𝑠𝐻 − 𝑠𝐿) and if she declines will be 𝑤. Therefore she
accepts if and only if 2𝑏𝑤 + 𝛾(𝑠𝐻 − 𝑠𝐿) > 𝑤𝐿, or 𝛾 > (1−2𝑏)𝑤𝑠𝐻−𝑠𝐿 .
Under case HCS by Proposition 3.4 a low-status uncommitted company will contribute if and
only if the alliance of the type H→L is formed. Therefore the utility of the low-status invitee if she
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accepts the invitation will be 3𝑏𝑤+ 𝛾(𝑠𝐻 − 𝑠𝐿) and if she declines will be 𝑤. Therefore she accepts
if and only if 3𝑏𝑤+ 𝛾(𝑠𝐻 − 𝑠𝐿) > 𝑤, or 𝛾 > (1−3𝑏)𝑤𝑠𝐻−𝑠𝐿 , which case HCS implies. Hence she will accept
the invitation.
H→H Under both cases MCS or HCS the low-status uncommitted companies will contribute if
and only if the alliance of the type LL is formed. The utility of the high-status invitee if she accepts
the invitation will be 4𝑏𝑤 and if she declines will be 𝑤. By Assumption 3.1b the high-status invitee
will accept the invitation.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Under case MCS or LMB by Proposition 3.6 an invitee of either status will
decline an invitation from the low-status initiator. Therefore the initiator is indifferent between
inviting any company or not inviting any company. If she invites a company, the invitee will
decline. By Proposition 3.4 no company will contribute in the contribution stage.
Under the intersection of cases HCS and HMB by Proposition 3.6, while a low-status invitee will
still decline an invitation from the low-status initiator, a high-status invitee will accept. In the latter
case by Proposition 3.4 the low-status uncommitted company will contribute as well. Therefore the
low-status initiator’s utility if she invites a high-status company will be 3𝑏𝑤 + 𝛾(𝑠𝐻 − 𝑠𝐿) and if
she does not invite any company or invites a low-status company (who will decline) the low-status
initiator’s utility will be 𝑤. In case HMB the initiator will invite a high-status company.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Under case HCS by Proposition 3.6 any invitee will accept an invitation
from the high-status initiator. By Proposition 3.4 regardless of whether the initiator invites a high-
or low-status company to form the alliance, a low-status uncommitted company will contribute in
the contribution stage. On the other hand by Proposition 3.4 if the initiator does not invite any
company, no company will contribute. Therefore the high-status initiator’s utility will be 4𝑏𝑤 if she
invites the other high-status company, 3𝑏𝑤 if she invites a low-status company, and 𝑤 if she does
not invite any company. By Assumption 3.1b in equilibrium the high-status initiator will invite the
other high-status company.
Under case MCS by Proposition 3.6 a high-status invitee will always accept an invitation from
the high-status initiator and a low-status invitee will accept if and only if 𝛾 > (1−2𝑏)𝑤𝑠𝐻−𝑠𝐿 . If the
initiators invites the other high-status company, the equilibrium in the subgame will be identical
to that under case HCS and the initiator’s utility will be 4𝑏𝑤. If the initiator invites a low-status
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company, and if the invitee accepts, by Proposition 3.4 the low-status uncommitted company will
contribute but the high-status one will not. The initiator’s utility will be 3𝑏𝑤. On the other hand
if the low-status invitee declines, by Proposition 3.4 no company will contribute, so the high-status
initiator’s utility will be 𝑤. If the initiator does not invite any company, by Proposition 3.4 the
initiator’s utility will be 𝑤. By Assumption 3.1b in equilibrium the high-status initiator will invite
the other high-status company.
Appendix 3.C Additional Laboratory Results
Figure 3.5: Group Contribution Over Time




















Group contribution average by the round across all sessions and treatments.
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Treatment I 15.4 ***
(2.8)







N. of subjects 182
Test 1: S = F 𝑝 < 0.001
Test 2: I = F 𝑝 = 0.666
GLS regression with subject random effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance is denoted * 𝑝 < 0.10
** 𝑝 < 0.05 *** 𝑝 < 0.01. Tests 1 & 2: Wald 𝜒2-test on the hypothesis that the average group contribution is equal
between in the two treatments in comparison.
Table 3.12: Comparison of Treatments I and F
Frequency of alliance Profit with alliance Test: Profit> 20? (𝑝-value) Profit without alliance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment I 0.431 28.5 <0.001 20.6
Treatment F 0.431 28.2 <0.001 20.4
Rank-sum test (𝑝-value) 1.000 0.701 - 0.285
Table 3.13: Treatment F—Effect of Status on Acceptance
Accept
High-status invitee Low-status invitee High-status initiator Low-status initiator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initiator status high 0.129 0.735
(0.533) (0.584)
Invitee status high -0.107 0.445
(0.302) (0.330)
Round -0.0980 -0.170 -0.0663 -0.123*
(0.0719) (0.117) (0.0463) (0.0650)
Constant 1.06** 0.620 0.683* 0.446
(0.490) (0.761) (0.368) (0.475)
Observations 122 64 89 97
N. of subjects 49 39 40 44
Probit regression with subject random effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance is denoted *
𝑝 < 0.10 ** 𝑝 < 0.05 *** 𝑝 < 0.01. Variables: Accept is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if an invitation
is accepted; initiator status high is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if the invitation is from a high-status
initiator; invitee status high is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if the initiator invites a high-status company.
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Table 3.14: Treatment F—Contribution by Uncommitted Company to an Alliance
Contribution by uncommitted company
High status Low status
(1) (2)
Alliance type LL -0.244
(0.396)







N. of subjects 39 46
Probit regression with subject random effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance is denoted *
𝑝 < 0.10 ** 𝑝 < 0.05 *** 𝑝 < 0.01. The variable Alliance type LL is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if the
alliance is of the type LL and zero otherwise; Alliance type HH is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if the
alliance formed is of the type HH and zero otherwise. The baseline for the type of alliance is HL/LH.
Table 3.15: Treatment F—Contribution by Uncommitted Companies when Alliance Is Formed









N. of subjects 10
Probit regression with subject random effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance is denoted *
𝑝 < 0.10, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01. The variable alliance formed is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if an
alliance is formed.
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Table 3.16: Treatment S—Effect of Pro-sociality on Contributions
Contribution in treatment S









N. of subjects 24 24
Probit regression with subject random effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance is denoted *
𝑝 < 0.10 ** 𝑝 < 0.05 *** 𝑝 < 0.01. The variable Pro-social is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if the company
is pro-social and zero otherwise. The data includes treatment S only.
Table 3.17: Treatment F—Effects of Alliance on Profit
Average profit (in points)
Initiator Invitee All roles
High status Low status All High status Low status All High status Low status All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Alliance formed 21.4 22.4 21.9 21.6 22.7 21.9 26.5 30.0 28.2
(53) (59) (112) (76) (36) (74) (224) (224) (448)
Alliance not formed 20.1 19.7 19.9 21.2 21.7 21.4 20.5 20.3 20.4
(75) (73) (148) (46) (28) (112) (296) (296) (592)
Test 1 (𝑝-value) 0.570 0.012 0.021 0.856 0.382 0.744 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Average round profit per role. Number of observations reported in parentheses. “All roles” include all companies
in the roles of initiator, invitee, and uncommitted company. Test 1: Wilcoxon rank-sum test on the hypothesis of
equality of profits when an alliance is and is not formed.





Contribution when alliance is
not formed
High status Low status High status Low status High status Low status High status Low status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Risk averse -0.069 0.147 0.014 -0.068 -0.176 0.853 0.196 -0.416
(0.382) (0.510) (0.714) (0.798) (0.334) (0.696) (0.556) (0.432)
Round -0.123** -0.228*** -0.095 -0.146 -0.158** -0.199*** -0.103 -0.111**
(0.058) (0.083) (0.071) (0.106) (0.071) (0.069) (0.072) (0.054)
Constant 1.425*** 2.173*** 1.084** 1.033 0.651* -0.461 -2.433*** -1.403***
(0.447) (0.629) (0.503) (0.676) (0.382) (0.496) (0.683) (0.426)
Observations 128 132 122 64 95 129 296 296
N. of subjects 48 49 49 39 39 46 52 52
Probit regression with subject random effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted
* 𝑝 < 0.10 ** 𝑝 < 0.05 *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
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4 Social Responsibility Auditing in Supply Chain Networks
Abstract. We study a buyer’s problem of auditing suppliers within a network to ensure
social responsibility compliance. The buyer suffers economic damages if a violation is
exposed at a supplier (whether by the media, regulator, or NGO). To avoid damages
the buyer may audit them to identify non-compliance. If a supplier fails an audit, the
buyer must take one of two costly actions: either rectify the supplier or drop the supplier
(along with dependent suppliers). Dropping a supplier reduces competition and therefore
increases the buyer’s input cost. The network topology evolves as the buyer conducts
audits. We build a two-phase model: an auditing phase followed by a production phase.
The unique production phase equilibrium arising from the competition in the supply
network establishes the buyer’s production profit and each supplier’s value to the buyer.
We then identify the buyer’s optimal dynamic auditing policy: the buyer will first audit
and drop some suppliers, before either auditing and rectifying suppliers, or proceeding
directly to production. Within the audit-and-drop subphase, when auditing only in
the upper tier, the buyer always audits the least valuable unaudited supplier, yielding
greater balance. We also establish the condition under which the buyer may truncate
auditing altogether, carrying unaudited suppliers to production (“hear no evil, see no
evil”). When the buyer audits more broadly, any supplier (not necessarily the least
valuable) may be chosen. A supplier in a pivotal position may be chosen to help the
buyer ascertain the viability of a portion of the network (“litmus test”).
4.1 Introduction
Violations of social responsibility norms by suppliers are widespread. Such violations appear in do-
mains as varied as infringement on human rights (Teixeira 2019, Segal 2019), animal abuse (Phillips
2016, Elejalde-Ruiz 2019), or environmental harm (Rana 2018). A common trait of these examples
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is that they are process compliance violations, which involve issues with production processes and
typically require on-site vetting to detect. Some companies have taken proactive steps to audit their
suppliers to ensure compliance on social responsibility issues. Apple Inc. regularly audits suppliers
and describes the results in its annual Supplier Responsibility Progress Report (Apple Inc. 2018b).
In the 2018 Report, Apple uncovered debt-bonded labor among its suppliers, which the U.N. deems
a form of modern slavery (Zeldin 2016) and for which Apple has “zero tolerance” (Apple Inc. 2018b).
For each labor violation an audit uncovered, Apple put the supplier on immediate probation, re-
quiring it to undergo rectification, including financial remedies for every affected employee. Another
area covered by Apple’s report is the sourcing of minerals that may originate from mines that fi-
nance armed conflicts (Zhang et al. 2017). Apple reports in a specialized disclosure that it dropped
ten smelters and refiners from its supply chain in 2017 for non-compliance on the issue of conflict
minerals (Apple Inc. 2018a).
As the example of Apple shows, once an audit uncovers a violation, the buyer may decide to
rectify the supplier or to drop the supplier from the supply network. Such audits can be costly; for
large international buyers, indiscriminately auditing all suppliers would be practically impossible
(Rowe 2013). Instead, how should a buyer choose the suppliers to audit, then decide to rectify or
to drop a supplier in the event of non-compliance? Three layers of tradeoff complicate the auditing
problem. (1) By not auditing a supplier, the buyer faces the potential penalty when an NGO, law
enforcement, or the media exposes a violation at the supplier; by auditing a supplier, the buyer
incurs the cost to conduct the audit and, if the supplier turns out to be non-compliant, subsequent
costs to address the problem, as discussed next. (2) Once an audit reveals non-compliance, the
buyer chooses either to incur the cost of rectifying the supplier or to drop it (along with others
depending on it) forfeiting profit from production activity attributable to the suppliers dropped:
the fewer the suppliers in the upstream markets, the less competitive the markets will be, and thus
the higher the input cost for the buyer. (3) The buyer also faces a tradeoff in choosing a supplier
to audit, which is influenced by the supplier’s location in the network. For example, dropping a
supplier with many questionable upstream sources may be a less expensive approach than to audit
those sources individually, but potentially carves away a profitable part of the supply network.
We build a two-phase model for a three-tier supply network: an auditing phase followed by a
production phase. Each stage of the auditing phase consists of the following: the buyer selects an
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unaudited supplier to audit; the audit reveals whether the supplier is compliant; in the event of
non-compliance, the buyer decides to rectify the supplier or to drop it. Dropping a supplier has
the effect of also dropping any other firms relying solely on that dropped supplier. Once the buyer
decides to conclude the auditing phase, the remaining supply network is carried to the production
phase, where every firm competes with its peers to determine the equilibrium quantities and prices.
The equilibrium determines the buyer’s profit from production activity.
Equipped with the model, we investigate the following interdependent decisions: (1) Which sup-
plier to audit? Should the buyer prioritize suppliers in an upper tier or a lower tier? More central
or more peripheral? (2) When is it optimal to drop a non-compliant supplier, along with its depen-
dents? When is it optimal to rectify the supplier? (3) In which sequence should the buyer conduct
audits? The choice of the next supplier to audit may depend on the outcome of an earlier audit.
(4) When is it optimal to cease auditing and go straight to production? In other words, when is it
in the best interest of the buyer to “see no evil, hear no evil”? Sometimes the buyer may prefer not
to learn of non-compliance among some suppliers rather than to uncover the non-compliance and
then be obligated to address the problem.
4.2 Literature Review
The literature on socially responsible supply chain management covers various aspects, including
supplier selection (Guo et al. 2016, Agrawal and Lee 2019), unauthorized subcontracting (Caro
et al. 2016), network-wide effects of violation penalty (Zhang et al. 2017), consumer motives (Kraft
et al. 2018), disclosure of the supplier list (Chen et al. 2018, Kalkanci and Plambeck 2019b), and
investment in supplier social responsibility capacity (Kraft et al. 2019). Huang et al. (2017) and
Feng et al. (2019) study when the buyer should directly implement social responsibility standards at
upstream suppliers versus delegating the task to midtier suppliers. In particular Feng et al. (2019)
considers supply networks with fixed material flow structure and finds that the buyer gains more
by engaging directly with upstream suppliers when the network has a complex structure. We focus
on directly auditing upstream suppliers in our model.
Within this literature our work is most closely related to the stream on auditing practices. Plam-
beck and Taylor (2016) shows that under certain conditions increasing auditing effort on a single
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supplier motivates the supplier to hide misconduct. Through a comparison of alternative contract-
ing arrangements, Chen and Lee (2016) establishes that process auditing effectively reduces the risk
of non-compliance by a supplier. Focusing on a single supplier, Caro et al. (2018) and Fang and
Cho (2019) compare the mechanism of independent, joint, and shared auditing by multiple buyers.
Also on the subject of information sharing, Ha et al. (2018) studies how sharing audit information
between competitors interacts with sourcing decisions. Chen et al. (2019b) studies the collusion be-
tween the supplier and the auditor. We complement the literature by studying the dynamic auditing
policy in a supply network. Closest to our work, Chen et al. (2019a) studies the auditing behavior
of two buyers situated in a W-shaped supply network (i.e., each buyer has one exclusive supplier
and the two buyers share a third supplier). It shows that without coordination each buyer chooses
to audit its exclusive supplier, actions which are suboptimal for the combined profit of the buyers;
with joint auditing the buyers choose the shared supplier and avoids the inefficiency. While Chen
et al. (2019a) focuses on the coordination between buyers auditing a static supply network, our
work considers a single buyer auditing a three-tier network which evolves dynamically throughout
the auditing process: the buyer may decide to remove a non-compliant supplier from the network,
changing the network topology.
To understand the dynamic auditing decision we also need to model how the topology of a
network impacts the competition that determines the quantities and prices. This aspect of our
model connects our work to the diverse literature on supply networks, e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2012),
Ang et al. (2017), Belavina (2017), Bimpikis et al. (2018), Korpeoglu et al. (2018). The research
closest to ours adopt a model of Cournot competition that endogenously determines the equilibrium
prices and quantities. The foundational work of Corbett and Karmarkar (2001), along with others
including Adida and DeMiguel (2011) and Bimpikis et al. (2019), studies supply networks with a
complete market between adjacent tiers: every buyer in a downstream tier procures from every
supplier in an upstream tier. While we limit our model to two suppliers in the midstream tier,




The model consists of two phases, an auditing phase followed by a production phase, each consisting
of multiple stages. The supply network has three tiers with a single buyer in the most downstream
tier. Each supplier in the network can be compliant or non-compliant, which the buyer may discover
with an audit. In each stage of auditing, the buyer chooses which supplier to audit, if any. If the
audit finds non-compliance at the supplier, then the buyer either rectifies the supplier so that it
becomes compliant, or drops it from the supply network. Dropping a supplier may involve dropping
dependent suppliers, as discussed in the following section. The buyer may terminate the auditing
phase at any point and carry the remaining network to the production phase, in which each firm
chooses its supply quantities in competition with one another.
We next describe in detail the supply network model, the auditing phase, and the production
phase. We list the notation in Appendix 4.A.
4.3.1 Supply Network
We model a three-tier supply network with a single buyer in tier 0, two suppliers in tier 1, and
any number of suppliers in tier 2. Suppliers in the same tier manufacture a perfectly substitutable
product.
We denote the buyer as c and the two tier-1 firms a and b. Denote the set of tier-1 firms
𝑆(1) = {a,b}. Let 𝑆(2) denote all tier-2 firms, which we partition into three subsets: 𝑆a, 𝑆b, 𝑆ab.
The subset 𝑆a is the set of exclusive suppliers to firm a, each of which sells to a but not to b.
Similarly, the subset 𝑆b is the set of exclusive suppliers to firm b. The subset 𝑆ab is the set of
shared suppliers, each selling to both firms a and b. We represent the supply network by the tuple
𝑔 = (𝑆(1), 𝑆a, 𝑆b, 𝑆ab). We denote by 𝑆𝑔 = 𝑆(1)∪𝑆(2) the set of all suppliers in 𝑔. Throughout the
auditing phase the buyer may drop tier-1 firms resulting in 𝑆(1) having fewer than two firms. In
particular when 𝑆(1) = ∅ (or 𝑆(2) = ∅) we denote the resulting null supply network 𝑔∅. We denote
𝐺 the set of all supply networks.
Given supply network 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺 we denote 𝑡a = |𝑆a| the number of exclusive suppliers to firm a,
𝑡b = |𝑆b| the number of exclusive suppliers to firm b, and 𝑡ab = |𝑆ab| the number of shared suppliers.
We call the tier-1 firm with more tier-2 suppliers the majority tier-1 firm and the other the minority
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Supply network 𝑔 = ({a,b}, {1, 2}, ∅, {3}). Here, suppliers 1 and 2 are dependents of firm a, but a is not a dependent
of 1 or 2; firm b is a dependent of supplier 3, but 3 is not a dependent of b.
tier-1 firm. We call an exclusive supplier to the majority tier-1 firm a majority-exclusive supplier
and an exclusive supplier to the minority tier-1 firm a minority-exclusive supplier.
The model uses the concept of dependent suppliers, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. Given a supplier
𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑔 in network 𝑔, denote 𝐷𝑔(𝑖) the set of dependents of 𝑖 in 𝑔, each solely relying on 𝑖 to sell to
the buyer. Specifically a supplier is always a dependent of itself. If 𝑖 is a tier-1 firm, its dependents
also include all its exclusive suppliers; i.e., if 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1), 𝐷𝑔(𝑖) = 𝑆𝑖 ∪ {𝑖}. For example in Figure 4.1,
𝐷𝑔(a) = {1, 2,a}. If 𝑖 is a tier-2 supplier, then its dependents also include any tier-1 firm whose sole
supplier is firm 𝑖; i.e., if 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(2), 𝐷𝑔(𝑖) includes a tier-1 firm 𝑗 ∈ {a,b} if and only if 𝑆𝑗∪𝑆ab = {𝑖}.
In Figure 4.1 we see 𝐷𝑔(3) = {3,b}.
4.3.2 Auditing Phase
We now describe the auditing phase. Each supplier is either compliant (with probability 1 − 𝑢)
or non-compliant (with probability 𝑢). Through an audit the buyer accurately discovers whether
the supplier is compliant or non-compliant. Whether a supplier is compliant or not is independent
across suppliers. In each stage of the auditing phase, the buyer decides whether to audit a supplier
or to conclude the auditing phase and proceed to the production phase. If the buyer decides to audit
(at cost 𝑎 > 0), it selects an unaudited supplier. If the audit of that supplier reveals non-compliance,
the buyer decides either to rectify the non-compliant supplier (at cost 𝑟 > 0) or to drop it from
the supply network. We assume that a supplier undergoing rectification becomes compliant. When
a supplier is dropped, its dependents are dropped as a consequence. For example in Figure 4.1,
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dropping firm a would result in firms 1 and 2 being dropped, too. Consequently, the buyer need
not be concerned with non-compliance at those dropped dependent suppliers.
We model the auditing phase as a Markov decision process for the buyer. A state consists of
a supply network (tier-1 suppliers, their exclusive suppliers, and their shared suppliers) and the
auditing status of each supplier (unaudited or vetted). A supplier is vetted if it passed an audit
or underwent rectification upon failing an audit; in either case the buyer knows the supplier is
compliant. Specifically a state is a tuple 𝛾 = (𝑔𝛾 , 𝑈𝛾) where 𝑔𝛾 = (𝑆(1), 𝑆a, 𝑆b, 𝑆ab) is a supply
network and 𝑈𝛾 ⊆ 𝑆𝑔𝛾 is the set of suppliers that are currently unaudited. We omit the subscript
“𝛾” whenever doing so causes no confusion. Any supplier 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑔∖𝑈 is vetted. The state space is
Γ = {(𝑔, 𝑈) : 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺,𝑈 ⊆ 𝑆𝑔}. The terminal states Γ𝑇 are the supply networks with no more
unaudited suppliers, Γ𝑇 = {𝛾 = (𝑔, 𝑈) ∈ Γ : 𝑈 = ∅}. In the terminal states the auditing phase
necessarily concludes and the production phase begins. However, the buyer may choose to enter the
production phase prior to reaching a terminal state (i.e., to proceed to production with unaudited
suppliers).
To facilitate the formulation of the dynamic program, we define two operators that will be used
when updating the state. Let 𝑍 = {(𝛾, 𝑖) : 𝛾 ∈ Γ, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾} be the set of pairs of a state and
an unaudited supplier (in that state). The first mapping ⊕ : 𝑍 → Γ changes a supplier from an
unaudited to a vetted status, i.e., given state 𝛾 and unaudited supplier 𝑖 in 𝛾, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖 is the state
otherwise identical to 𝛾 but with a vetted 𝑖.1 The operator ⊕ will be used when a supplier passes
an audit or is rectified upon failing an audit. The second mapping ⊖ : 𝑍 → Γ removes a supplier
along with its dependents from a state, i.e., given state 𝛾 and unaudited supplier 𝑖 in 𝛾, 𝛾⊖ 𝑖 is the
state otherwise identical to 𝛾 but with 𝑖 and all its dependents removed.2 The operator ⊖ is used
when a supplier has failed an audit and will be dropped from the network.





action pp represents concluding the auditing phase and Proceeding to the Production phase. The
action ar(𝑖) represents Auditing supplier 𝑖 and Rectifying 𝑖 if the audit uncovers non-compliance.
Following ar(𝑖), regardless of whether the supplier passes the audit, the state transits from 𝛾 to 𝛾⊕𝑖.
1Given 𝛾 = (𝑔, 𝑈) ∈ Γ and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈 , 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖 = (𝑔, 𝑈 ′) where 𝑈 ′ = 𝑈∖{𝑖}.
2Given 𝛾 = (𝑔, 𝑈) ∈ Γ where 𝑔 = (𝑆(1), 𝑆a, 𝑆b, 𝑆ab) and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈 , write 𝛾⊖𝑖 = (𝑔′, 𝑈 ′). Then 𝑈 ′ = 𝑈∖𝐷𝑔(𝑖). If
𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1), let −𝑖 ∈ {a,b}∖{𝑖}, 𝑆′𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖, and 𝑆′−𝑖 = 𝑆−𝑖∪𝑆ab, then 𝑔′ = (𝑆(1)∖𝐷𝑔(𝑖), 𝑆′a∖𝐷𝑔(𝑖), 𝑆′b∖𝐷𝑔(𝑖), ∅);
otherwise 𝑔′ = (𝑆(1)∖𝐷𝑔(𝑖), 𝑆a∖𝐷𝑔(𝑖), 𝑆b∖𝐷𝑔(𝑖), 𝑆ab∖𝐷𝑔(𝑖)).
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Similarly, the action ad(𝑖) represents Auditing supplier 𝑖 and Dropping 𝑖 (and its dependents) if the
audit uncovers non-compliance. Following ad(𝑖) the state transits from 𝛾 to 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖 if 𝑖 is compliant
(passes the audit) and to 𝛾⊖ 𝑖 if 𝑖 is non-compliant (fails the audit). In the notation for ad and ar,
besides using the specific index for a supplier (e.g., 𝑖), we also use ea to represent a generic unaudited
exclusive supplier to firm a, eb a generic exclusive supplier to firm b, and s a generic shared supplier
(e.g., ad(ea) represents the decision to audit and drop (if non-compliant) an exclusive supplier to
firm a). Let 𝑈 =
⋃︀




. An auditing policy is a mapping
𝜉 : Γ → 𝑋 such that 𝜉(𝛾) ∈ 𝑋𝛾 ,∀𝛾 ∈ Γ. Let Ξ be the set of all auditing policies.
Given 𝛾 = (𝑔, 𝑈) ∈ Γ, let 𝜋(𝛾) be the buyer’s production profit, which is a result of the equilib-
rium production activity on supply network 𝑔 in the production phase (we uniquely determine this
equilibrium in section 4.4.1). We use ∇(𝛾, 𝑖) = 𝜋(𝛾) − 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) to denote the loss in production
profit due to the removal of a supplier 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 (in state 𝛾) and call it the production value of supplier
𝑖 in state 𝛾. A violation by a non-compliant supplier will be exposed in the production phase with
probability 𝑤 ∈ [0, 1]; for example, this revelation may arise from an investigation led by an NGO
or a regulatory body. The possible exposure of violation is independent across suppliers. The buyer
incurs a cost of 𝑧 > 0 upon the exposure of a violation at each non-compliant supplier. Let 𝜁(𝛾) be
the expected total penalty from violations on state 𝛾. (If any penalty arises at all, it does so during
the production phase.) By the independence of non-compliance and exposure of violations across
suppliers, 𝜁(𝛾) = |𝑈𝛾 |𝑢𝑤𝑧, since 𝑈𝛾 is the set of unaudited suppliers, each of which is non-compliant
with probability 𝑢 and costs the buyer a penalty 𝑧 if exposed with probability 𝑤.
We define 𝑉 * : Γ → R as the optimal value function. Let ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾, 𝑥) be the expected value of
choosing action 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝛾 when in state 𝛾 ∈ Γ and following an optimal policy thereon. Then
𝑉 *(𝛾) = max
𝑥∈𝑋𝛾
̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾, 𝑥), ∀𝛾 ∈ Γ (4.1)
where ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,pp) = 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜁(𝛾) (4.2)
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and for 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 ,
̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖)) = −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) + 𝑢𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) (4.3)
̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ar(𝑖)) = −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) + 𝑢(−𝑟 + 𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖)) (4.4)
= −𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + 𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖). (4.5)
Equation (4.2) reflects the buyer’s value when it takes action pp, which consists of the production
profit minus the expected penalty of violation. Equations (4.3) and (4.4) are the buyer’s values
when the ad(𝑖) and ar(𝑖) actions are taken, respectively, which consist of an auditing cost 𝑎 and the
weighted average of values in consequent states when the supplier passes (with probability 1−𝑢) or
fails (with probability 𝑢) the audit. In a terminal state 𝛾 ∈ Γ𝑇 , 𝑋𝛾 = {pp}, so 𝑉 *(𝛾) = 𝜋(𝛾)−𝜁(𝛾).
An optimal auditing policy 𝜉 ∈ Ξ solves 𝜉(𝛾) ∈ argmax𝑥∈𝑋𝛾 ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾, 𝑥) for any 𝛾 ∈ Γ.
Throughout the auditing phase the topology of the supply network and the status of each remain-
ing supplier evolve with the progression of auditing activities. Once the auditing phase concludes
(either the buyer decides to proceed to production or the Markov decision process enters a termi-
nal state) the remaining supply network is carried to the production phase in which the buyer’s
production profit is determined.
4.3.3 Production Phase
In the production phase, each firm in the network chooses its production quantity to maximize its
profit, given the unit input price and anticipating the downstream demand. The chosen quantities
of the upstream firms determine a downstream firm’s input price, as we describe below. All firms in
𝑆a and 𝑆ab compete to supply firm a; all firms in 𝑆b and 𝑆ab compete to supply firm b; and firms a
and b compete to supply the buyer. This is similar to Corbett and Karmarkar (2001) other than we
limit ourselves to three tiers and two tier-1 firms but allow more general relationships between firms
in adjacent tiers. Specifically, in Corbett and Karmarkar (2001) all firms in an upstream tier are
shared suppliers of all downstream firms; using our notation they have 𝑆(2) = 𝑆ab and 𝑆a = 𝑆b = ∅.
Corresponding to the three tiers in the supply network, there are three stages in the production
phase. In the first stage, the firms in 𝑆a and 𝑆ab choose the quantities they will supply to firm
a which establishes 𝑝(2)a, the selling price of those tier-2 suppliers to firm a (whenever a number
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appears in parentheses in a subscript, it is referring to the tier in the network). In parallel, the firms
in 𝑆b and 𝑆ab choose their quantities to establish 𝑝(2)b, their selling price to firm b. In particular
a shared supplier in tier 2 may sell to firms a and b at different prices. In the second stage, firms
a and b choose quantities which result in 𝑝(1), the selling price of the tier-1 firms to the buyer.
In the third stage the buyer chooses a quantity to establish 𝑝(0), the selling price of the buyer to
downstream customers. Let 𝑞𝑗 be the total quantity produced by firm 𝑗. The unit production cost
of a tier-𝑘 firm is 𝑣𝑘; denote 𝑣𝑇 =
∑︀2
𝑘=0 𝑣𝑘 which is the total production cost embedded in each
unit of the final product. Next we describe these three stages in detail, in reverse order.
Third Stage: Buyer’s Problem. In the third stage of the production phase, the buyer c faces
an exogenous linear aggregate demand from downstream customers characterized by inverse demand
function
𝑝(0)(𝑞c) = 𝛼− 𝛽𝑞c (4.6)
where 𝛽 > 0. Assume 𝛼 > 𝑣𝑇 to ensure the supply chain is profitable. The buyer takes the price of





𝜋c(𝑞c) ≡ (𝑝(0)(𝑞c)− 𝑣0 − 𝑝(1))𝑞c
}︀
. (4.7)
Proposition 4.1. Given the buyer’s input price 𝑝(1), there exists a unique optimal quantity 𝑞*c which
solves the buyer’s problem 𝑃0. Moreover, the resulting inverse demand function faced by the tier-1
firms is
𝑝*(1)(𝑞c) = 𝛼− 𝑣0 − 2𝛽𝑞c. (4.8)
We relegate all proofs to the appendices.
Second Stage: Tier-1 Firms’ Game. In the second stage of the production phase, tier-1
firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1), anticipating inverse demand 𝑝*(1)(𝑞c) and taking the input prices 𝑝(2)𝑖 as given,
chooses production quantity 𝑞𝑖 in strategy space 𝐶𝑖 = R to maximize its profit
𝜋𝑖 = (𝑝
*
(1)(𝑞c)− 𝑣1 − 𝑝(2)𝑖)𝑞𝑖 (4.9)
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In other words, when there are two tier-1 firms, they engage in Cournot competition for the buyer’s
business. Denote a strategy profile of the tier-1 firms q(1) = (𝑞𝑖)𝑖∈𝑆(1) ∈
∏︀
𝑖∈𝑆(1)𝐶𝑖 (i.e., a vector of






⎞⎠− 𝑣1 − 𝑝(2)𝑖
⎞⎠ 𝑞𝑖. (4.11)
Let the game in the second stage be the strategic-form game 𝑃1 = (𝑆(1), (𝐶𝑖)𝑖∈𝑆(1), (𝜋𝑖)𝑖∈𝑆(1)).
Proposition 4.2. Given the tier-1 vector of input prices p(2) = (𝑝(2)𝑖)𝑖∈𝑆(1), there exists a unique
equilibrium in pure strategies q*(1) of the game 𝑃1. Moreover, the resulting inverse demand function
faced by the tier-2 firms supplying firm 𝑖 is (for 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1))




First Stage: Tier-2 Suppliers’ Game. In the first stage of the production phase, each tier-2
supplier 𝑗 chooses 𝑠𝑗,𝑖, the quantity it produces for its tier-1 customer firm 𝑖. A tier-2 supplier 𝑗
anticipates inverse demand 𝑝*(2)𝑖(q(1)) for 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1). An exclusive supplier 𝑗 to tier-1 firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1)




















𝑠𝑗′,𝑖, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1). (4.15)
In other words, for each firm 𝑖 in tier 1, the tier-2 suppliers in 𝑆𝑖 and 𝑆ab engage in Cournot
competition to supply firm 𝑖. When there are two tier-1 firms, a shared tier-2 supplier competes
simultaneously for the business of each tier-1 firm.
To make the strategy space of a tier-2 supplier compact for proving existence and uniqueness of
the equilibrium, we assume there exists (arbitrarily large) theoretical maximum capacity 𝑀 > 0
such that 𝑠𝑗,𝑖 6 𝑀 for any tier-2 supplier 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆(2) and its tier-1 customer 𝑖. That is, the strategy
space of supplier 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆(2) is 𝐶𝑗 = {s𝑗 : 0 6 𝑠𝑗,𝑖 6 𝑀}. Denote a strategy profile of tier-2 suppliers
s(2) = (s𝑗)𝑗∈𝑆(2) ∈
∏︀
𝑗∈𝑆(2)𝐶𝑗 . We substitute (4.15) into (4.13) to write the payoff function of
























Let the game in the first stage be the strategic-form game 𝑃2 = (𝑆(2), (𝐶𝑗)𝑗∈𝑆(2), (𝜋𝑗)𝑗∈𝑆(2)). We
denote an equilibrium in pure strategies s*(2) = (s
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𝑗,𝑖 if 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆ab.
Production Phase Equilibrium. Let s*(2) be an equilibrium of the game 𝑃2 in the first stage




(1) be an equilibrium of
the game 𝑃1 in the second stage and 𝑝*(1) the resulting selling price of the tier-1 firms. Given 𝑝
*
(1),
let 𝑞*c be an optimal solution to the buyer’s problem 𝑃0 in the third stage and 𝑝*(0) the resulting











a production phase equilibrium. In the next section we show this equilibrium is unique and fully
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characterize the equilibrium.
4.4 Production Phase Results
In the spirit of backward induction, we present the results for the two phases in the reverse order:
the results for the production phase in this section are followed by the results for the auditing phase
in section 4.5.
4.4.1 Production Phase Equilibrium
We are now ready to present the existence and uniqueness of the production phase equilibrium.











every supply network 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺∖{𝑔∅}.
Let 𝜋*c be the buyer’s profit in the unique equilibrium in Theorem 4.1, obtained by substituting
the equilibrium quantities and prices in (4.7). For any state in the auditing phase 𝛾 = (𝑔, 𝑈) ∈ Γ
the buyer’s production profit 𝜋(𝛾) is given by 𝜋*c in the equilibrium that arises in network 𝛾. At
the state 𝛾∅ which corresponds to the null supply network 𝑔∅, we set the buyer’s production profit
to zero: when the buyer has access to no supplier, there is no production activity, and thus no
production profit.
We begin with a simple relationship between the buyer’s equilibrium production quantity and
profit:
Proposition 4.3. The buyer’s equilibrium profit is 𝜋*c = 𝛽 · (𝑞*c)2.
In equilibrium the buyer’s production profit depends only on the buyer’s quantity of production 𝑞*c,
which is also the total quantity produced by the supply network.
Recall that 𝑡a = |𝑆a|, 𝑡b = |𝑆b|, and 𝑡ab = |𝑆ab|. Without loss of generality, we index the majority
tier-1 firm as a, i.e., 𝑡a > 𝑡b. We define the following functions 𝐿, 𝑠𝑒, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑞 : R3 → R to facilitate
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representation of the equilibrium quantities.
𝐿(𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3) = 4𝑥1 + 4𝑥2 + 8𝑥3 + 3𝑥1𝑥2 + 4𝑥1𝑥3 + 4𝑥2𝑥3 + 4𝑥
2
3 + 4 (4.18)










































The following proposition provides closed-form expressions for the equilibrium quantities.
Proposition 4.4. (a) If 𝑡a 6 2𝑡b + 2𝑡ab + 2, in equilibrium:
i. Exclusive supplier 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 to tier-1 firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1) chooses supply quantity 𝑠*𝑗,𝑖 = 𝑠𝑒(𝑡𝑖, 𝑡−𝑖, 𝑡ab)
where −𝑖 ∈ {a,b}∖{𝑖};
ii. Shared supplier 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆ab chooses supply quantities 𝑠*𝑗,a = 𝑠𝑠(𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab) and 𝑠*𝑗,b = 𝑠𝑠(𝑡b, 𝑡a, 𝑡ab);
iii. Tier-1 firm 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1) chooses supply quantity 𝑞*𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑒(𝑡𝑖, 𝑡−𝑖, 𝑡ab) + 𝑡ab𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑖, 𝑡−𝑖, 𝑡ab) =
𝑞(1)(𝑡𝑖, 𝑡−𝑖, 𝑡ab) where −𝑖 ∈ {a,b}∖{𝑖};
iv. The total quantity the supply network produces is
𝑞*c = 𝑡a𝑠𝑒(𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab) + 𝑡b𝑠𝑒(𝑡b, 𝑡a, 𝑡ab) + 𝑡ab(𝑠𝑠(𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab) + 𝑠𝑠(𝑡b, 𝑡a, 𝑡ab)) = 𝑞(𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab). (4.23)
(b) If 𝑡a > 2𝑡b + 2𝑡ab + 2, in equilibrium:
i. Firm a’s exclusive supplier 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆a chooses supply quantity 𝑠*𝑗,a = 𝑠𝑒(𝑡a, 𝑡b + 𝑡ab, 0);
ii. Firm b’s exclusive supplier 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆b chooses supply quantity 𝑠*𝑗,b = 𝑠𝑒(𝑡b + 𝑡ab, 𝑡a, 0);
iii. Shared supplier 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆ab chooses supply quantities 𝑠*𝑗,a = 0 and 𝑠*𝑗,b = 𝑠𝑒(𝑡b + 𝑡ab, 𝑡a, 0);
iv. Firm a chooses supply quantity 𝑞*a = 𝑡a𝑠𝑒(𝑡a, 𝑡b + 𝑡ab, 0) = 𝑞(1)(𝑡a, 𝑡b + 𝑡ab, 0);
v. Firm b chooses supply quantity 𝑞*b = (𝑡b + 𝑡ab)𝑠𝑒(𝑡b + 𝑡ab, 𝑡a, 0) = 𝑞(1)(𝑡b + 𝑡ab, 𝑡a, 0);
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Table 4.1: Comparative Statics in Production Phase















b − + +
𝑝*(1) − − −
𝑝*(2)a − − −
𝑝*(2)b − − −
𝜌*a + − −
𝜌*b − + +
How the equilibrium value of each variable changes as the number of tier-2 suppliers increases by one. (See Theorem 4.2
for details.) “+” indicates the variable increases; “−” indicates the variable decreases; “+/−” indicates there exist
both instances of the variable increasing and decreasing depending on the specific topology of the supply network
(captured by 𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab).
vi. The total quantity the supply network produces is
𝑞*c = 𝑡a𝑠𝑒(𝑡a, 𝑡b + 𝑡ab, 0) + (𝑡b + 𝑡ab)𝑠𝑒(𝑡b + 𝑡ab, 𝑡a, 0) = 𝑞(𝑡a, 𝑡b + 𝑡ab, 0). (4.24)
The closed-form expressions for supply quantities in Proposition 4.4 allow us to express the equi-
librium prices and profits of all players in closed form. From the proposition, beyond market demand
parameters (𝛼, 𝛽) and the total production cost (𝑣𝑇 ), the only determinant of the equilibrium profit
is the topology of the supply network captured by 𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab.
In Proposition 4.4b where 𝑡a > 2𝑡b+2𝑡ab+2, the majority tier-1 firm a has so many exclusive tier-
2 suppliers (relative to shared suppliers and firm b’s exclusive suppliers) that its upstream market is
too competitive for any shared supplier to profitably participate in it. Each shared supplier chooses
to behave as an exclusive supplier to minority tier-1 firm b.
4.4.2 Comparative Statics
We now seek to understand the value of the contribution by each supplier to the buyer’s production
profit, which guides the buyer’s decisions in the auditing phase. Let 𝑚*c, 𝑚*a, and 𝑚*b be the margins
of the buyer, firm a, and firm b in equilibrium, i.e., 𝑚*c = 𝑝*(0) − 𝑝
*







and 𝑚*b = 𝑝*(1) − 𝑝
*








be the market shares of the two tier-1 firms
in equilibrium. As in section 4.4.1 we index the majority tier-1 firm as a, i.e., 𝑡a > 𝑡b.
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Theorem 4.2. Given a supply network 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺, adding a tier-2 supplier changes the equilibrium
values of the variables in Table 4.1 as follows:
(a) Adding a majority-exclusive supplier changes the equilibrium values as in column (I);
(b) Adding a minority-exclusive supplier changes the equilibrium values as in column (II);
(c) Adding a shared supplier changes the equilibrium values as in column (III) if 𝑡a 6 2𝑡b+2𝑡ab+2,
and as in column (II) otherwise.
Columns (I) and (II) of Table 4.1 reflect the following intuitive observation: adding an exclusive
supplier to a tier-1 firm gives that tier-1 firm greater advantage in competition, increasing its
quantity, margin, profit, and market share, and decreasing the same metrics for the other tier-1
firm. If 𝑡a > 2𝑡b +2𝑡ab +2, firm a dominates the supply network so much that the shared suppliers
behave as exclusive suppliers to firm b, in which case adding a shared supplier has the same effect
as adding an exclusive supplier to firm b, as shown in Column (II). The only ambiguity arises when
𝑡a 6 2𝑡b +2𝑡ab +2, and we add a shared supplier. In this case, as shown in Column (III), the effect
on firm b is clear, but the effect on firm a’s quantity, margin, and profit is not. First, consider
firm b, which has less market power: adding a shared supplier boosts firm b’s power more than it
boosts that of firm a, which enjoyed greater power to begin with. In fact firm b’s quantity, margin,
profit, and market share all improve, at the expense of firm a’s market share. The following result
resolves the ambiguity of the effect on firm a’s quantity, margin, and profit.
Proposition 4.5. Given supply network 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺 where 𝑡a 6 2𝑡b +2𝑡ab +2, adding a shared supplier
to 𝑔 increases equilibrium variables 𝑞*a, 𝑚*a, and 𝜋*a if and only if
𝑡a <
√︀
33𝑡2b + 72𝑡b𝑡𝑠 + 108𝑡b + 48𝑡
2








When 𝑡a is relatively small, adding a shared supplier benefits both the minority tier-1 firm b (as
we have seen in Theorem 4.2) and the majority tier-1 firm a. When 𝑡a is relatively large, adding a
shared supplier benefits the minority tier-1 firm b but hurts the majority tier-1 firm a. The reason
is that while adding the shared supplier makes firm a’s input market more competitive, directly
benefiting firm a, the addition benefits the minority tier-1 firm b even more. In fact, the boost in
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firm b’s power improves its position so much in the downstream competition with firm a, that it
rebounds to hurt firm a by overwhelmingly slashing its margin.
Despite the ambiguity of the effect on the majority tier-1 firm, Theorem 4.2 shows that regardless
of where we add the tier-2 supplier, the addition always decreases the input prices of both tier-1
firms and that of the buyer, and increases the quantity, margin, and profit of the buyer. The next
proposition ranks the buyer’s gain from the addition of a supplier based on the supplier’s location
in the network.
Proposition 4.6. Given supply network 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺:
(a) Adding a shared supplier to 𝑔 induces a strictly greater increase in 𝑞*c,𝑚*c, 𝜋*c than adding a
minority-exclusive supplier;
(b) Adding a minority-exclusive supplier to 𝑔 induces a greater or equal increase in 𝑞*c,𝑚*c, 𝜋*c
than adding a majority-exclusive supplier.
For the buyer, a shared supplier is more valuable than a minority-exclusive supplier (Proposi-
tion 4.6a), which in turn is more valuable than a majority-exclusive supplier (Proposition 4.6b).
Generally the greater the upstream competition, the better off the buyer. Adding a shared supplier
intensifies the competition in both tier-1 firms’ input markets, which then intensifies the competition
in the buyer’s input market, more than adding an exclusive supplier. Adding an exclusive supplier
to the minority tier-1 firm helps to counter the disadvantageous position of the minority tier-1 firm
in the competition for the buyer’s business, bringing down the buyer’s input cost more than adding
an exclusive supplier to the majority tier-1 firm.
4.5 Auditing Phase Results
We begin with two examples that illustrate intriguing properties of the optimal auditing behavior,
which we later explain in the following sections.
Example 4.1. Let the parameters be 𝛼 = 190, 𝛽 = 1.4, 𝑣𝑇 = 1.5, 𝑎 = 75, 𝑟 = 860, 𝑧 = 357.88, 𝑢 =
0.47, 𝑤 = 0.46. In the state 𝛾 shown in Figure 4.2: tier-1 firm a has 22 exclusive suppliers (firms
1 to 22); tier-1 firm b has one exclusive supplier (firm 24); firms a and b share one supplier (firm
23). Both tier-1 firms are vetted. All tier-2 suppliers are unaudited.
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The majority tier-1 firm a has 22 exclusive suppliers.
In this example (and the next), the unit rectification cost, 𝑟, is so high that the buyer bypasses
any rectification actions, instead auditing suppliers and dropping them if they are non-compliant.
Therefore, the prevailing tradeoff is whether to audit a supplier and potentially drop it from the
network versus carrying an unaudited supplier to production and possibly incurring a violation
penalty. The buyer is then faced with the question: which supplier to audit first?
As Proposition 4.6 suggests, firms 1 through 22 are less valuable for the buyer than firms 23 or
24. Therefore we may suspect the more appealing option for the buyer would be to audit, say, firm
1 rather than firm 24. If the buyer starts with ad(1) (i.e., audit firm 1 and drop it if non-compliant)
and firm 1 fails the audit, in this example we find that the next optimal action would be one of
ad(2), . . . ,ad(22) (i.e., audit another exclusive supplier to firm a and drop it if non-compliant).
The consequence of this could be that the buyer ends up dropping multiple exclusive suppliers to
firm a. However, if the buyer starts with ad(24), the minority-exclusive supplier, and firm 24 fails
the audit, we find that the next optimal action in this example would be to stop auditing activities
altogether and directly proceed to the production phase (pp).
Which of these two paths, with the initial firms failing their audits, brings the buyer more profit
overall: start with an audit of the less valuable firm 1 and risk losing additional suppliers, or start
with an audit of the more valuable firm 24, ensuring the retention of all other suppliers?
Example 4.2. We consider how the optimal first auditing decision varies with the value of penalty 𝑧.
Still using the same values of parameters in Example 4.1, we consider the state shown in Figure 4.4(a)
where all suppliers are unaudited. Figure 4.4(b) presents the optimal first decision as penalty 𝑧
110





1 62 3 4 5
Every supplier is unaudited in 𝛾.










As penalty 𝑧 increases the optimal decision at 𝛾 shifts
in order from pp, to ad(1) (or any other exclusive
supplier to firm a), to ad(6), to ad(4) (or the other
shared supplier 5), to ad(b), and eventually to ad(a).
varies.
With low 𝑧 (𝑧 < 550) the potential penalty is too low to justify any audit by the buyer; the buyer
proceeds to the production phase directly.
With high 𝑧 (𝑧 > 1570) the penalty is so great that the buyer turns its attention to the tier-1
firms. It is optimal for the buyer to start with auditing a tier-1 supplier and dropping it if non-
compliant (ad(b) for 1570 < 𝑧 < 1704 and ad(a) for 𝑧 > 1704). Dropping a tier-1 firm enables
the buyer to drop all dependent tier-2 suppliers, thus avoiding both the expense of auditing them
and any associated violation penalties. In short, the penalty is so high that the buyer is willing to
remove an entire side of the supply network rather than risk carrying unaudited suppliers through
to production.
With intermediate 𝑧 (550 < 𝑧 < 1570) the buyer focuses the ad effort on the tier-2 suppliers.
As 𝑧 increases from 550, the optimal first audit is ad(1) (or any majority-exclusive supplier). As
𝑧 further increases, ad(6) (the minority-exclusive supplier) also becomes an optimal first audit.
Similarly ad(4) (or any shared supplier) becomes an optimal first audit as 𝑧 increases further up to
1570. As seen in Figure 4.4(b) there are ranges within 550 < 𝑧 < 1570 in which multiple auditing
decisions are optimal: for example, for values of 𝑧 between 1223 and 1297, ad(1), ad(4), and ad(6)
are all equally good auditing decisions. For values of 𝑧 between 1297 and 1431, ad(4) (or ad(5))
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and ad(6) are the only optimal first auditing decisions; for values of 𝑧 between 1431 and 1570,
ad(4) (or the other shared supplier) becomes the unique optimal auditing decision. It is peculiar
that the buyer would optimally choose supplier 6, a minority-exclusive supplier, or supplier 4, a
shared supplier, as the first firm to audit. After all, Proposition 4.6 identifies supplier 1 (or 2 or 3)
as the least valuable supplier within tier 2 to the buyer. One may therefore intuit that among tier-2
suppliers, the buyer would prioritize auditing supplier 1 (or any other majority-exclusive supplier)
which is less valuable to the buyer when it reaches the production phase, but carries as much penalty
as any other supplier in the event of a violation. Yet, as the example shows, the buyer may find
it optimal to start with an audit of a minority-exclusive or a shared supplier with greater direct
damage to the buyer’s production profit when dropped. Why would the buyer start its audit with
a minority-exclusive or shared supplier and risk losing more production profit in the event it is
dropped?
4.5.1 Two Subphases of Auditing
We identify a surprisingly simple property of an optimal policy. The buyer will first audit and drop
some suppliers; we call this the ad subphase. Only after the buyer ceases the ad subphase will it
then proceed to what we refer to as the rp subphase. In the rp subphase the buyer either proceeds
to the production phase directly, or audits and rectifies all remaining suppliers in an arbitrary
sequence.
Theorem 4.3. There exists an optimal policy 𝜉* ∈ Ξ with the property that auditing decisions are
divided into two subphases:
(a) ad subphase: To audit and drop (ad) some suppliers (or no supplier); followed by
(b) rp subphase: To audit and rectify (ar) all remaining unaudited suppliers in an arbitrary
sequence if 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟 6 𝑢𝑤𝑧; or to proceed to production (pp) if 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟 > 𝑢𝑤𝑧.
Under the optimal policy in Theorem 4.3 any auditing and dropping activity (ad subphase) will
precede any rectification activity (in the rp subphase). Once the buyer starts rectifying suppliers
it will not return to dropping suppliers again. The theorem is, however, silent on the length of the
ad subphase and when the rp subphase will commence. Specifically, the commencement of the rp
subphase depends upon the outcome of the various audits conducted in the ad subphase.
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To explain the separation of the ad and ar activities into subphases, we make the following
observation: given any policy in which ar(𝑖) immediately precedes ad(𝑗) for two unaudited suppli-
ers 𝑖 and 𝑗, we can change the sequence of the two actions (so that ad(𝑗) precedes ar(𝑖)) and the
outcome will either strictly improve or remain the same. When 𝑖 is a dependent of 𝑗, the reversal
will make the buyer strictly better off (in expectation): in the event 𝑗 is dropped (and takes 𝑖
along with it), by putting ad(𝑗) before ar(𝑖) the buyer avoids the cost of auditing and rectifying
𝑖. On the other hand, when 𝑖 is not a dependent of 𝑗, the outcome will remain the same. Auditing
and rectifying supplier 𝑖 will make it a vetted supplier, regardless of its initial compliance status,
leaving the remainder of the supply network unchanged. Therefore, neither the costs incurred nor
the resulting state will be affected by the sequence of the two actions.
Once in the rp subphase, now that the ad activity is over, the topology of the supply network
will not change hereafter. This sets in stone the production profit, determined solely by the supply
network, thereby leaving the buyer with the following decision for each unaudited supplier: whether
to audit and rectify it or to allow it to enter the production phase unaudited. In deciding this, the
buyer compares the cost of auditing the supplier and rectifying it if it fails the audit (𝑎+𝑢𝑟) against
the penalty that arises when an unaudited supplier is exposed to be non-compliant (𝑢𝑤𝑧). Since
all unaudited suppliers are identical (other than their location in the network), this comparison
is identical for all suppliers. Hence in the rp subphase the buyer either proceeds to production
directly or audits and rectifies all remaining suppliers. In the scenario that the buyer stops short of
auditing all suppliers in the ad subphase and proceeds to the production phase directly in the rp
subphase, the optimal policy manifests as “see no evil, hear no evil”: the buyer conducts no further
audits. We revisit this scenario in section 4.5.2.
The optimal behavior in the rp subphase leads to the following result:
Corollary 4.1. At state 𝛾 ∈ Γ, if the optimal policy 𝜉* is already in the rp subphase,
𝑉 *(𝛾) = 𝜋(𝛾)− [(𝑢𝑤𝑧) ∧ (𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟)]|𝑈𝛾 |. (4.26)
In the rest of the paper, we focus on policies which consist of the two subphases, described in
Theorem 4.3. In particular, in each stage of the auditing phase, we only need to consider the actions
to audit and drop a supplier (ad) and the action to proceed to the rp subphase. We introduce a
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new action rp that is a shorthand for “audit and rectify (ar) all remaining unaudited suppliers if
𝑎 + 𝑢𝑟 < 𝑢𝑤𝑧 and proceed to production (pp) otherwise.” Following Corollary 4.1 we denote the
cost associated with each unaudited supplier in the rp subphase 𝑐rp ≡ (𝑢𝑤𝑧) ∧ (𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟).
4.5.2 Optimal Auditing Sequence in Tier 2: Toward a Balanced Supply Network
In this subsection we consider the sequence of suppliers the buyer will audit and drop in the ad
subphase. As Example 4.2 shows, any supplier may emerge as the buyer’s optimal choice for the
first audit as a single parameter of the model is varied. Despite this fickle behavior, once we limit
the auditing to the tier-2 suppliers, we demonstrate the optimal auditing sequence is determined
by the value of the firm, which in turn depends on its location in the network. With this result
we address the question posed in Example 4.1, where the buyer faces the quandary of which tier-2
supplier to audit when the tier-1 firms are already vetted. Later in section 4.5.3 we consider the
scenario where all suppliers are unaudited to shed light on the question from Example 4.2.
Recall that we define ∇(𝛾, 𝑖) as the production value of supplier 𝑖 for the buyer at state 𝛾:
∇(𝛾, 𝑖) = 𝜋(𝛾) − 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖). For the purposes of this section, it is useful to separately identify a
boundary element of the state space, denoted 𝛾1 = (𝑔, 𝑈), the state in which the buyer is served
by two separate linear branches (i.e., 𝑔 = ({a,b}, {1}, {2}, ∅)), and both tier-1 firms are vetted and
both tier-2 suppliers are unaudited (i.e., 𝑈 = {1, 2}). We treat 𝛾1 separately.
We now introduce an intuitive property of the supply network, specifically a condition on pro-
duction profit 𝜋.
Condition 1 (decreasing differences of production profit). For any 𝛾 ∈ Γ∖{𝛾1} in which every tier-1
firm is vetted (i.e., 𝑆(1) ∩ 𝑈𝛾 = ∅) and for any 𝑖, 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 such that 𝑖′ /∈ 𝐷𝛾(𝑖),
∇(𝛾, 𝑖′) 6 ∇(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖, 𝑖′). (4.27)
Condition 1 says that the production value of a supplier is greater in smaller supply networks. This
is intuitive since each additional supplier adds to the buyer’s profit (due to increased competition
leading to lower input prices) but to a lesser extent than the previous one. Using the closed-form
expressions derived in Proposition 4.4, we have algebraically verified Condition 1 for any network
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with up to 100 tier-2 suppliers.3
We now define a concept which is then used in the subsequent result.
Definition 4.1. Let 𝛾 ∈ Γ and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 . If ∇(𝛾, 𝑖) 6 ∇(𝛾, 𝑖′) for any 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 , then we call 𝑖 a least
valuable unaudited supplier (LVUS) in 𝛾.4
An LVUS is the unaudited supplier that carries the least value to the buyer’s production profit.
We now show that the LVUS is the next firm to audit when auditing tier-2 firms only.
Theorem 4.4. Under Condition 1 the following policy 𝜉** is optimal at any state 𝛾 in which every
tier-1 firm is vetted: for any nonterminal state 𝛾 ̸= 𝛾1, let 𝑖 be an LVUS in 𝛾, then
𝜉**(𝛾) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
ad(𝑖), if 𝑢∇(𝛾, 𝑖) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp
rp, if 𝑢∇(𝛾, 𝑖) + 𝑎 > 𝑐rp
. (4.28)
According to Theorem 4.4, the buyer’s optimal sequence follows a simple rule: identify an LVUS
𝑖 and audit it if 𝑢∇(𝛾, 𝑖) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp. The buyer should always audit and drop an LVUS, a supplier
that carries the least production value in the current supply network, until the stage at which even
an LVUS carries more production value than the costs and risk associated with the supplier in the
rp subphase (captured by 𝑐rp). Once at that stage the buyer should proceed to the rp subphase
to either rectify all non-compliant suppliers identified by exhaustive auditing or just proceed to
production and brace itself for any damages from the potential exposure of violation from unaudited
suppliers. Suppose every supplier, even an LVUS, carries sufficient production value to justify
retention (𝑢∇(𝛾, 𝑖)+𝑎 > 𝑐rp for LVUS 𝑖) and the penalty is not high enough to warrant rectification
(𝑎 + 𝑢𝑟 > 𝑢𝑤𝑧 as in Theorem 4.3). In such an instance the buyer will optimally “see no evil, hear
no evil” and not audit any supplier.
To assist in identifying the LVUS, we list the following result, based on Proposition 4.6.
Corollary 4.2. Any unaudited majority-exclusive supplier will be an LVUS.
3Network 𝛾1 does not satisfy Condition 1 (hence, we treat it separately) because it is a special case: the
removal of any supplier will prune an entire branch of the network, which eliminates the competition
between firms a and b. Fortunately, we know the optimal auditing policy at 𝛾1, which we fully describe
in Theorem 4.4′ in Appendix 4.C.2.
4“LVUS” is pronounced |"Elv@s|, the same as the “King of Rock and Roll.”
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Equipped with Theorem 4.4 and Corollary 4.2, we can return to considering Example 4.1, in which
the buyer will identify firm 1 (or any of the majority-exclusive suppliers to firm a) as an LVUS. Firm
1 will be audited and dropped (if it fails) since it is a majority-exclusive supplier. Before considering
firm 24, the minority-exclusive supplier, which is not LVUS, the buyer will continue with firms 2,
3, . . . , 22, which are LVUS. (Of course, the buyer may choose to truncate the ad subphase and
proceed to rp, at any time.) Within the context of Example 4.1, an LVUS is a majority-exclusive
supplier to firm a, as the potential for dropping one of many of these suppliers only marginally
affects the competition compared to possibly dropping firm 24 which would have a more dramatic
effect upon the competition on that side of the network.
In summary by following the optimal policy in Theorem 4.4, the buyer will target whichever side
of the supply network has a greater number of exclusive tier-2 suppliers and will continue trimming
that side whenever those firms fail their audits. We observe that as firms are dropped through
failing audits, the network evolves towards a more balanced shape, where 𝑡a and 𝑡b become more
similar.
Remark 4.1. Since the value of each state 𝛾 critically depends on the status (unaudited or vetted)
of every supplier, one may expect that the choice of the supplier to audit in the ad subphase should
depend not only on the supplier’s value to the buyer’s production profit, but also on the status of
other suppliers. For example, if a tier-2 supplier has many vetted peers (e.g., an unaudited majority-
exclusive supplier when most other majority-exclusive suppliers are vetted), shouldn’t the buyer be
less inclined to audit and drop that supplier and instead focus on less vetted regions of the supply
network? Surprisingly under the conditions of Theorem 4.4 the choice of the supplier to audit is
independent of the status of any other supplier in the supply network. The value the supplier brings
to the buyer’s production profit (i.e., ∇(𝛾, 𝑖) for supplier 𝑖 in state 𝛾) solely determines whether to
audit and drop any supplier and which supplier to audit.
4.5.3 Supplier Choice When Auditing One Firm
While we have fully characterized the optimal policy when all tier-1 firms are vetted, the problem
gets substantially more complicated if the tier-1 firms are among the choices to audit. We illustrate
the complexity of this problem in section 4.5.4. We are able to prove the optimal policy of auditing
for any state 𝛾 ∈ Γ if we allow the buyer to audit at most one supplier (e.g., due to a limited
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auditing budget).
Proposition 4.7. At nonterminal state 𝛾, suppose the buyer can audit (ad or ar) at most one
supplier, before proceeding to production (pp). There exist two (possibly coinciding) thresholds 𝑧
¯
6 𝑧
for penalty 𝑧 such that
(a) If 𝑧 6 𝑧
¯
the optimal decision is pp;
(b) If 𝑧
¯
< 𝑧 6 𝑧 the optimal decision is ar(𝑖) for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾;
(c) If 𝑧 > 𝑧 the optimal decision is ad(𝑖) where 𝑖 solves
max
𝑖∈𝑈𝛾
{𝑢𝑤𝑧(|𝑈𝛾 | − |𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖|)−∇(𝛾, 𝑖)} (4.29)
We identify the thresholds 𝑧
¯
and 𝑧 in the proof of Proposition 4.7 in Appendix 4.C.3.
With low penalty 𝑧 (𝑧 6 𝑧
¯
) the buyer has no incentive to make any effort to audit and proceeds
directly to the production phase. The buyer is willing to suffer the minor penalty if a supplier
violates. With intermediate penalty 𝑧 (𝑧
¯
< 𝑧 6 𝑧) retaining maximal profit from production activity
remains the dominating consideration. The buyer audits a supplier but refrains from dropping it if
the audit reveals it as non-compliant; instead the buyer rectifies the supplier to keep it in the supply
network. With high penalty 𝑧 (𝑧 > 𝑧) the buyer’s priority shifts to auditing and then dropping
the risky suppliers. When dropping a supplier 𝑖, the buyer has two effects to consider: the loss
in production profit, ∇(𝛾, 𝑖), versus the avoidance of violation penalties. The latter is given by
𝑢𝑤𝑧(|𝑈𝛾 | − |𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖|), notably because 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖 will involve not only the removal of 𝑖 but also any of
𝑖’s dependents from the network 𝛾. Hence, the buyer chooses whichever supplier maximizes the
difference between the violation penalty avoidance and loss in production profit, as shown in (4.29).
When the buyer’s auditing expands beyond tier 2, it is now possible that the buyer’s optimal
first audit will not be an LVUS (which is the supplier with the lowest ∇(𝛾, 𝑖)). Instead, in an
effort to quickly eliminate violation penalties due to multiple suppliers, the buyer now considers the
possibility of dropping tier-1 suppliers, which will take away their exclusive tier-2 suppliers with
them. With this in mind, the next proposition specifies which particular supplier the buyer would
audit once 𝑧 > 𝑧. We consider a state 𝛾+ = (𝑔, 𝑈) in which there is at least one supplier in each
position in tier 2 (majority-exclusive, minority-exclusive, shared; i.e., 𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab > 1), all suppliers
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(including those in tier 1) are unaudited, and the majority tier-1 firm a has strictly more suppliers
than the minority tier-1 firm b (i.e., 𝑡a > 𝑡b). This structure allows us to compare all possible
auditing choices. We define in Appendix 4.C.3 the thresholds used in the following proposition,
𝑧a|1, 𝑧b|1, 𝑧a|b, in closed-form expressions.
Proposition 4.8. At state 𝛾+ suppose the buyer can audit at most one supplier before proceeding to
production (pp). Let 𝑧
¯ 𝑑
= (𝑧a|1 ∧ 𝑧b|1)∨ 𝑧 and 𝑧𝑑 = 𝑧a|1 ∨ 𝑧a|b ∨ 𝑧 where 𝑧 is as in Proposition 4.7.
The optimal decision is ad(ea) (i.e., auditing and dropping (if non-compliant) an exclusive supplier
to firm a) if and only if 𝑧 < 𝑧 6 𝑧
¯ 𝑑
, ad(b) if and only if 𝑧
¯ 𝑑
< 𝑧 6 𝑧𝑑, and ad(a) if and only if
𝑧 > 𝑧𝑑.
We illustrate the results of Propositions 4.7 and 4.8 in Figure 4.5. As we have seen in Proposi-
tion 4.7, the buyer starts auditing with the intention to drop only if 𝑧 exceeds 𝑧. In that region, if 𝑧
is relatively low (𝑧 < 𝑧 < 𝑧
¯𝑑
), the buyer will still choose an LVUS — a majority-exclusive supplier —
to audit. However, once 𝑧 exceeds 𝑧
¯𝑑
, the supplier to audit is no longer an LVUS. When penalty 𝑧 is
intermediate (𝑧
¯𝑑
< 𝑧 6 𝑧𝑑) the buyer chooses the minority tier-1 firm b (ad(b)). The decision risks
losing the production profit attributable to firm b and the entire side of the network dependent on
firm b, but simultaneously avoids the potential penalty from all those suppliers. When penalty 𝑧 is
high (𝑧 > 𝑧𝑑) the buyer chooses the majority tier-1 firm a with even higher stakes: the potential of
losing all production profit attributable to firm a and its side of the supply network while avoiding
penalty from this large group of suppliers.
Let us revisit Example 4.2 in light of Propositions 4.7 and 4.8, by comparing Figure 4.4(b) with
Figure 4.5. First, in Example 4.2 the rectification cost was sufficiently high that ar is not utilized
at all. Second, in both figures we see as 𝑧 increases, the first auditing choice moves from a majority-
exclusive supplier and then eventually to the minority tier-1 firm b to the majority tier-1 firm a.
However, we also observe notable differences, primarily attributable to the fact that the results in
this section limit the audit to a single firm while Example 4.2 considers the first auditing choice
within a sequence of audits. Notably, in Figure 4.4(b) for certain values of 𝑧 the buyer will first
audit a minority-exclusive or shared supplier in tier 2, something we do not observe in Figure 4.5.
In this section where the buyer is restricted to auditing at most one supplier, it is never optimal
for the buyer to audit and drop a minority-exclusive or shared supplier: dropping one such supplier
118














Schematic illustration of the optimal decision as penalty 𝑧 varies and when the buyer is limited to conduct at most
one audit. ar represents auditing and rectifying if non-compliant any unaudited supplier.
leads to greater loss of profit compared to an LVUS (majority-exclusive supplier) while avoiding
only as much potential penalty from violation. However, when the buyer may conduct a sequence of
audits, shared or minority-exclusive suppliers may be chosen as we see in Example 4.2, something
we explore further in the next section.
4.5.4 Patterns in Optimal Auditing Paths
We have shown in section 4.5.2 a complete picture of optimal auditing behavior in the second tier.
In particular the buyer will always prioritize an LVUS for ad. On the other hand Example 4.2
shows that, if we include the tier-1 firms as auditing candidates, over a certain range of parameters
the optimal first decision can be auditing and dropping (if non-compliant) a minority-exclusive
supplier or even a shared supplier, neither of which is an LVUS. What drives such behavior? How
can auditing and dropping (if non-compliant), say, a shared supplier benefit the buyer more than
auditing a majority-exclusive supplier?
Figure 4.6 presents an event tree of the buyer’s optimal auditing paths in Example 4.2. The initial
network state 𝛾 may be seen in Figure 4.4(a). The event tree in Figure 4.6 is attained when penalty
𝑧 = 1500 so that the buyer strictly prefers to first audit and drop a shared supplier, i.e., take action
ad(s) at 𝛾. In network 𝛾, ea may correspond to any exclusive supplier to firm a, suppliers 1, 2, or
3; eb refers to the exclusive supplier to firm b, supplier 6; and s refers to either shared supplier, 4
or 5. We use 𝒫 to represent the branch for passing an audit and ℱ for failing. Figure 4.6 shows
an example in which the rp subphase consists only of pp activity but not ar, due to the high
rectification cost, as discussed in section 4.5.1.
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The first pattern we discuss is what we call the “litmus test.” In certain states the buyer opts to
audit a supplier in a pivotal position in the network (instead of an LVUS) to gauge the viability
of a portion of the supply network or even the entire network. For example, the buyer chooses the
shared supplier as the first firm to audit in state 𝛾, as seen in Figure 4.6. Such a supplier is in a
pivotal location in that it serves both firms a and b; knowing the outcome of the audit allows the
buyer to deduce how valuable firms a and b will be. By testing the shared supplier early on, the
buyer gains information that it can act up on in the early stages of auditing. In the event that
the shared supplier passes, the buyer is optimistic about the viability of both sides of the supply
network, and as seen in Figure 4.6, it takes a more cautious approach by auditing a sequence of
majority-exclusive suppliers, each of which is an LVUS. Notably, however, when the shared supplier
fails the audit, the buyer is pessimistic about the value of firm b, because that side of the supply
network is not as attractive as it once might have been when the shared supplier was in the network.
Hence, the buyer goes on to audit firm b, which is yet another litmus test: that supplier is also in a
pivotal position (and not an LVUS), and the buyer takes dramatically different actions depending
on the outcome of that audit, as we discuss next.
We observe a second pattern, a “rescue operation” versus a “kill mission,” that follows the auditing
of firm b in the lower half of the event tree (ad(b)), which follows when ad(s) fails. What we label
as the “kill mission” follows when firm b fails. In that case the buyer is left with only firm a’s
side of the supply network with four unaudited tier-2 suppliers (there is no longer a distinction
between exclusive and shared suppliers). Given the unattractive production profit of such a limited
network, the buyer proceeds to audit firm a, the failing of which will kill the entire supply network,
thus avoiding costly audits of all remaining tier-2 suppliers. Even if firm a passes, the buyer keeps
auditing all remaining suppliers to eliminate any non-compliance.
In contrast if firm b passes, the buyer conducts what we label as a “rescue operation”: after the
initial setback of dropping the first shared supplier, the prospect has improved sufficiently with the
passing of firm b that the buyer mostly follows a conventional auditing sequence of LVUS suppliers.
Thus, the buyer goes on to audit numerous tier-2 suppliers in an attempt to only prune the less
valuable suppliers.
In summary as both the production profit and the penalty can be potentially high, the buyer
takes great care in auditing. In several states the buyer’s auditing choice is intended to test the
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Figure 4.7: Auditing and Risk as Probability of Non-compliance Varies
(a) Expected Number of Suppliers Audited
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1






















(b) Probability of Exposure in Production Phase
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State 𝛾 = (𝑔, 𝑈) where 𝑔 = ({a,b}, {1, 2}, {3}, {4}) and 𝑈 = 𝑆𝑔. Parameters 𝛼 = 100, 𝛽 = 10, 𝑣𝑇 = 2, 𝑎 = 1, 𝑟 = 20,
𝑤 = 0.5. (In the left panel, the graph for 𝑧 = 12 coincides with the horizontal axis.)
waters and determine which part of the network is worthy to protect and which is not. Because
the shared supplier occupies the key position of simultaneously influencing both sides of the supply
network, it is the perfect candidate for the first audit as a litmus test (with the given parameters).
The buyer prefers ad(s) over ad(ea) for the information ad(s) can provide to guide the buyer’s
subsequent decision. In particular, if the first audit ad(s) ascertains compliance the buyer takes a
more optimistic approach by proceeding to audit the other tier-2 suppliers, the dropping of which
wouldn’t damage the buyer’s production profit too much. On the other hand, if the first audit
ad(s) reveals non-compliance the buyer starts to approach auditing more aggressively by directly
turning to the tier-1 firms, starting with firm b. Depending on the outcome of ad(b), the buyer will
then conduct either a rescue operation (upon b passing the audit) or a kill mission (upon b failing
the audit). The rescue operation intends to preserve the profitability of the network, while the kill
mission has a good chance of putting an end to the network and preventing any production.
4.5.5 Effect of Probability of Non-compliance
What is the role of the ex ante probability of non-compliance 𝑢 in the auditing activity and the level
of risk in the supply network resulting from the auditing phase? We consider a state with supply
network 𝑔 = ({a,b}, {1, 2}, {3}, {4}) in which all suppliers are unaudited, with values of parameters
𝛼 = 100, 𝛽 = 10, 𝑣𝑇 = 2, 𝑎 = 1, 𝑟 = 20, and 𝑤 = 0.5. Figure 4.8(a) shows the expected number of
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suppliers to be audited throughout the auditing phase as 𝑢 increases from 0 to 1 for various values
of penalty 𝑧; this expectation is taken over all possible sample paths of whether any supplier passes
or fails an audit under the optimal auditing policy. Figure 4.8(b) shows the corresponding expected
probability of the exposure of violation at any remaining unaudited suppliers in the supply network
after the auditing phase. This is calculated by 1 − (1 − 𝑢𝑤)|𝑈 | where 𝑢𝑤 is the probability of an
unaudited supplier being non-compliant and subsequently exposed and 𝑈 is the set of any unaudited
suppliers at the conclusion of the auditing phase (these are the only suppliers which could possibly
violate in the production phase). The set 𝑈 is the culmination of the path-dependent auditing
process.
In Figures 4.8(a) and 4.8(b), a jump from one smooth segment on a curve to the next smooth
segment represents a shift in the auditing policy. For low values of 𝑧 (e.g., 𝑧 6 12) the buyer
conducts no audits at all regardless of the probability of non-compliance; the number of suppliers
to be audited remains zero and the network’s probability of exposure increases monotonically in
𝑢 without auditing. With higher 𝑧 the buyer starts to audit once 𝑢 reaches a threshold, which
decreases as 𝑧 gets larger. For example, compare the 𝑧 = 22 to the 𝑧 = 12 curves: for 𝑧 = 22
when 𝑢 > 0.27 the buyer is sufficiently concerned about non-compliance that some auditing will
occur, resulting in a corresponding drop in the probability of exposure, relative to the 𝑧 = 12
curve. Overall as 𝑢 increases the expected number of suppliers audited first shows an upward
trend, reflecting the buyer’s greater concern of the potential penalty from violation, leading to more
audits. The expected number of audited firms trends downward, however, as 𝑢 increases further.
With a higher probability of non-compliance the business becomes too risky so the buyer turns to
auditing the tier-1 firms directly. The buyer expects to drop these tier-1 firms, along with their tier-2
dependents if the tier-1 firms turn out to be non-compliant, thus avoiding the cost of conducting
those tier-2 audits (highly likely to be non-compliant). As 𝑢 approaches 1, the expected number
of audits approaches 2, because the buyer audits firms a and b (which are very likely to fail the
audits), thus dropping them and killing the business. Figure 4.8(b) reflects the same effects: the
probability of exposure in the network first exhibits an overall upward trend with increasing 𝑢 but
eventually falls to zero as the buyer drops both firms a and b, and consequently the entire supply
network, thus avoiding risk entirely.
Neither figure shows a generally monotonic pattern. Higher probability of non-compliance drives
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auditing. As 𝑢 increases the buyer adopts an increasingly aggressive approach to auditing, the
effectiveness of which is the concomitant reduction in the probability of exposure (Figure 4.8(b)).
Ultimately, such auditing may be exhaustive (all firms are audited) to ensure full compliance or to
extinguish the business.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
We study a buyer’s problem of dynamically auditing its suppliers for social responsibility compliance
in a three-tier supply network with general sourcing relationships between adjacent tiers. We model
the competition in the supply network in the production phase and characterize the unique equilib-
rium arising from the Cournot competition. In particular, we characterize the buyer’s production
profit, observing how the configuration of the supply network affects the profit, and the value each
supplier carries for the buyer. We find that the buyer profits from a more balanced supply network.
Turning to the auditing phase, we identify two subphases of the optimal policy: (1) the buyer
conducts all activities of auditing and dropping (if non-compliant), then (2) proceeds either to
the production phase directly or to audit and rectify (if non-compliant) all remaining suppliers.
When the buyer focuses exclusively on the second tier, the value each supplier carries in the buyer’s
production profit entirely determines the buyer’s choice of which supplier to audit (and drop if
non-compliant): the buyer always chooses a least valuable unaudited supplier (LVUS) in the current
state. On the other hand, if even the LVUS carries more value for the buyer than the potential
penalty associated with the supplier as well as the cost of auditing and rectification, the buyer will
skip auditing and proceed directly to production: “see no evil, hear no evil.” In contrast if we
allow a broader set of firms to be audited — if the tier-1 firms could now be candidates along with
the tier-2 firms — we observe that the buyer may wish to audit and drop a non-LVUS supplier.
Depending on the danger of violation, the buyer may shift the focus to a shared tier-2 supplier or
even a tier-1 firm, which occupies a pivotal location within the network. The result of such audits
helps the buyer ascertain the viability (or lack thereof) of the entire supply chain. We think of such
audits as “litmus tests” since they deliver valuable information, upon which the buyer may act to
“rescue” or “kill” the network.
As our model shows, oftentimes it is not optimal for a buyer to exhaustively audit all suppliers.
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Strategic considerations direct the choice of the suppliers to audit. Earlier we describe Apple’s policy
of dropping a non-compliant supplier or working with the supplier to rectify its practice. Our results
show that either choice can be optimal depending on the properties of the supply network and the
stage in the auditing process. A buyer like Apple may benefit by prioritizing auditing suppliers that
it is prepared to drop if an audit finds non-compliance and postponing auditing suppliers that the
buyer is willing to rectify. When focusing on an upstream tier the buyer may want to first audit
suppliers in more peripheral positions that carry less weight in the buyer’s profit from production
activity.
Appendix 4.A Symbols Used
∇(𝛾, 𝑖) = 𝜋(𝛾)−𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖) for 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 where 𝛾 ∈ Γ, the production value of supplier 𝑖 in state 𝛾
⊕,⊖ operators that map a state-unaudited-supplier pair to a state; used in defining dy-
namic program
𝑎 cost of auditing a supplier
a, b tier-1 firms
𝛼, 𝛽 parameters of the demand function from customers downstream to the buyer
c the buyer
𝐶𝑖 strategy space of firm 𝑖
𝐷𝑔(𝑖) set of dependents of supplier 𝑖 in supply network 𝑔
ea, eb an exclusive supplier to firm a and that to firm b, used in notation for ad and ar
decisions
𝑔 supply network
𝑔∅ the null supply network
𝛾 = (𝑔, 𝑈) state in the auditing phase
Γ state space of the auditing phase
Γ𝑇 set of terminal states
𝑝(0) selling price of buyer
𝑝(1) selling price of tier-1 firms to the buyer
𝑝(2)𝑖 selling price of tier-2 suppliers to tier-1 firm 𝑖
𝜋(𝛾) buyer’s production profit in state 𝛾
𝜋𝑖 profit of firm 𝑖 from production activity
𝑞𝑖 total quantity produced by firm 𝑖
𝑟 cost of rectifying a non-compliant supplier
𝑅+(𝛾) set of states reachable from state 𝛾
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𝑠𝑗,𝑖 quantity supplier 𝑗 produces for downstream firm 𝑖
s a shared supplier, used in notation for ad and ar decisions
𝑆a, 𝑆b set of exclusive suppliers to tier-1 firm a and that to firm b
𝑆ab set of shared suppliers
𝑆𝑔 set of suppliers in supply network 𝑔
𝑆(𝑘) set of suppliers in tier 𝑘 = 1, 2
𝑢 probability that an unaudited supplier is non-compliant
𝑈𝛾 set of unaudited suppliers in state 𝛾
𝑈 union of sets of unaudited suppliers in any state in Γ
𝑉 value function in auditing phase
𝑉 * optimal value function in auditing phasẽ︀𝑉 state value function in auditing phasẽ︀𝑉 * optimal state value function in auditing phase
𝑣𝑘 unit production cost in tier 𝑘
𝑣𝑇 sum of production costs per unit across tiers
𝑤 probability that violation at a supplier will be exposed, given that it is non-compliant
𝑋 union of sets of admissible actions in any state in Γ
𝑋𝛾 set of admissible actions at state 𝛾
𝜉 auditing policy
Ξ set of all auditing policies
𝑧 cost to the buyer of an exposed violation
𝑍 set of state-unaudited-supplier pairs
𝜁(𝛾) expected total penalty from violations on state 𝛾
Appendix 4.B Proofs for the Production Phase
4.B.1 Proofs of Results in Section 4.3.3
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Substitute (4.6) into (4.7) and differentiate to get
𝜕𝜋c
𝜕𝑞c





Since 𝛽 > 0, (4.31) implies that 𝜋c is strictly concave. Hence a quantity 𝑞c maximizes 𝜋c if and








We rewrite it in the form of an inverse demand function to obtain (4.8).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Substitute (4.8) into (4.9) to get tier-1 supplier 𝑖’s profit
𝜋𝑖 = (𝛼− 𝑣0 − 2𝛽𝑞c − 𝑣1 − 𝑝(2)𝑖)𝑞𝑖. (4.33)
Substitute (4.10) into (4.33) to get
𝜋𝑖 =














Given 𝛽 > 0, (4.36) implies 𝜋𝑖 is strictly concave in 𝑞𝑖. Given any other tier-1 firm’s decision, a







⎞⎠+ 𝛼− 𝑣0 − 𝑣1 − 𝑝(2)𝑖
4𝛽
. (4.37)
Hence a strategy profile q(1) = (𝑞𝑖)𝑖∈𝑆(1) is an equilibrium of the tier-1 firms’ game 𝑃1 if and only
if it solves the system of linear equations (4.37) for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1).
If |𝑆(1)| = 1, let 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1), then it is clear that q(1) = 𝑞𝑖 =
𝛼−𝑣0−𝑣1−𝑝(2)𝑖
4𝛽 is the unique (degenerate)
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equilibrium of the game 𝑃1. If |𝑆(1)| = 2, i.e., 𝑆(1) = {a,b}, we write the system (4.37) as⎡⎢⎣1 12
1
2 1








⎤⎥⎦ is invertible; hence the system (4.37) has a unique solution, which is the
unique equilibrium of the game 𝑃1. We rewrite (4.37) in the form of an inverse demand function to
obtain (4.12).
4.B.2 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Proposition 4.9. (a) A tier-2 supplier 𝑗’s profit 𝜋𝑗 is strictly concave in s𝑗.
(b) There exists a unique equilibrium of the game 𝑃2 of Cournot competition among tier-2 sup-
pliers in the first stage of the production phase.
(c) Given the inverse demand function (4.12) from tier-1 firm 𝑖 that its tier-2 suppliers collectively





























Proof. (Part c). For exclusive supplier 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1), substitute (4.12) into (4.13), replace
𝑣0 + 𝑣1 + 𝑣2 with 𝑣𝑇 , and then substitute (4.15) to get
𝜋𝑗 =















Differentiate (4.42) with respect to 𝑠𝑗,𝑖 to get (4.39). For shared supplier 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆ab, substitute (4.12)




















Differentiate (4.44) with respect to 𝑠𝑗,𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1), to get (4.40).




Therefore 𝜋𝑗 is strictly concave in s𝑗 = 𝑠𝑗,𝑖. For shared supplier 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆ab, differentiate (4.40) with
respect to 𝑠𝑗,𝑖 and with respect to 𝑠𝑗,𝑖′ for 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑆(1)∖{𝑖} to get
𝜕2𝜋𝑗
𝜕𝑠2𝑗,𝑖




Hence the Hessian of 𝜋𝑗 with respect to s𝑗 is
⎡⎢⎣−8𝛽 −4𝛽
−4𝛽 −8𝛽
⎤⎥⎦ which, given that 𝛽 > 0, can be easily
verified to be negative definite. Therefore 𝜋𝑗 is strictly concave in s𝑗 = {𝑠𝑗,𝑖}𝑖∈𝑆(1).
(Part b). (Existence.) The strategy space 𝐶𝑗 of tier-2 supplier 𝑗 is a nonempty compact convex
subset of R (if 𝑗 is an exclusive supplier) or R2 (if 𝑗 is a shared supplier). The payoff function 𝜋𝑗
of supplier 𝑗 (4.42) (for exclusive supplier 𝑗) or (4.44) (for shared supplier 𝑗) is continuous in the
strategy profile (s𝑗)𝑗∈𝑆(2) and strictly concave, hence quasi-concave, in supplier 𝑗’s own strategy s𝑗 .
By Proposition 20.3 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium of
the game among tier-2 suppliers in the first stage.
(Uniqueness.) We use the method due to Rosen (1965). As we have seen, the strategy space 𝐶𝑗
of supplier 𝑗 is convex, closed, and bounded. 𝜋𝑗 is continuous in the strategy profile and concave
in supplier 𝑗’s strategy. Label a tier-1 firm a and, if there is a second one, label it b. Label
𝑆(2) = {1, . . . , 𝑛}, where 𝑛 = |𝑆(2)|, such that {1, . . . , 𝑡a} are tier-1 firm a’s exclusive suppliers,
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{𝑡a +1, . . . , 𝑡a + 𝑡ab} are the shared suppliers, and {𝑡a + 𝑡ab +1, . . . , 𝑛} are tier-1 firm b’s exclusive
suppliers (any of the subsets could be empty, but at least 𝑆(2) is nonempty, i.e., 𝑛 > 0). Let
x = (s𝑗)𝑗∈𝑆(2). We choose r = ι𝑛 = (1, . . . , 1)T ∈ R𝑛 as the weights for the payoff functions in





























By (4.45), (4.46), (4.42), and (4.44), the Jacobian 𝐺(x, ι𝑛) of 𝑔(x, ι𝑛) with respect to x is equal
to −2𝛽Λ(𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab), a symmetric matrix. Hence 𝐺(x, ι𝑛) + (𝐺(x, ι𝑛))T = −4𝛽Λ(𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab), which
is negative definite for any x ∈
∏︀
𝑗∈𝑆(2)𝐶𝑗 by Lemma 4.3 in Appendix 4.D and that 𝛽 > 0. By
Theorem 6 in Rosen (1965), 𝜎(x, ι𝑛) is diagonally strictly concave. By Theorem 2 in Rosen (1965),
the equilibrium of the game among tier-2 suppliers in the first stage of the production phase is
unique.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By Proposition 4.9, there exists a unique equilibrium (s*𝑗 )𝑗∈𝑆(2) of the game
in the first stage among tier-2 supplier; let (𝑝*(2)𝑖)𝑖∈𝑆(1) be the resulting selling prices of the tier-2
suppliers. Given (𝑝*(2)𝑖)𝑖∈𝑆(1), by Proposition 4.2, there exists a unique equilibrium q
*
(1) of the game
in the second stage among tier-1 firms; let 𝑝*(1) be the resulting selling price of the tier-1 firms. Given
𝑝*(1), by Proposition 4.1, there exists a unique optimal solution 𝑞
*
c to the buyer’s problem in the first













is the unique production phase equilibrium.
4.B.3 Equilibrium Characterization
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Substitute (4.6) for 𝑝(0) and (4.8) for 𝑝(1) in (4.7).
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Proof of Proposition 4.4. Tier-2 supplier 𝑗’s problem is
(𝑃(2)𝑗) max 𝜋𝑗(s(2)) (4.48)
subject to s𝑗 > 0. (4.49)
By Proposition 4.9a, 𝜋𝑗(s(2)) is concave in s𝑗 . With merely the nonnegativity constraints, constraint





6 0, with equality if 𝑠*𝑗,𝑖 > 0, (if 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1); or for 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1) if 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆ab)
(4.50)





𝑃(2)𝑗 , then s*𝑗 is a best response to (s
*
𝑗′)𝑗′∈𝑆(2)∖{𝑗}. If for every 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆(2), s*𝑗 is a best response to
(s*𝑗′)𝑗′∈𝑆(2)∖{𝑗}, then s
*
(2) is an equilibrium in pure strategies of 𝑃2.
(Case a). We note 𝑠𝑒(𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3) > 0, ∀𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 > 0; hence the supply quantity of every exclusive
supplier, as defined using 𝑠𝑒, is positive. If there exists a shared supplier 𝑗, then by the assumption
𝑡a 6 2𝑡b + 2𝑡ab + 2 and the expression in (4.20), 𝑠*𝑗,a = 𝑠𝑠(𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab) > 0. Since 𝑡a > 𝑡b, 𝑠
*
𝑗,b =
𝑠𝑠(𝑡b, 𝑡a, 𝑡ab) > 0. s*𝑗 as defined is nonnegative for every 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆(2).








= 0 for 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1) and 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 ∪ 𝑆ab. Therefore s*(2) satisfies the nonnegativity
constraints and the KKT conditions (4.50) for every tier-2 supplier 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆(2). Hence s*(2) is an
equilibrium of 𝑃2.
We verify part iii by substituting the values of 𝑠*𝑗,𝑖 in parts i and ii into (4.15) for the corresponding
quantities, and substituting (4.19), (4.20), and (4.21). We verify (4.23) by substituting (4.15) into
(4.10), then substituting the values of 𝑠*𝑗,𝑖 in parts i and ii for the corresponding quantities.
(Case b). Except for 𝑠*𝑗,a = 0 for a shared supplier 𝑗, the supply quantities in parts i–iii are
defined using 𝑠𝑒 and, as such, positive. Therefore s*𝑗 as defined is nonnegative for every 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆(2).
Analogous to case a, substituting supply quantities in parts i–iii into (4.39) and (4.40), following







= 0 for exclusive supplier 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1), and for shared






6 0 for every shared supplier







= 𝑎− 𝑣𝑇 − 4𝛽𝑡a𝑠𝑒(𝑡a, 𝑡b + 𝑡ab, 0)− 2𝛽(𝑡b + 𝑡ab)𝑠𝑒(𝑡b + 𝑡ab, 𝑡a, 0)− 2𝛽𝑠𝑒(𝑡b + 𝑡ab, 𝑡a, 0)
(4.51)
= 𝑎− 𝑣𝑇 − 4𝛽𝑡a𝑠𝑒(𝑡a, 𝑡b + 𝑡ab, 0)− 2𝛽(𝑡b + 𝑡ab + 1)𝑠𝑒(𝑡b + 𝑡ab, 𝑡a, 0). (4.52)
𝐿(𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3) is symmetric in 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 in the sense that 𝐿(𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3) = 𝐿(𝑥2, 𝑥1, 𝑥3). Let ̂︀𝐿 =





= 𝑎− 𝑣𝑇 − 2(𝛼− 𝑣𝑇 )
𝑡a(𝑡b + 𝑡ab + 2)̂︀𝐿 − (𝛼− 𝑣𝑇 )(𝑡a + 2)(𝑡b + 𝑡ab + 1)̂︀𝐿 (4.53)
= (𝑎− 𝑣𝑇 )
[︂
1− 1̂︀𝐿(3𝑡a𝑡b + 3𝑡a𝑡ab + 5𝑡a + 2𝑡b + 2𝑡ab + 2)
]︂
(4.54)
= (𝑎− 𝑣𝑇 )
1̂︀𝐿(−𝑡a + 2𝑡b + 2𝑡ab + 2) (4.55)
which is nonpositive by the assumption 𝛼 > 𝑣𝑇 and the premise 𝑡a > 2𝑡b + 2𝑡ab + 2.
We verify parts iv and v by substituting the values of 𝑠*𝑗,𝑖 in parts i–iii into (4.15) for the corre-
sponding quantities. We verify (4.24) by substituting (4.15) into (4.10) then substituting the values
of 𝑠*𝑗,𝑖 in parts i–iii for the corresponding quantities.
4.B.4 Comparative Statics
In this section, we consider only the case 𝛼 > 𝑣𝑇 . (If 𝛼 = 𝑣𝑇 , by Proposition 4.4, every supply
quantity is zero.) All comparative statics results, except those on 𝑞*c and 𝜋*c, are applicable only to
non-null supply networks. To facilitate the proofs we introduce an alternative notation of a supply
network in terms of 𝑡a, the number of exclusive suppliers to firm a, 𝑡b that of exclusive suppliers to
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firm b, and 𝑡ab that of shared suppliers. Specifically, we define an operator ⟨·⟩ : N30 → 𝐺 by
⟨𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab⟩ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
({a,b}, {1, . . . , 𝑡a}, {𝑡a + 1, . . . , 𝑡a + 𝑡b},
{𝑡a + 𝑡b + 1, . . . , 𝑡a + 𝑡b + 𝑡ab})
, if 𝑡a + 𝑡ab > 0 and 𝑡b + 𝑡ab > 0
({a}, {1, . . . , 𝑡a + 𝑡ab}, ∅, ∅), if 𝑡a + 𝑡ab > 0 and 𝑡b + 𝑡ab = 0
({b}, ∅, {1, . . . , 𝑡b + 𝑡ab}, ∅), if 𝑡a + 𝑡ab = 0 and 𝑡b + 𝑡ab > 0
𝑔∅, if 𝑡a + 𝑡ab = 0 and 𝑡b + 𝑡ab = 0
.
(4.56)
Let 𝑓 be a variable that arises from the production phase equilibrium (quantity, margin, profit, price,
market share). We denote by 𝑓(𝑔) = 𝑓⟨𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab⟩ the value of this variable in supply network 𝑔 =
⟨𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab⟩. We further denote Δ1 𝑓⟨𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab⟩ = 𝑓⟨𝑡a+1, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab⟩−𝑓⟨𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab⟩, Δ2 𝑓⟨𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab⟩ =
𝑓⟨𝑡a, 𝑡b + 1, 𝑡ab⟩ − 𝑓⟨𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab⟩, and Δ3 𝑓⟨𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab⟩ = 𝑓⟨𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab + 1⟩ − 𝑓⟨𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab⟩.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We begin by noting a few relationships between the equilibrium variables.
By the definition of 𝑝(0) and (4.8),
𝑚*c = (𝛼− 𝛽𝑞*c)− (𝛼− 𝑣0 − 2𝛽𝑞*c)− 𝑣0 = 𝛽𝑞*c. (4.57)
By Proposition 4.3, 𝜋*c = 𝛽(𝑞*c)2. Therefore, 𝑞*c, 𝑚*c, and 𝜋*c always change in the same direction,
which is opposite to the change in 𝑝*(1) by (4.8). Hence the direction of the change in any one of the
four variables determines those of the other three. Let 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆(1). By (4.12),
𝑝*(2)𝑖 = 𝛼− 𝑣0 − 𝑣1 − 4𝛽𝑞
*
𝑖 − 2𝛽(𝑞*c − 𝑞*𝑖 ) = 𝛼− 𝑣0 − 𝑣1 − 2𝛽𝑞*𝑖 − 2𝛽𝑞*c. (4.58)
Then by (4.8),










Therefore, 𝑞*𝑖 , 𝑚
*
𝑖 , and 𝜋
*
𝑖 always change in the same direction. Finally, 𝜌
*
a = 1− 𝜌*b.
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Given the characterization of the equilibrium in Proposition 4.4, we directly calculate the change
Δ𝑘 𝑓(𝑔) in each equilibrium variable 𝑓 , factor the expression when appropriate, and then check its
sign, for 𝑘 = 1, 2, 3. We illustrate the procedure for Δ1 𝑓(𝑔) only, which involves incrementing 𝑡a.
We consider cases which satisfy 𝑡a 6 2𝑡b+2𝑡ab+2 and 𝑡a+1 6 2𝑡b+2𝑡ab+2 so that Proposition 4.4a
is applicable before and after incrementing 𝑡a. We also elaborate on Δ3 𝑓(𝑔) for 𝑓 ∈ {𝑞*a,𝑚*a, 𝜋*a}
when 𝑡a 6 2𝑡b + 2𝑡ab + 2 that results in the peculiar case of the cell with “+/−” in column (III) of
Table 4.1 in the proof of Proposition 4.5 that follows.




(𝛼− 𝑣𝑇 )(𝑡b + 2𝑡𝑠 + 2)2
𝛽𝐿(𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab)𝐿(𝑡a + 1, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab)
> 0 (4.61)
since 𝛼 > 𝑣𝑇 and 𝐿(𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3) > 0, ∀𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 > 0. Since 𝑞*c, 𝑚*c, and 𝜋*c always change in the same








2(𝛼− 𝑣𝑇 )(𝑡ab + 𝑡b + 1)(2𝑡ab + 𝑡b + 2)
𝛽𝐿(𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab)𝐿(𝑡a + 1, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab)
> 0. (4.62)




(𝛼− 𝑣𝑇 )𝑡b(2𝑡ab + 𝑡b + 2)
𝛽𝐿(𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab)𝐿(𝑡a + 1, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab)
< 0 (4.63)




2(𝛼− 𝑣𝑇 )(2𝑡ab + 𝑡b + 2)(4𝑡ab + 3𝑡b + 4)





4(𝛼− 𝑣𝑇 )(𝑡ab + 1)(2𝑡ab + 𝑡b + 2)






3(2𝑡ab + 𝑡b + 2)(2𝑡ab + 3𝑡b)
2(4𝑡2ab + 4𝑡a𝑡ab + 4𝑡b𝑡ab + 4𝑡ab + 3𝑡a + 3𝑡a𝑡b + 3𝑡b)
×
1
4𝑡2ab + 4𝑡a𝑡ab + 4𝑡b𝑡ab + 8𝑡ab + 3𝑡a + 3𝑡a𝑡b + 6𝑡b + 3
> 0 (4.66)
(“> 0” if 𝑡b + 𝑡ab > 0) which gives the results for 𝜌*b as well.
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Proof of Proposition 4.5. As we have shown in the proof of Theorem 4.2, 𝑞*a,𝑚*a, and 𝜋*a always
change in the same direction. Hence it suffices to show the effect on 𝑞*a. Using the result from




2(𝛼− 𝑣𝑇 )(4𝑡a𝑡ab − 4𝑡2ab − 8𝑡b𝑡ab − 12𝑡ab + 2𝑡2a + 𝑡b𝑡a + 6𝑡a − 4𝑡2b − 12𝑡b − 8)
3𝛽𝐿(𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab)𝐿(𝑡a, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab + 1)
.
(4.67)
Since 𝐿(𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3) > 0,∀𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 > 0,
sgn(Δ3 𝑞
*
a(𝑔)) = sgn(−(4𝑡a𝑡ab − 4𝑡2ab − 8𝑡b𝑡ab − 12𝑡ab + 2𝑡2a + 𝑡b𝑡a + 6𝑡a − 4𝑡2b − 12𝑡b − 8)) (4.68)
Note that what is inside the sgn operator on the right-hand side of (4.68) is quadratic in 𝑡a with




(−6− 𝑡b − 4𝑡ab −
√︀
72𝑡b𝑡ab + 48𝑡2ab + 144𝑡ab + 33𝑡
2




(−6− 𝑡b − 4𝑡ab +
√︀
72𝑡b𝑡ab + 48𝑡2ab + 144𝑡ab + 33𝑡
2
b + 108𝑡b + 100) (4.70)
It is clear that 𝑡a− < 0. We next show that 0 < 𝑡a+ < 2𝑡b + 2𝑡ab + 2. Note
(
√︀
72𝑡b𝑡ab + 48𝑡2ab + 144𝑡ab + 33𝑡
2
b + 108𝑡b + 100)
2 − (−6− 𝑡b − 4𝑡ab)2
= 32(𝑡b(2𝑡ab + 3) + 𝑡
2
ab + 3𝑡ab + 𝑡
2
b + 2) > 0 (4.71)
so √︀
72𝑡b𝑡ab + 48𝑡2ab + 144𝑡ab + 33𝑡
2
b + 108𝑡b + 100 > | − 6− 𝑡b − 4𝑡ab| (4.72)
which is equivalent to 𝑡a+ > 0. On the other hand,




12𝑡ab + 9𝑡b + 14−
√︀








(12𝑡ab + 9𝑡b + 14)
2 − (
√︀




= 8[37 + 6𝑡2b + 60𝑡ab + 24𝑡
2
ab + 9𝑡b(5 + 4𝑡ab)] > 0 (4.74)
which implies (4.73) is negative. Therefore, when 𝑡a 6 2𝑡b + 2𝑡ab + 2, Δ3(𝑞*a) > 0 if 𝑡a < 𝑡a+ and
Δ3(𝑞
*
a) < 0 if 𝑡a > 𝑡a+.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2; by calculating, factoring, and ob-
serving the sign of the relevant difference.
Appendix 4.C Proofs for the Auditing Phase
We define 𝑉 : Ξ×Γ → R as the value function. Let ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾, 𝑥) be expected value of choosing 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝛾
when in state 𝛾 ∈ Γ and following policy 𝜉 ∈ Ξ thereon. Therefore, given auditing policy 𝜉 ∈ Ξ and
state 𝛾 ∈ Γ, 𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾) = ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾, 𝜉(𝛾)), and
̃︀𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾,pp) = 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜁(𝛾) (4.75)
and given 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 ,
̃︀𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾,ad(𝑖)) = −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) + 𝑢𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖). (4.76)
̃︀𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾,ar(𝑖)) = −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) + 𝑢(−𝑟 + 𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖)) (4.77)
= −𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + 𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖). (4.78)
Recall from section 4.5.1 that rp is a shorthand for “audit and rectify (ar) all remaining unaudited
suppliers if 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟 < 𝑢𝑤𝑧 and proceed to production (pp) otherwise” and 𝑐rp ≡ (𝑢𝑤𝑧)∧ (𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟) is
the cost associated with each unaudited supplier in the rp subphase. For any 𝛾 ∈ Γ and 𝜉 ∈ Ξ we
write ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,rp) = ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾,rp) = 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑐rp|𝑈𝛾 |.
Given state 𝛾 ∈ Γ, let 𝑅+(𝛾) ⊆ Γ be the set of states reachable from 𝛾 (including 𝛾 itself):
𝛾′ ∈ 𝑅+(𝛾) if and only if there exists a policy 𝜉 ∈ Ξ such that 𝛾′ is reached from 𝛾 with strictly
positive probability by following 𝜉.
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4.C.1 Two Subphases of Auditing
Proposition 4.10. The buyer can be at least as well off by postponing all audit and rectify (ar)
actions to after all audit and drop (ad) actions.
Proof. Let 𝜉 ∈ Ξ be such that there exists 𝛾 = (𝑔, 𝑈) ∈ Γ, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 , and 𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝛾⊕𝑖 such that
𝜉(𝛾) = ar(𝑖) and 𝜉(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) = ad(𝑗). (4.79)
(If there does not exist such a triple of 𝛾, 𝑖, and 𝑗 then in 𝜉 already all ar actions come after all
ad actions.) We specify a policy 𝜉′ ∈ Ξ otherwise identical to 𝜉 but with the sequence of the above
two actions swapped, namely,
𝜉′(𝛾′) = 𝜉(𝛾′), ∀𝛾′ ∈ Γ∖{𝛾, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑗, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗} (4.80)
𝜉′(𝛾) = ad(𝑗) (4.81)
𝜉′(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑗) = ar(𝑖) (4.82)
𝜉′(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
ar(𝑖), if 𝑖 ̸∈ 𝐷𝑔(𝑗)
𝜉(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗), if 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝑔(𝑗)
. (4.83)
It suffices to show 𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾) > 𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾).
Now
𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾) = ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾,ar(𝑖)) (4.84)
= −𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + 𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) (4.85)
= −𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖,ad(𝑗)) (by (4.79)) (4.86)
= −𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 − 𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊕ 𝑗) + 𝑢𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑗) (by (4.76)) (4.87)
and
𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾) = ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾,ad(𝑗)) (4.88)
= −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑗) + 𝑢𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗). (4.89)
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There are two cases of 𝑖:
∙ Case 1: 𝑖 ̸∈ 𝐷𝑔(𝑗). Then
𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾) = −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)̃︀𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑗,ar(𝑖)) + 𝑢̃︀𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗,ar(𝑖)) (4.90)
= −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)(−𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + 𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑗 ⊕ 𝑖))
+ 𝑢(−𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + 𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗 ⊕ 𝑖)) (4.91)
= −𝑎− 𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + (1− 𝑢)𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑗 ⊕ 𝑖) + 𝑢𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗 ⊕ 𝑖) (4.92)
Note that 𝜉′|𝑅+(𝛾⊕𝑗⊕𝑖) = 𝜉|𝑅+(𝛾⊕𝑖⊕𝑗), so 𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑗 ⊕ 𝑖) = 𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖 ⊕ 𝑗). Since 𝑖 ̸∈ 𝐷𝑔(𝑗),
𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗 ⊕ 𝑖 = 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖 ⊖ 𝑗. Also, 𝜉′|𝑅+(𝛾⊖𝑗⊕𝑖) = 𝜉|𝑅+(𝛾⊕𝑖⊖𝑗). Hence, 𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗 ⊕ 𝑖) = 𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖 ⊖ 𝑗).
Therefore by comparing (4.87) and (4.92) we conclude 𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾) = 𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾).
∙ Case 2: 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝑔(𝑗). Immediately, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑗 = 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗.
𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾) = −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)̃︀𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑗,ar(𝑖)) + 𝑢𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗) (4.93)
= −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)(−𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + 𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑗 ⊕ 𝑖)) + 𝑢𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗) (4.94)
= −𝑎− (1− 𝑢)(𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟) + (1− 𝑢)𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑗 ⊕ 𝑖) + 𝑢𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗). (4.95)
Same as above, since 𝜉′|𝑅+(𝛾⊕𝑗⊕𝑖) = 𝜉|𝑅+(𝛾⊕𝑖⊕𝑗),
𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑗 ⊕ 𝑖) = 𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊕ 𝑗). (4.96)
Since 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝑔(𝑗), 𝜉′(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗) = 𝜉(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗). Hence 𝜉′|𝑅+(𝛾⊖𝑗) = 𝜉|𝑅+(𝛾⊖𝑗). By 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑗 = 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗,
𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑗) = 𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗) = 𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑗). (4.97)
Substitute (4.96) and (4.97) into (4.95), then subtract (4.87) to obtain
𝑉 (𝜉′, 𝛾)− 𝑉 (𝜉, 𝛾) = 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟 − (1− 𝑢)(𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟) = 𝑢(𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟) > 0. (4.98)
This completes the proof. Note that the buyer is strictly better off by swapping the actions ar(𝑖)
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and ad(𝑗) (as in 𝜉′) if and only if 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝑔(𝑗) and 𝑢(𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟) > 0.
Proposition 4.11. Limit the buyer’s actions to audit and rectify (ar) unaudited suppliers and
proceed to production (pp). The optimal auditing policy is to audit and rectify all unaudited suppliers
in any sequence if 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟 6 𝑢𝑤𝑧 and to proceed to production if 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟 > 𝑢𝑤𝑧. Furthermore, given
𝛾 ∈ Γ,
𝑉 *(𝛾) = 𝜋(𝛾)− [(𝑢𝑤𝑧) ∧ (𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟)]|𝑈𝛾 |. (4.99)
Proof. Given 𝛾 ∈ Γ and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 , by (4.2) and the definition of 𝜁,
̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,pp) = 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧|𝑈𝛾 |. (4.100)
We prove the result by mathematical induction on the number of unaudited supplier in the state,
|𝑈𝛾 |. If |𝑈𝛾 | = 1, let 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 , then 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖 is a terminal state. By (4.5),
̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ar(𝑖)) = −𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + 𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) = −𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + 𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) = −𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + 𝜋(𝛾) (4.101)
since states 𝛾⊕ 𝑖 and 𝛾 have the same underlying supply network, which determines the production
profit. Note ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ar(𝑖)) is independent of 𝑖. pp is preferred to ar(𝑖) iff ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,pp) > ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ar(𝑖)),
or 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧 > −𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + 𝜋(𝛾), or 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟 > 𝑢𝑤𝑧. Hence,
𝑉 *(𝛾) = 𝜋(𝛾)− (𝑢𝑤𝑧) ∧ (𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟). (4.102)
By mathematical induction, suppose if |𝑈𝛾 | = 𝑚,
𝑉 *(𝛾) = 𝜋(𝛾)−𝑚[(𝑢𝑤𝑧) ∧ (𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟)]. (4.103)
Now if |𝑈𝛾 | = 𝑚+ 1, pick arbitrary 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 , then |𝑈𝛾⊕𝑖| = 𝑚. By (4.5) and (4.103),
̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ar(𝑖)) = −𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + 𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) = −𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + 𝜋(𝛾)−𝑚[(𝑢𝑤𝑧) ∧ (𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟)]. (4.104)
pp is preferred to ad(𝑖) iff ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,pp) > ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ar(𝑖)), or 𝜋(𝛾) − (𝑚 + 1)𝑢𝑤𝑧 > −𝑎 − 𝑢𝑟 + 𝜋(𝛾) −
𝑚[(𝑢𝑤𝑧) ∧ (𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟)], or 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟+𝑚[(𝑢𝑤𝑧) ∧ (𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟)] > (𝑚+ 1)𝑢𝑤𝑧, which holds iff 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟 > 𝑢𝑤𝑧,
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as we wanted to show. Finally, to complete the induction step, note
𝑉 *(𝛾) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,pp), if 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟 > 𝑢𝑤𝑧
̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ar(𝑖)), if 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟 6 𝑢𝑤𝑧 (4.105)
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝜋(𝛾)− (𝑚+ 1)𝑢𝑤𝑧, if 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟 > 𝑢𝑤𝑧
−𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + 𝜋(𝛾)−𝑚[(𝑢𝑤𝑧) ∧ (𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟)], if 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟 6 𝑢𝑤𝑧
(4.106)
= 𝜋(𝛾)− (𝑚+ 1)[(𝑢𝑤𝑧) ∧ (𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟)]. (4.107)
Proof of Theorem 4.3. The result is a direct consequence of Propositions 4.10 and 4.11.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. The result follows (4.107) in the proof of Proposition 4.11.
4.C.2 Optimal Auditing Sequence
We first identify an optimal policy in a general class of supply networks in Theorem 4.5, the proof
of which serves as the basis for our proof of Theorem 4.4′, an expanded version of Theorem 4.4.
Assumption 4.1 (decreasing differences of production profit). For any 𝛾 ∈ Γ and any 𝑖, 𝑖′ ∈
𝑈𝛾 , 𝑖
′ /∈ 𝐷𝛾(𝑖),
∇(𝛾, 𝑖′) 6 ∇(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖, 𝑖′). (4.108)
To state the next assumption, we define a concept of symmetry for suppliers.
Definition 4.2. In state 𝛾 = (𝑔, 𝑈) two unaudited suppliers 𝑖, 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈 are symmetric (1) if they
belong to the same class of tier-2 suppliers 𝑆a, 𝑆b, or 𝑆ab; or, (2) in the case of |𝑆a| = |𝑆b| and
|𝑆a ∩ 𝑈 | = |𝑆b ∩ 𝑈 |, (i) if 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆a and 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑆b, or (ii) if 𝑖 = a and 𝑖′ = b.
Assumption 4.2 (preservation of LVUS). Let 𝛾 ∈ Γ and 𝑖 be an LVUS in 𝛾. Let 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 that is
not symmetric with 𝑖. Then 𝑖 is an LVUS in 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′, i.e.,
∇(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′, 𝑖) 6 ∇(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′, 𝑖′′), ∀𝑖′′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖′ . (4.109)
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Under Assumption 4.2, an LVUS remains an LVUS when we remove a nonsymmetric supplier
from the supply network.
Given the assumptions we may completely characterize the optimal auditing policy.
Theorem 4.5. Let 𝛾0 = (𝑔, 𝑈) ∈ Γ be such that for any 𝛾 ∈ 𝑅+(𝛾0), no unaudited supplier in 𝛾 is a
dependent of another unaudited supplier, i.e., any 𝑖, 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 (𝑖 ̸= 𝑖′) satisfy 𝑖 /∈ 𝐷𝑔(𝑖′) and 𝑖′ /∈ 𝐷𝑔(𝑖).
Under Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2, the following policy 𝜉* is optimal in every state 𝛾 ∈ 𝑅+(𝛾0):
𝜉*(𝛾) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
ad(𝑖), if 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 , 𝑢∇(𝛾, 𝑖) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp, and ∇(𝛾, 𝑖) 6 ∇(𝛾, 𝑖′), ∀𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾
rp, if 𝑢∇(𝛾, 𝑖) + 𝑎 > 𝑐rp,∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾
. (4.110)
Proof. We prove the result by mathematical induction on the number of unaudited supplier in the
state, |𝑈𝛾 |. If |𝑈𝛾 | = 1, let 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 , then ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,rp) iff
−𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) + 𝑢𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) > 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑐rp (4.111)
iff
−𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) + 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) > 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑐rp. (4.112)
But 𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) = 𝜋(𝛾), so above is equivalent to
−𝑎− 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)) > −𝑐rp (4.113)
equivalent to the condition stipulated by 𝜉* for taking action ad(𝑖). Therefore 𝜉* is optimal at 𝛾.
By way of mathematical induction, suppose 𝜉* is optimal for all 𝛾′ ∈ 𝑅+(𝛾0) such that |𝑈𝛾′ | 6
𝑘 ∈ N+. Let 𝛾 ∈ 𝑅+(𝛾0) be such that |𝑈𝛾 | = 𝑘 + 1. We divide the proof of the induction step into
two cases based on (4.110).
Case a (𝑢∇(𝛾, 𝑖) + 𝑎 > 𝑐rp,∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾). We show that ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,rp) > ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖)) for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 ,
thus proving the optimality of the action rp when 𝑢∇(𝛾, 𝑖) + 𝑎 > 𝑐rp,∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 as Theorem 4.5
prescribes. Let 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 . We first show two equalities: 𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) = ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖,rp) and 𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) =̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖,rp).
First consider the state 𝛾⊕𝑖. Note 𝜋(𝛾⊕𝑖) = 𝜋(𝛾) and for any 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾∖{𝑖}, 𝜋(𝛾⊕𝑖⊖𝑖′) = 𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖′).
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Then for any 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾⊕𝑖 = 𝑈𝛾∖{𝑖},
𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′)) + 𝑎 = 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)) + 𝑎 = 𝑢∇(𝛾, 𝑖′) + 𝑎 > 𝑐rp. (4.114)
Hence by the definition of 𝜉*, 𝜉*(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) = rp, i.e., 𝜉* prescribes the action rp in state 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖. But
|𝑈𝛾⊕𝑖| = 𝑘. By invoking the induction hypothesis (that 𝜉* is optimal at any state 𝛾′ ∈ 𝑅+(𝛾0) such
that |𝑈𝛾′ | 6 𝑘), we conclude that the action rp is optimal at state 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖. Therefore 𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) =̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖,rp).
Next consider the state 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖. Since no unaudited supplier in 𝛾 is a dependent of another,
𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖 = 𝑈𝛾∖{𝑖}. By Assumption 4.1, for any 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖,
𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′)) + 𝑎 > 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)) + 𝑎 = 𝑢∇(𝛾, 𝑖′) + 𝑎 (4.115)
which we know is greater than or equal to 𝑐rp for any 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 . Hence 𝜉*(𝛾⊖𝑖) = rp. But |𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖| 6 𝑘.
By invoking the induction hypothesis (that 𝜉* is optimal at any state 𝛾′ ∈ 𝑅+(𝛾0) such that |𝑈𝛾′ | 6
𝑘), we conclude that the action rp is optimal in state 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖. Therefore 𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) = ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖,rp).
Now
̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,rp) = 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑐rp|𝑈𝛾 | (4.116)
= 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑐rp(|𝑈𝛾 | − 1)− 𝑐rp (4.117)
> 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑐rp(|𝑈𝛾 | − 1)− [𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)) + 𝑎] (4.118)
= −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)(𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖)− 𝑐rp|𝑈𝛾⊕𝑖|) + 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)− 𝑐rp|𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖|) (4.119)
= −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖,rp) + 𝑢̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖,rp) (4.120)
= −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) + 𝑢𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) (4.121)
= ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖)) (4.122)
where (4.118) is by the assumption 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)−𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖))+𝑎 > 𝑐rp; (4.119) is by |𝑈𝛾⊕𝑖| = |𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖| = |𝑈𝛾 |−1
(no unaudited supplier in 𝛾 is a dependent of another so that 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖 has exactly one less unaudited
supplier than 𝛾); and (4.121) is by 𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) = ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖,rp) and 𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) = ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖,rp).
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Case b (∃𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 such that 𝑢∇(𝛾, 𝑖′) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp). Let 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 be an LVUS in 𝛾, i.e., ∇(𝛾, 𝑖) 6
∇(𝛾, 𝑗), ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 . We first show that ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,rp), then show that ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖)) >̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖′)) for any 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 . With these we prove that if 𝑖 is an LVUS in 𝛾 and 𝑢∇(𝜋, 𝑖)+ 𝑎 < 𝑐rp
then the optimal action to take in state 𝛾 is ad(𝑖) as Theorem 4.5 prescribes. Now
̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖)) = −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) + 𝑢𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) (4.123)
> −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖,rp) + 𝑢̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖,rp) (4.124)
= −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)(𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖)− 𝑐rp|𝑈𝛾⊕𝑖|) + 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)− 𝑐rp|𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖|) (4.125)
= −𝑎+ 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑐rp|𝑈𝛾⊕𝑖| − 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)) (4.126)
> 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑐rp|𝑈𝛾 | (4.127)
= ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,rp) (4.128)
where (4.124) is by 𝑉 * being optimal; (4.126) is by 𝜋(𝛾⊕𝑖) = 𝜋(𝛾); and (4.127) is by |𝑈𝛾⊕𝑖| = |𝑈𝛾 |−1
and the premise of case b.
We next show that ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖′)) for any 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 . Let 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝑔 such that 𝑖′ is not
symmetric with 𝑖. (If 𝑖′ is symmetric with 𝑖, clearly ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖)) = ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖′)).) Since 𝑖 is an
LVUS in 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖′ and 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖′)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖′ ⊖ 𝑖)) + 𝑎 = 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp (by the premise
of case b), by the induction hypothesis, 𝜉*(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖′) = ad(𝑖). On the other hand, by Assumption 4.2,
𝑖 is an LVUS in 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′; therefore5
𝜉*(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ad(𝑖), if 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊖ 𝑖)) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp
ar(𝑖), if 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊖ 𝑖)) + 𝑎 > 𝑐rp and 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟 < 𝑢𝑤𝑧
pp, if 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊖ 𝑖)) + 𝑎 > 𝑐rp and 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟 > 𝑢𝑤𝑧
. (4.129)
We next look at the three cases in (4.129) separately. In each case we devise a policy ̂︀𝜉 so that the
buyer’s expected profit from first taking the action ad(𝑖) and following ̂︀𝜉 thereafter is at least as
good as the expected profit from first taking ad(𝑖′) and following the optimal policy 𝜉* thereafter
(𝜉* is optimal thereafter by the induction hypothesis). That is, ̃︀𝑉 (̂︀𝜉, 𝛾,ad(𝑖))) > ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉*, 𝛾,ad(𝑖′)) =
5If 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖′)−𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖′⊖𝑖))+𝑎 > 𝑐rp and 𝑎+𝑢𝑟 < 𝑢𝑤𝑧, 𝜉* prescribes auditing and rectify (if non-compliant)
all unaudited suppliers in any sequence; here we choose 𝑖 to audit next.
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̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖′)). Since ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 (̂︀𝜉, 𝛾,ad(𝑖))), we must then have ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖′))
as desired. In each case we consider the following four events that together form a partition of the
sample space:
𝐻11 = {both 𝑖 and 𝑖′ are compliant} (4.130)
𝐻10 = {𝑖 is compliant and 𝑖′ is not compliant} (4.131)
𝐻01 = {𝑖 is not compliant and 𝑖′ is compliant} (4.132)
𝐻00 = {neither 𝑖 nor 𝑖′ is compliant}. (4.133)
Case b(i) (𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊖ 𝑖)) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp). Let ̂︀𝜉 ∈ Ξ be the policy such that ̂︀𝜉(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) =̂︀𝜉(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) = ad(𝑖′) and ̂︀𝜉(𝛾′) = 𝜉*(𝛾′) for any 𝛾′ ∈ Γ∖{𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖}.
Conditional on 𝐻11: The path of state transition by taking ad(𝑖) at state 𝛾 then following policŷ︀𝜉 is
𝛾
ad(𝑖)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖 ad(𝑖
′)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊕ 𝑖′ (4.134)
while that by taking ad(𝑖′) at state 𝛾 then following policy 𝜉* is
𝛾
ad(𝑖′)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖′ ad(𝑖)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖′ ⊕ 𝑖. (4.135)
Note that 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖 ⊕ 𝑖′ = 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖′ ⊕ 𝑖 and ̂︀𝜉|𝑅+(𝛾⊕𝑖⊕𝑖′) = 𝜉*|𝑅+(𝛾⊕𝑖′⊕𝑖), so the expected profit at 𝛾 from
first taking ad(𝑖) then following policy ̂︀𝜉 is the same as that from first taking ad(𝑖′) then following
𝜉* conditional on 𝐻11.
Conditional on 𝐻10: The path of state transition by taking ad(𝑖) at state 𝛾 then following policŷ︀𝜉 is
𝛾
ad(𝑖)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖 ad(𝑖
′)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′ (4.136)
while that by taking ad(𝑖′) at state 𝛾 then following policy 𝜉* is
𝛾
ad(𝑖′)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ad(𝑖)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊕ 𝑖. (4.137)
Note that 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖 ⊖ 𝑖′ = 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊕ 𝑖 and ̂︀𝜉|𝑅+(𝛾⊕𝑖⊖𝑖′) = 𝜉*|𝑅+(𝛾⊖𝑖′⊕𝑖), so the expected profit at 𝛾 from
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first taking ad(𝑖) then following policy ̂︀𝜉 is the same as that from first taking ad(𝑖′) then following
𝜉* conditional on 𝐻10.
Conditional on 𝐻01 or 𝐻00: Similarly we can show that the expected profit at 𝛾 from first taking
ad(𝑖) then following policy ̂︀𝜉 is the same as that from first taking ad(𝑖′) then following 𝜉*.
Therefore the unconditional expected profit at 𝛾 from first taking ad(𝑖) then following policy ̂︀𝜉
and that from first taking ad(𝑖′) then following 𝜉*, which are integrals of the respected conditional
expected profits, must be equal; that is ̃︀𝑉 (̂︀𝜉, 𝛾,ad(𝑖)) = ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉*, 𝛾,ad(𝑖′)). Therefore
̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 (̂︀𝜉, 𝛾,ad(𝑖)) = ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉*, 𝛾,ad(𝑖′)) = ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖′)) (4.138)
where the induction hypothesis (that 𝜉* is optimal at any state 𝛾′ ∈ 𝑅+(𝛾0) with |𝑈𝛾′ | 6 𝑘) gives
the last equality.
Case b(ii) (𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′) − 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊖ 𝑖)) + 𝑎 > 𝑐rp and 𝑎 + 𝑢𝑟 < 𝑢𝑤𝑧). Let ̂︀𝜉 ∈ Ξ be the policy
such that ̂︀𝜉(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) = ad(𝑖′), ̂︀𝜉(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) = ar(𝑖′), and ̂︀𝜉(𝛾′) = 𝜉*(𝛾′) for any 𝛾′ ∈ Γ∖{𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖}.
Conditional on 𝐻11: Using the same steps as in case b(i) we can show the expected profit at 𝛾
from first taking ad(𝑖) then following ̂︀𝜉 is the same as that from first taking ad(𝑖′) then following
𝜉* conditional on 𝐻11.
Conditional on 𝐻10: The path of state transition by taking ad(𝑖) at state 𝛾 then following policŷ︀𝜉 is
𝛾
ad(𝑖)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖 ad(𝑖
′)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′ (4.139)
while that by taking ad(𝑖′) at state 𝛾 then following policy 𝜉* is
𝛾
ad(𝑖′)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ar(𝑖)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊕ 𝑖. (4.140)
Note that 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖 ⊖ 𝑖′ = 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊕ 𝑖 and ̂︀𝜉|𝑅+(𝛾⊕𝑖⊖𝑖′) = 𝜉*|𝑅+(𝛾⊖𝑖′⊕𝑖), so the expected profit at 𝛾 from
first taking ad(𝑖) then following ̂︀𝜉 is the same as that from first taking ad(𝑖′) then following 𝜉*
conditional on 𝐻10.
Conditional on 𝐻01: Similarly we can show that the expected profit at 𝛾 from first taking ad(𝑖)
then following policy ̂︀𝜉 is the same as that from first taking ad(𝑖′) then following 𝜉*.
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Conditional on 𝐻00: The path of state transition by taking ad(𝑖) at state 𝛾 then following policŷ︀𝜉 is
𝛾
ad(𝑖)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖 ar(𝑖
′)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖⊕ 𝑖′ (4.141)
while that by taking ad(𝑖′) at state 𝛾 then following policy 𝜉* is
𝛾
ad(𝑖′)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ar(𝑖)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊕ 𝑖. (4.142)
Since 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖′⊕𝑖)−𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖′⊕𝑖⊖𝑖′′))+𝑎 = 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖′)−𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖′⊖𝑖′′))+𝑎 > 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖′)−𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖′⊖𝑖))+𝑎
for any 𝑖′′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖′⊕𝑖 (the last inequality is because 𝑖 is an LVUS in 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′, by Assumption 4.2), and
𝑢(𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖′)−𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖′⊖𝑖))+𝑎 > 𝑐rp (premise of case b(ii)), we have 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖′⊕𝑖)−𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖′⊕𝑖⊖𝑖′′))+𝑎 >
𝑐rp. Therefore 𝜉*(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊕ 𝑖) = rp. Note that since ̂︀𝜉|𝑅+(𝛾⊖𝑖⊕𝑖′) = 𝜉*|𝑅+(𝛾⊖𝑖⊕𝑖′),
𝑉 (̂︀𝜉, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖⊕ 𝑖′) = 𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖⊕ 𝑖′) > ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖⊕ 𝑖′,rp). (4.143)
On the other hand, since |𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖⊕𝑖′ | = |𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖′⊕𝑖|,
̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾⊖ 𝑖⊕ 𝑖′,rp)− ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾⊖ 𝑖′⊕ 𝑖,rp) = 𝜋(𝛾⊖ 𝑖⊕ 𝑖′)−𝜋(𝛾⊖ 𝑖′⊕ 𝑖) = 𝜋(𝛾⊖ 𝑖)−𝜋(𝛾⊖ 𝑖′) > 0 (4.144)
Together they imply
𝑉 (̂︀𝜉, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖⊕ 𝑖′) > ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊕ 𝑖,rp) = 𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊕ 𝑖) (4.145)
where the last equality is because 𝜉*(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊕ 𝑖) = rp. Therefore the expected profit at 𝛾 from first
taking ad(𝑖) then following ̂︀𝜉 is greater than or equal to that from first taking ad(𝑖′) then following
𝜉* conditional on 𝐻10.
Therefore the unconditional expected profit at 𝛾 from first taking ad(𝑖) then following policy ̂︀𝜉
is greater than or equal to that from first taking ad(𝑖′) then following 𝜉*; that is ̃︀𝑉 (̂︀𝜉, 𝛾,ad(𝑖)) >̃︀𝑉 (𝜉*, 𝛾,ad(𝑖′)). Therefore
̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 (̂︀𝜉, 𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉*, 𝛾,ad(𝑖′)) = ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖′)) (4.146)
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where the induction hypothesis gives the last equality.
Case b(iii) (𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊖ 𝑖)) + 𝑎 > 𝑐rp and 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟 > 𝑢𝑤𝑧). Let ̂︀𝜉 ∈ Ξ be the policy
such that (1) ̂︀𝜉(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) = ad(𝑖′), (2) for any 𝛾′ ∈ 𝑅+(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) such that 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾′ , ̂︀𝜉(𝛾′) = 𝜉*(𝛾′ ⊖ 𝑖′),
and (3) ̂︀𝜉(𝛾′) = 𝜉*(𝛾′) for any other state 𝛾′ (i.e., 𝛾′ ∈ Γ∖{𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖}∖{𝛾′′ ∈ 𝑅+(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) : 𝑖′′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾′}).
Conditional on 𝐻11: Using the same corresponding steps as in case b(i) we can show the expected
profit at 𝛾 from first taking ad(𝑖) then following ̂︀𝜉 is the same as that from first taking ad(𝑖′) then
following 𝜉* conditional on 𝐻11.
Conditional on 𝐻10: Since 𝑖 is an LVUS in 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′, by the premise of case b(iii), any unaudited
supplier 𝑖′′ in state 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′ must have 𝑢∇(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′, 𝑖′′) + 𝑎 = 𝑢∇(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′, 𝑖′′) + 𝑎 > 𝑐rp, then the
induction hypothesis implies 𝜉*(𝛾⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′) = pp. By the definition of ̂︀𝜉, ̂︀𝜉(𝛾⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′) = 𝜉*(𝛾⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′).
Therefore ̂︀𝜉(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′) = pp. Then the path of the state transition by taking ad(𝑖) at state 𝛾 then
following policy ̂︀𝜉 is
𝛾
ad(𝑖)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖 ad(𝑖
′)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′ pp−→ . (4.147)
The path of the state transition by taking ad(𝑖′) at state 𝛾 then following policy 𝜉* is
𝛾
ad(𝑖′)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ pp−→ . (4.148)
Note that 𝜋(𝛾⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′) = 𝜋(𝛾⊖ 𝑖′), so the only difference in the conditional expected profit between
the above two paths is the additional cost 𝑎 of carrying out one more audit in (4.147) (since 𝑖 is
compliant on 𝐻10 it will not incur any penalty from violation later on).
Conditional on 𝐻01: The path of the state transition by taking ad(𝑖) at state 𝛾 then following
policy ̂︀𝜉 is
𝛾
ad(𝑖)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖 (4.149)
while the path of the state transition by taking ad(𝑖′) at state 𝛾 then following policy 𝜉* is
𝛾
ad(𝑖′)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖′ ad(𝑖)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖′ ⊖ 𝑖. (4.150)
Note that the definition of ̂︀𝜉 means that the path subsequent to 𝛾⊖ 𝑖 in (4.149) and that subsequent
to 𝛾⊕ 𝑖′ ⊖ 𝑖 in (4.150) will be identical except that 𝑖′ will remain unaudited in all subsequent states
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in (4.149) while it is vetted in (4.150). Since on 𝐻01 𝑖′ is compliant the only difference in the
conditional expected profit between the above two paths is the additional cost 𝑎 of carrying out one
more audit in (4.150) (since 𝑖′ is compliant on 𝐻10, even if unaudited, it will not incur any penalty
from violation later on).
Conditional on 𝐻00: The path of the state transition by taking ad(𝑖) at state 𝛾 then following
policy ̂︀𝜉 is
𝛾
ad(𝑖)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖 pp−→ (4.151)
where ̂︀𝜉(𝛾⊖ 𝑖) = 𝜉*(𝛾⊖ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′) = pp by the premise of the current case and Assumption 4.1 (so that
𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′ ⊖ 𝑖′′)) + 𝑎 > 𝑐rp,∀𝑖′′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖⊖𝑖′), while the path of the state transition
by taking ad(𝑖′) at state 𝛾 then following policy 𝜉* is
𝛾
ad(𝑖′)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ pp−→ . (4.152)
Therefore conditional on 𝐻00 the expected profit at 𝛾 from first taking ad(𝑖) then following ̂︀𝜉 is
greater than that from first taking ad(𝑖′) then following 𝜉* by precisely 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′) > 0.
Therefore the unconditional expected profit at 𝛾 from first taking ad(𝑖) then following policy ̂︀𝜉
is greater than or equal to that from first taking ad(𝑖′) then following 𝜉*; that is ̃︀𝑉 (̂︀𝜉, 𝛾,ad(𝑖)) >̃︀𝑉 (𝜉*, 𝛾,ad(𝑖′)). Therefore
̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 (̂︀𝜉, 𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉*, 𝛾,ad(𝑖′)) = ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖′)) (4.153)
where the induction hypothesis yields the last equality.
To sum up, in all cases b(i)–b(iii), ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖′)).
𝜉* is optimal at 𝛾.
Theorem 4.4 is a shortened version of Theorem 4.4′.
Theorem 4.4′. Under Condition 1 the following policy 𝜉** is optimal at any state 𝛾 in which every
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tier-1 firm is vetted: for any nonterminal state 𝛾 ̸= 𝛾1, let 𝑖 be an LVUS in 𝛾, then
𝜉**(𝛾) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
ad(𝑖), if 𝑢∇(𝛾, 𝑖) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp
rp, if 𝑢∇(𝛾, 𝑖) + 𝑎 > 𝑐rp
(4.154)






(𝑎+ 𝑢∇(𝛾1, 𝑖)) +
𝑢
1 + 𝑢




(𝑎+ 𝑢∇(𝛾1, 𝑖)) +
𝑢
1 + 𝑢
(𝑎+ 𝑢𝜋(𝛾1 ⊖ 𝑖)) > 𝑐rp
. (4.155)
The policy 𝜉** differs from 𝜉* only at state 𝛾1 where Assumption 4.1 fails. At state 𝛾1, 𝜉**
prescribes ad(𝑖) in a larger region of the parameter space than 𝜉* does, since 𝜉** takes into account
of the fact that if the buyer drops 𝑖, the last remaining unaudited supplier will be even less valuable.
The buyer has less incentive to keep the supply network operating in state 𝛾1 than in states in which
decreasing differences hold.
Proof of Theorem 4.4′. Since we limit to states in which all tier-1 firms are vetted, (1) by Propo-
sition 4.6 Assumption 4.2 holds, and (2) no unaudited supplier can be a dependent of another
unaudited supplier. Under Condition 1, among all states we consider here the only state at which
Assumption 4.1 fails is 𝛾1, the induction proof of Theorem 4.5 applies directly by replacing 𝜉* with
𝜉**, with two exceptions: (1) at 𝛾1 itself, at which state we show the optimality of 𝜉** separately,
and (2) at state 𝛾2 = (𝑔, 𝑈) where 𝑔 = ({a,b}, {1}, {3}, {2}) and 𝑈 = {1, 2, 3}, and if the LVUS,
1, in 𝛾2 satisfies 𝑢∇(𝛾2, 𝑖) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp. We will go on to show why the induction proof still applies in
the second case.
𝜉** is optimal at 𝛾1 Set 𝛾 = 𝛾1. Call the two symmetric tier-2 suppliers in 𝛾1 𝑖 and 𝑖′. To
analyze the decision at 𝛾 we first consider the profits in state 𝛾⊕ 𝑖 and 𝛾⊖ 𝑖. In state 𝛾⊕ 𝑖 the only
unaudited supplier is 𝑖′. The decision is between ad(𝑖′) (with expected profit −𝑎+(1−𝑢)𝜋(𝛾⊕ 𝑖⊕
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𝑖′) + 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′)) and rp (with expected profit 𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖)− 𝑐rp). Therefore
𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊕ 𝑖′) + 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′),
if 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊕ 𝑖′)
−𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′)) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp
𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖)− 𝑐rp,
if 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖⊕ 𝑖′)




−𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝜋(𝛾) + 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′), if 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp
𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑐rp, if 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)) + 𝑎 > 𝑐rp
. (4.157)
Similary, in state 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖 the only unaudited supplier is 𝑖′. The decision is between ad(𝑖′) (with
expected profit −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖⊕ 𝑖′)) and rp (with expected profit 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)− 𝑐rp). Therefore
𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
−𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖⊕ 𝑖′), if 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖⊕ 𝑖′) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp




−𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖), if 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp
𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)− 𝑐rp if 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) + 𝑎 > 𝑐rp
. (4.159)
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By Proposition 4.4 we algebraically verify that 𝜋(𝛾) − 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′) > 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′) = 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) (which is
how Assumption 4.1 is violated). By (4.157) and (4.159) we obtain
̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖)) = −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) + 𝑢𝑉 *(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) (4.160)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−2𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)[(1− 𝑢)𝜋(𝛾) + 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)] + 𝑢[(1− 𝑢)𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)], if 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp
−𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)[𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑐rp] + 𝑢[−𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)], if
𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp
6 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)) + 𝑎




−2𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)2𝜋(𝛾) + 2𝑢(1− 𝑢)𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′), if 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp
−𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)[𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑐rp] + 𝑢[−𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)], if
𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp
6 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)) + 𝑎
−𝑎− 𝑐rp + (1− 𝑢)𝜋(𝛾) + 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖), if 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) + 𝑎 > 𝑐rp
.
(4.162)
On the other hand ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,rp) = 𝜋(𝛾) − 𝑐rp|𝑈𝛾 | = 𝜋(𝛾) − 2𝑐rp. Hence ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 *(𝛾,rp) if
and only if one of the following three (mutually exclusive) conditions holds:
1. 𝑎+ 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)) < 𝑐rp and −2𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)2𝜋(𝛾) + 2𝑢(1− 𝑢)𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′) > 𝜋(𝛾)− 2𝑐rp;
2. 𝑎+𝑢𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖) < 𝑐rp 6 𝑎+𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)−𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖′)) and −𝑎+(1−𝑢)[𝜋(𝛾)−𝑐rp]+𝑢[−𝑎+(1−𝑢)𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖)] >
𝜋(𝛾)− 2𝑐rp;
3. 𝑎+ 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) > 𝑐rp and −𝑎− 𝑐rp + (1− 𝑢)𝜋(𝛾) + 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) > 𝜋(𝛾)− 2𝑐rp.
In 1, the second inequality is equivalent to
2[𝑎+ 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′))]− 𝑢2[(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′))− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)] < 2𝑐rp (4.163)
which is implied by the first inequality and that (𝜋(𝛾) − 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)) > 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′) which we know to
be true. So 1 can be simplified to just 𝑎 + 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾) − 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)) < 𝑐rp. In 2, the last inequality is
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equivalent to




[𝑎+ 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖))] + 𝑢
1 + 𝑢
(𝑎+ 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)) < 𝑐rp. (4.165)
Note that (4.165) and the second inequality 𝑐rp 6 𝑎+𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)−𝜋(𝛾⊖ 𝑖′)) implies the first inequality
𝑎+ 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) < 𝑐rp. So 2 can be simplified to
1
1 + 𝑢
[𝑎+ 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖))] + 𝑢
1 + 𝑢
(𝑎+ 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)) < 𝑐rp 6 𝑎+ 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)). (4.166)
In 3, the second inequality is equivalent to
𝑎+ 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)) < 𝑐rp (4.167)
directly contradicting the first inequality; 3 can never hold. Therefore the three conditions above is
equivalent to either one of the following two conditions holds:
1. 𝑎+ 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)) < 𝑐rp;
2. 11+𝑢 [𝑎+ 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖))] +
𝑢
1+𝑢(𝑎+ 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)) < 𝑐rp 6 𝑎+ 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖
′))
which is obviously also equivalent to just
1
1 + 𝑢
[𝑎+ 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖))] + 𝑢
1 + 𝑢
(𝑎+ 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)) < 𝑐rp (4.168)
since 𝑎+ 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)) > 𝑎+ 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖). This shows the optimality of 𝜉** at 𝛾1.
𝜉** is optimal at 𝛾2 The only case to show is when the LVUS 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾2 of 𝛾2 satisfies 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾2) −
𝜋(𝛾2 ⊖ 𝑖)) + 𝑎 < 𝑐rp. The proof is analogous to case b in the proof of Theorem 4.5 by replacing 𝜉*
with 𝜉**; here we only point out the differences:
∙ Since now 𝛾 = 𝛾2 and 𝑖′ is the shared supplier in 𝛾2, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ = 𝛾1. Hence by the induction
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hypothesis
𝜉**(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ad(𝑖), if 𝐹 < 𝑐rp;
ar(𝑖), if 𝐹 > 𝑐rp and 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟 < 𝑢𝑤𝑧;
pp, if 𝐹 > 𝑐rp and 𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟 > 𝑢𝑤𝑧;
(4.169)
where 𝐹 = 11+𝑢 [𝑎 + 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖
′) − 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊖ 𝑖))] + 𝑢1+𝑢(𝑎 + 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖
′ ⊖ 𝑖)). We redefine the three
subcases b(i), b(ii), and b(iii) in the proof by the three cases for 𝜉**(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′) in (4.169) (i.e., replace
𝑎+ 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊖ 𝑖)) in the original condition for each subcase by 𝐹 ).
∙ In subcases b(ii) and b(iii), owing to (4.170),
∇(𝛾1, 𝑖′) > ∇(𝛾1 ⊖ 𝑖, 𝑖′). (4.170)
𝐹 > 𝑐rp implies 𝑎+ 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ ⊖ 𝑖)) > 𝑐rp.
∙ In subcase b(iii) (𝐹 > 𝑐rp and 𝑎 + 𝑢𝑟 > 𝑢𝑤𝑧) conditional on 𝐻00 the path of state transition
by taking ad(𝑖) at state 𝛾 then following policy ̂︀𝜉 is
𝛾
ad(𝑖)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖 (4.171)
while the path of state transition by taking ad(𝑖′) at state 𝛾 then following policy 𝜉** is
𝛾
ad(𝑖′)−−−→ 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ pp−→ . (4.172)
Here by the definition of ̂︀𝜉 and the induction hypothesis one of two actions could be taken subsequent
to (4.171) (𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′) = 164
(𝛼−𝑣𝑇 )2
𝛽 by Proposition 4.4):
i. If 𝑎+ 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′) = 𝑎+ 𝑢 164
(𝛼−𝑣𝑇 )2
𝛽 > 𝑐rp, then ̂︀𝜉(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) = 𝜉**(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′) = pp;
ii. If 𝑎+ 𝑢𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′) = 𝑎+ 𝑢 164
(𝛼−𝑣𝑇 )2
𝛽 < 𝑐rp, then ̂︀𝜉(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) = 𝜉**(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖⊖ 𝑖′) = ad(𝑖′′) where 𝑖′′
is the only supplier in 𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖⊖𝑖′ .
In sub-subcase 2(c)i the original proof applies. In sub-subcase 2(c)ii following (4.171) the action
is ad(𝑖′′) with two possible consequences: that 𝑖′′ passes the audit leading to 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖 ⊕ 𝑖′′ and that
𝑖′′ fails the audit leading to 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖 ⊖ 𝑖′′. Note that in either case the definition of ̂︀𝜉 prescribes pp
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afterward. Therefore, the expected profit subsequent to 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖 in (4.171) is











where the −𝑤𝑧 comes from that in event 𝐻00 we know 𝑖′ is non-compliant and the equality is by
Proposition 4.4. On the other hand the expected profit subsequent to 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′ in (4.172) is




− 𝑢𝑤𝑧 − 𝑤𝑧 (4.174)
where the −𝑢𝑤𝑧 is due to 𝑖′′ remaining unaudited, the −𝑤𝑧 is due to 𝑖 being non-compliant, and
the equality is by Proposition 4.4. We take the difference between (4.173) and (4.174) to get










But the premise of the sub-subcase is that 𝑎+ 𝑢 164
(𝛼−𝑣𝑇 )2
𝛽 < 𝑐rp where 𝑐rp = 𝑢𝑤𝑧 here, so (4.175)
is nonnegative.
Therefore the expected profit at 𝛾 from first taking ad(𝑖) then following ̂︀𝜉 is greater than or equal
to that from first taking ad(𝑖′) then following 𝜉** conditional on 𝐻00. This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 4.2. The result follows directly from Proposition 4.6.
4.C.3 Supplier Choice When Auditing One Firm
Let 𝛾 ∈ Γ and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 . We define two thresholds for 𝑧:
𝑧𝑝(𝛾, 𝑖) =
𝑢∇(𝛾, 𝑖) + 𝑎
𝑢𝑤[𝑢(|𝑈𝛾 | − |𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖| − 1) + 1]
and 𝑧𝑟(𝛾, 𝑖) =
∇(𝛾, 𝑖)− 𝑟
𝑢𝑤(|𝑈𝛾 | − |𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖| − 1)
. (4.176)
Proposition 4.12. At nonterminal state 𝛾, suppose the buyer can at most audit (ad or ar) one
supplier, then pp. The optimal decision is
(a) pp if and only if 𝑧 6 𝑎+𝑢𝑟𝑢𝑤 and 𝑧 6 𝑧𝑝(𝛾, 𝑖
′) for every 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾;
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(b) ar(𝑖) (for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾) if and only if 𝑧 > 𝑎+𝑢𝑟𝑢𝑤 , and 𝑧 6 𝑧𝑟(𝛾, 𝑖
′) for every 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 with an
unaudited dependent in 𝛾 and ∇(𝛾, 𝑖′) > 𝑟 for every 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 without an unaudited dependent in 𝛾.
(c) ad(𝑖) if and only if 𝑧 > 𝑧𝑝(𝛾, 𝑖), 𝑧 > 𝑧𝑟(𝛾, 𝑖) if 𝑖 has an unaudited dependent in 𝛾 and
∇(𝛾, 𝑖) < 𝑟 if 𝑖 does not have an unaudited dependent in 𝛾, and also 𝑖 satisfies (4.29).
Proof of Proposition 4.12. Let 𝜉pp be the policy that maps any state in Γ to the action pp. Then
for 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝑔,
̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ad(𝑖)) = −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖) + 𝑢𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) (4.177)
= −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)(𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧|𝑈𝛾⊕𝑖|) + 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧|𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖|) (4.178)
= −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)[𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧(|𝑈𝛾 | − 1)] + 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧|𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖|) (4.179)
̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ar(𝑖)) = −𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + 𝜋(𝛾 ⊕ 𝑖)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧|𝑈𝛾⊕𝑖| (4.180)
= −𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧(|𝑈𝛾 | − 1) (4.181)
and ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,pp) = 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧|𝑈𝛾 |. (4.182)
Note that ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ar(𝑖)) is independent of 𝑖.
Therefore ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ar(𝑖′)) for any 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 iff
−𝑎+(1−𝑢)[𝜋(𝛾)−𝑢𝑤𝑧(|𝑈𝛾 |−1)]+𝑢(𝜋(𝛾⊖𝑖)−𝑢𝑤𝑧|𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖|) > −𝑎−𝑢𝑟+𝜋(𝛾)−𝑢𝑤𝑧(|𝑈𝛾 |−1) (4.183)
which is equivalent to
𝑢𝑤𝑧(|𝑈𝛾 | − |𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖| − 1) > 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)− 𝑟. (4.184)
If 𝑖 has no unaudited dependent, i.e., 𝐷𝑔(𝑖) ∩ 𝑈𝛾 = ∅ where 𝑔 is the supply network in state 𝛾,
then |𝑈𝛾 | − 1 = |𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖|; (4.184) is equivalent to 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖) < 𝑟. Otherwise if 𝑖 has at least one
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unaudited dependent, then |𝑈𝛾 | − 1 > |𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖|; (4.184) is equivalent to
𝑧 >
𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)− 𝑟
𝑢𝑤(|𝑈𝛾 | − |𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖| − 1)
. (4.185)
̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,pp) iff
−𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)[𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧(|𝑈𝛾 − 1|)] + 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧|𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖|) > 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧|𝑈𝛾 | (4.186)
which is equivalent to
𝑧 >
𝑢(𝜋(𝛾)− 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)) + 𝑎
𝑢𝑤[𝑢(|𝑈𝛾 | − |𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖|) + 1− 𝑢]
. (4.187)
̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ad(𝑖′)) for 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 iff
− 𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)[𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧(|𝑈𝛾 | − 1)] + 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧|𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖|)
> −𝑎+ (1− 𝑢)[𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧(|𝑈𝛾 | − 1)] + 𝑢(𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧|𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖′ |) (4.188)
which is equivalent to
𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧|𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖| > 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧|𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖′ |. (4.189)
̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ar(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,pp) iff
−𝑎− 𝑢𝑟 + 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧(|𝑈𝛾 | − 1) > 𝜋(𝛾)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧|𝑈𝛾 | (4.190)
which is equivalent to 𝑧 > 𝑎+𝑢𝑟𝑢𝑤 .
The optimal decision is pp iff ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,pp) > ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ad(𝑖)) and ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,pp) > ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ar(𝑖))
for any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 . This gives part a. The optimal decision is ad(𝑖) iff ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ar(𝑖′)),̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,pp), and ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ad(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ad(𝑖′)) for any 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 . This gives
part c. The optimal decision is ar(𝑖) iff ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ar(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ad(𝑖′)) for any 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 and̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ar(𝑖)) > ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,pp). This gives part b.
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In the following we enumerate all but one possible orderings of the three thresholds to verify that
they are consistent with the property we describe in Proposition 4.7. We then show the remaining
one ordering can never arise. In the following the supplier 𝑖 in ar(𝑖) can be any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑈𝛾 and
the supplier 𝑖 in ad(𝑖) is given by (4.29).6 We consider two mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive cases as follows.
1. First we look at the case that either ∇(𝛾, 𝑖′) < 𝑟 for some 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 without an unaudited
dependent, or 𝑎+𝑢𝑟𝑢𝑤 > 𝑧¯𝑟
(𝛾). Then by Proposition 4.12 ar(𝑖) is never optimal. Therefore the

























(𝛾) establishes the property Proposition 4.7 describes.
2. Second we look at the case that ∇(𝛾, 𝑖′) > 𝑟 for every 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 without an unaudited dependent,
and 𝑎+𝑢𝑟𝑢𝑤 < 𝑧¯𝑟
(𝛾). By Proposition 4.12 the optimal decision is ar(𝑖) if and only if 𝑎+𝑢𝑟𝑢𝑤 < 𝑧 6 𝑧¯𝑟
(𝛾).
Suppose 𝑎+𝑢𝑟𝑢𝑤 6 𝑧¯𝑝
(𝛾) then the optimal decision is pp if and only if 𝑧 6 𝑎+𝑢𝑟𝑢𝑤 . So setting 𝑧¯
= 𝑎+𝑢𝑟𝑢𝑤
and 𝑧 = 𝑧
¯𝑟
(𝛾) will establish the property Proposition 4.7 describes. We only need to show that
indeed 𝑎+𝑢𝑟𝑢𝑤 6 𝑧¯𝑝
(𝛾) under case 2.
By way of contradiction suppose 𝑎+𝑢𝑟𝑢𝑤 > 𝑧¯𝑝
(𝛾). It implies that there exists 𝑖′′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 such that
𝑧𝑝(𝛾, 𝑖
′′) =
𝑢∇(𝛾, 𝑖′′) + 𝑎





∙ If 𝑖′′ does not have an unaudited dependent in 𝛾, then |𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖′′ | = |𝑈𝛾 | − 1; then (4.192) implies
∇(𝛾, 𝑖′′) < 𝑟, contradicting that ∇(𝛾, 𝑖′) > 𝑟 for every 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 without an unaudited dependent (in
the premise of case 2).
6The identity of supplier 𝑖 may change as 𝑧 changes.
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∙ If 𝑖′′ has an unaudited dependent, then (4.192) implies
∇(𝛾, 𝑖′′) < (𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟)(|𝑈𝛾 | − |𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖′′ | − 1) + 𝑟. (4.193)







𝑢𝑤(|𝑈𝛾 | − |𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖′′ | − 1)
(4.194)
which is equivalent to
∇(𝛾, 𝑖′′)− 𝑟 > (𝑎+ 𝑢𝑟)(|𝑈𝛾 | − |𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖′′ | − 1) (4.195)
contradicting (4.193). Therefore under case 2, 𝑎+𝑢𝑟𝑢𝑤 6 𝑧¯𝑝
(𝛾).




















































3(𝑡a − 1) + 3𝑡b + 4𝑡ab + 4(𝑡a − 1)𝑡ab + 4𝑡b𝑡ab + 3(𝑡a − 1)𝑡b + 4𝑡2ab
𝐿(𝑡a − 1, 𝑡b, 𝑡ab)
]︂2
, if 𝑡a 6 2𝑡b + 2𝑡ab + 2[︂
3(𝑡a − 1) + 3(𝑡b + 𝑡ab) + 3(𝑡a − 1)(𝑡b + 𝑡ab)
𝐿(𝑡a − 1, 𝑡b + 𝑡ab, 0)
]︂2
, if 𝑡a > 2𝑡b + 2𝑡ab + 2
.
(4.199)
Proof of Proposition 4.8. By the proof of Proposition 4.12, let 𝑖, 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑈𝛾 , then ̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ad(𝑖)) >̃︀𝑉 (𝜉pp, 𝛾,ad(𝑖′)) iff
𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧|𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖| > 𝜋(𝛾 ⊖ 𝑖′)− 𝑢𝑤𝑧|𝑈𝛾⊖𝑖′ |. (4.200)
Since no tier-2 supplier has a dependent in 𝛾, (4.200) implies the buyer should prefer among tier-2
suppliers to ad a supplier 𝑖 with the highest 𝜋(𝛾⊖ 𝑖). By Proposition 4.6 this supplier is a majority-
exclusive supplier. Hence we only need to compare the majority-exclusive supplier 1, firm a, and
firm b.
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By the structure of supply network 𝑔,
|𝑈𝛾⊖a| = |𝑈𝛾 | − 𝑡a − 1 (4.201)
|𝑈𝛾⊖b| = |𝑈𝛾 | − 𝑡b − 1 (4.202)
|𝑈𝛾⊖1| = |𝑈𝛾 | − 1. (4.203)
By Proposition 4.4,






𝑡b + 𝑡ab + 1
)︂2
(4.204)






𝑡a + 𝑡ab + 1
)︂2
(4.205)





One may verify that the buyer prefers ad(a) to ad(b) if and only if 𝑧 > 𝑧a|b, the buyer prefers
ad(b) to ad(1) if and only if 𝑧 > 𝑧b|1, and the buyer prefers ad(a) to ad(1) if and only if 𝑧 > 𝑧a|1,
by plugging (4.201)–(4.206) into (4.200). By Proposition 4.7 when 𝑧 > ̂︀𝑧 the optimal decision is to
ad some supplier. Proposition 4.8 now follows.
Appendix 4.D Technical Lemmas




𝑎 𝑏 𝑏 · · · 𝑏






. . . . . . 0
𝑐 0 · · · 0 𝑑
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
𝑛×𝑛
= [𝑎𝑑− (𝑛− 1)𝑏𝑐]𝑑𝑛−2. (4.207)
Proof. Denote the matrix in (4.207) by Ψ. If 𝑑 = 0 we expanding Ψ along the first column in the
way of Laplace to find det(Ψ) = 0 (each submatrix in the expansion has zero determinant). If 𝑑 > 0
159
we multiply columns 2 to 𝑛 each by − 𝑐𝑑 and add them all to the first column to get
det(Ψ) = det
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
𝑎− (𝑛− 1) 𝑏𝑐𝑑 𝑏 𝑏 · · · 𝑏
0 𝑑 0 · · · 0
...




. . . . . . 0
0 · · · · · · 0 𝑑
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(4.208)
which, by the formula for the determinant of a diagonal matrix, is equal to the right-hand side of
(4.207).
For 𝑚,𝑛, 𝑘 ∈ N0, denote by 𝐽𝑚,𝑛 = [1]𝑚×𝑛 the 𝑚× 𝑛 matrix of 1’s; 𝐽𝑛 = 𝐽𝑛,𝑛. Denote
𝐷𝑛 = 𝐼𝑛 + 𝐽𝑛 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2 1 · · · 1
1
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 1





1 · · · 1




1 · · · 1




1 · · · 1





2 · · · 2




2 · · · 2




2 · · · 2





Denote ̃︀𝐷2𝑛 = 𝐷𝑛⊗𝐷2, where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. Finally, define the two (𝑚+2𝑘+




















Lemma 4.2. For 𝑚,𝑛, 𝑘 such that 𝑚+ 𝑛+ 𝑘 > 0, ̃︀Λ(𝑚,𝑛, 𝑘) is positive definite.
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The proof consists of two parts:
1. 2𝐷𝑚′ is positive definite;
2. The Schur complement of 2𝐷𝑚′ in ̃︀Λ, i.e., ̃︀Λ/(2𝐷𝑚′) = 2𝐷𝑛′ − 𝐵T(2𝐷𝑚′)−1𝐵, is positive
definite.
Then by the Schur complement condition (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004, Appendix A.5.5), ̃︀Λ is
positive definite, as we want.
1 To show that 2𝐷𝑚′ is positive definite, it suffices to show that every leading principal minor of
𝐷𝑚′ is positive. For 𝑖 ∈ N+, subtract the first row of 𝐷𝑖 from every other row to get
det(𝐷𝑖) = det
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 1 · · · · · · 1
−1 1 0 · · · 0
... 0




. . . . . . 0
−1 0 · · · 0 1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(4.212)
which by Lemma 4.1 equals (2 × 1 − (𝑖 − 1) × 1 × (−1)) × 1𝑖−2 = 𝑖 + 1 > 0. Therefore 2𝐷𝑚+𝑘 is
positive definite.






𝑚′ −1 · · · −1
−1 . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . −1














𝑚′ −1 · · · −1
−1 . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . −1










1 · · · 1 2 1 · · · 1
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 1
...








𝑚′ −1 · · · −1
−1 . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . −1











0 · · · 0 𝑚′ + 1 0 · · · 0
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 · · · · · · · · · · · · 0 𝑚′ + 1
1 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 1
...
...














. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...









2(𝑚′ + 1) 𝑚′ + 1 · · · · · · 𝑚′ + 1 𝑚′ + 1 · · · 𝑚′ + 1
𝑚′ + 1










. . . . . . 𝑚′ + 1
...
...
𝑚′ + 1 · · · · · · 𝑚′ + 1 2(𝑚′ + 1) 𝑚′ + 1 · · · 𝑚′ + 1























































































































. . . . . . 3𝑚′+4
2(𝑚′+1)
3












It only remains to show that (4.219) is positive definite. We conduct the following row operations
on the matrix so that each newly formed row 𝑖 only references the rows 𝑗 6 𝑖 in (4.219), ensuring
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2 0 · · · 0 0 · · · · · · 0
... 0






. . . . . . 0
...
...
−32 0 · · · 0
3
2 0 · · · · · · 0
















. . . . . . 1
2(𝑚′+1)
−32 0 · · · · · · 0
1



















2 0 · · · 0 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
... 0






. . . . . . 0
...
...
−32 0 · · · 0
3
2 0 · · · · · · · · · 0





















. . . . . . 0
0 0 · · · · · · 0 −2 0 · · · 0 2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (4.221)
To show that (4.219) is positive definite, it suffices to show that every leading principal minor
det(𝑀𝑖) of (4.221) is positive.





















(𝑖+ 1) > 0. (4.222)
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For 𝑖 = 𝑘 + 1, (i) expanding
𝑀𝑘+1 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣







2 0 · · · 0 0
... 0





. . . . . . 0
...
−32 0 · · · 0
3
2 0





in the way of Laplace along the last row, then (ii) expanding the (𝑘 + 1, 1)th minor of 𝑀𝑘+1 along
































































where 𝑆𝑗 is the submatrix of 𝑀𝑖 formed by deleting row 𝑘+ 1 and column 𝑗. We next evaluate the
det(𝑆𝑗).
(Evaluate det(𝑆1)). Denote 𝑆
(𝑙)
1 for 𝑙 = 1, . . . , 𝑘 − 1 the (𝑖− 1− 𝑙)× (𝑖− 1− 𝑙) submatrix of 𝑆1






















where empty space represents zeros and there are 𝑘 − 1 − 𝑙 entries of 32 on the subdiagonal and
𝑖− 𝑘− 1 entries of 2 on the diagonal. In particular, there is no 32 on the subdiagonal of 𝑆
(𝑘−1)
1 since
all of them are deleted. Then expand 𝑆(𝑙)1 successively along the second row:
det(𝑆1) = det(𝑆
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Observing that the lower-left block of the matrix is a submatrix of zeros, we find




























where, in particular, the (𝑗− 𝑘+1)th row is (−2, 0, . . . , 0). Expand its determinant along this row:
det(𝑌𝑗) = (−1)𝑗−𝑘+2(−2) det(2𝐼𝑖−𝑘−2) = (−1)𝑗−𝑘+3(2𝑖−𝑘−1). (4.235)
Since the lower-left submatrix of 𝑆𝑗 is zero, we have






where (4.231) is substituted for det(𝐴).
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(2𝑖−𝑘−1) > 0. (4.237)
Therefore (4.221) is positive definite. The proof is complete.
Lemma 4.3. For 𝑚,𝑛, 𝑘 such that 𝑚+ 𝑛+ 𝑘 > 0, Λ(𝑚,𝑛, 𝑘) is positive definite.
Proof. In the following we omit the arguments (𝑚,𝑛, 𝑘) of the matrices Λ and ̃︀Λ as doing so causes
no confusion.
Rewrite ̃︀Λ in (4.210) by breaking up its upper-left and lower-right blocks as
̃︀Λ(𝑚,𝑛, 𝑘) =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2𝐷𝑚 2𝐽𝑚,𝑘 𝐽𝑚,𝑘 𝐽𝑚,𝑛
2𝐽𝑘,𝑚 2𝐷𝑘 𝐷𝑘 𝐽𝑘,𝑛
𝐽𝑘,𝑚 𝐷𝑘 2𝐷𝑘 2𝐽𝑘,𝑛




Now the blocks in the four corners of ̃︀Λ are identical to the corresponding blocks in Λ. The idea
is to permute the rows and columns of Λ in between the corner blocks symmetrically to obtaiñ︀Λ. Specifically, let 𝑃 be the (𝑚 + 2𝑘 + 𝑛) × (𝑚 + 2𝑘 + 𝑛) permutation matrix that leaves rows
1, . . . ,𝑚 and 𝑚 + 2𝑘 + 1, . . . ,𝑚 + 2𝑘 + 𝑛 intact and permutes rows 𝑚 + 1, . . . ,𝑚 + 2𝑘 according
to the permutation of the set {1, . . . , 2𝑘} (where element 𝑙 corresponds to row 𝑚+ 𝑙) as follows (in
Cauchy’s two-line notation):⎛⎝1 2 · · · 𝑖 𝑖+ 1 · · · 𝑘 − 1 𝑘 𝑘 + 1 𝑘 + 2 · · · 𝑗 𝑗 + 1 · · · 2𝑘 − 1 2𝑘
1 𝑘 + 1 · · · 𝑖 𝑘 + 𝑖 · · · 𝑘 − 1 2𝑘 − 1 2 𝑘 + 2 · · · 𝑗 − 𝑘 + 1 𝑗 + 1 · · · 𝑘 2𝑘
⎞⎠
(4.239)
where 𝑖 is any odd number between 1 and 𝑘− 1 and 𝑗 is any odd number between 𝑘+1 and 2𝑘− 1
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(all ends inclusive), for 𝑘 even, and
⎛⎜⎝1 2 · · · 𝑖 𝑖+1 · · · 𝑘−2 𝑘−1 𝑘 𝑘+1 𝑘+2 · · · 𝑗 𝑗+1 · · · 2𝑘−2 2𝑘−1 2𝑘
1 𝑘+2 · · · 𝑖 𝑘+𝑖+1 · · · 𝑘−2 2𝑘−1 𝑘 2 𝑘+3 · · · 𝑗−𝑘+1 𝑗+2 · · · 𝑘−1 2𝑘 𝑘+1
⎞⎟⎠
(4.240)
where 𝑖 is any odd number between 1 and 𝑘− 2 and 𝑗 is any even number between 𝑘+1 and 2𝑘− 2
(all ends inclusive), for 𝑘 odd. Then ̃︀Λ = 𝑃Λ𝑃T.
By Lemma 4.2, ̃︀Λ is positive definite. By Theorem 6C(V) in Strang (1980), there exists an
invertible matrix 𝑄 such that ̃︀Λ = 𝑄T𝑄 . Since 𝑃 is a permutation matrix, the matrix 𝑄(𝑃−1)T is
invertible. Therefore, again by Theorem 6C(V) in Strang (1980), (𝑄(𝑃−1)T)T𝑄(𝑃−1)T is positive
definite. But since ̃︀Λ = 𝑃Λ𝑃T,
(𝑄(𝑃−1)T)T𝑄(𝑃−1)T = 𝑃−1𝑄T𝑄(𝑃−1)T = 𝑃−1̃︀Λ(𝑃T)−1 = 𝑃−1𝑃Λ𝑃T(𝑃T)−1 = Λ (4.241)
implying Λ is positive definite.
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5 Conclusion
With extensive and interconnected supply chains, companies, regulators, and NGOs must account
for the structure of supply networks when working toward their social responsibility goals. I study
the effect of the structure of supply networks on social responsibility outcomes from three perspec-
tives.
In chapter 2 we examine the supply network of conflict minerals that consists of manufacturers,
smelters, and mines to understand the effects of legislative and NGO efforts to curb the use of
conflict sources. Each manufacturer and smelter makes its compliance and sourcing decisions,
together determining the equilibrium. We find that an important predictor of outcomes is the
“compliance-prone demand” in the network: the total demand of the manufacturers whose penalty
for noncompliance exceeds their cost of compliance. If the compliance-prone demand is below a
threshold, then there will be enough certified metal to go around. However, once the compliance-
prone demand exceeds the threshold, a shortage of certified metal will arise, forcing some compliant
manufacturers to use noncertified metal to make up for the shortage. The results imply that even
if policy-makers (NGOs and legislative bodies) imposed increasingly high noncompliance penalties
on a broader group of manufacturers, such penalties might not be sufficient to eliminate the use
of conflict sources. Once the compliance-prone demand reaches a threshold, further increases in
the compliance-prone demand will be countered with less than commensurate increases in certified
metal capacity, leading to shortages. We also show that when the certified metal is in shortage the
NGO should target the manufacturers whose noncompliance penalty, spread over the volume of the
metal they use, is high enough to justify paying the premium for certified metal.
Inspired by how a group of companies launched the Initial Audit Fund to finance the auditing of
smelters for conflict minerals, in chapter 3 we study the formation of an industrial alliance to fund a
social responsibility project that benefits a group of companies. We model the problem as a public
goods game that incorporates two features we observe of the Initial Audit Fund: an invitation stage
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when an initiating alliance can be formed, and the different brand values of the companies. We
conduct laboratory experiments to test the predictions of our model. Both our theoretical model and
experiments confirm that forming an initiating alliance is key to reaching overall high contribution.
While all initiating members of the Initial Audit Fund had high brand values, our results suggest
that a low-brand-value company can also start an alliance that will be equally effective in inducing
contribution. To increase the chances of forming an alliance the low-brand-value company should
approach some high-brand-value companies, who are more likely to agree to jointly initiate the
social responsibility project.
In chapter 4 we focus on a single buyer that dynamically audits a decentralized supply network
to assure social responsibility compliance. The buyer picks the suppliers to audit, and if an audit
uncovers a violation, decides on the remedial action taken: to rectify the noncompliant supplier or
to drop it along with its dependent suppliers. Our results show that oftentimes it is not optimal
for a buyer to exhaustively audit all suppliers. Strategic considerations direct the choice of the
suppliers to audit. Each of the two types of remedial action can be optimal depending on the
properties of the supply network, the stage in the auditing process, and the supplier audited. Our
results suggest that a buyer benefits by prioritizing auditing suppliers it is prepared to drop and
postponing auditing suppliers that it is willing to rectify. When focusing on an upstream tier the
buyer may want to first audit suppliers in more peripheral positions, which carry less weight in
the buyer’s profit from production activities. Companies may also benefit by auditing suppliers
in pivotal positions to gauge the viability of the network. Such a “litmus test” may even compel
the shutdown of an entire product line (a “kill mission”), a predicament some companies caught off
guard with a supplier violation had to undergo (e.g., Phillips 2016).
Supply networks create unique challenges for social responsibility efforts. This dissertation consti-
tutes a first step in understanding how the structure of supply networks affects social responsibility
outcomes through corporate and regulatory decisions. It provides frameworks for understanding
the implications of supply network structure on social responsibility from many more perspectives,
e.g., competition, visibility, and compliance certification.
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